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Three Essays on Idiosyncratic Volatility 
Anas Aboulamer Ph.D. 
Concordia University 2014 
 This thesis consists of three essays. The first essay (chapter two) examines the relationship 
between idiosyncratic volatility and future returns in the Canadian market. The negative relationship 
between realized idiosyncratic volatility (RIvol) and future returns uncovered by Ang et al. (2006) for 
the US market has been attributed to return reversals. For the Canadian market where return reversals 
have considerably less importance, we find that RIvol is positively related to future returns, even after 
controlling for risk loadings, illiquidity and reversals. Unlike the findings of Bali et al. (2011) for the 
US market, we find for the Canadian market that the relationship between extreme positive returns 
and future returns is positive and that idiosyncratic volatility is consistently positively related to future 
returns.  
 The second essay (chapter three) discusses the relationship between closed end fund discounts and 
the level of uncertainty about its holdings. Our trade-off model states that the intrinsic premium of a 
closed-end fund (CEF) is equal to the CEF’s price minus both its NAVPS (net asset value per share) 
and the net present value (NPV) of its future benefits from liquidity, managerial abilities and leverage 
minus its managerial costs. Any additional premium will persist to the extent that arbitrage between 
these two price series is both costly and risky. We find that arbitrage incompleteness due to the 
uncertainties about this NPV and the CEF’s holdings, as captured by idiosyncratic risk and other 
proxies, explains over two-thirds of the variation in CEF premiums or their changes. As expected, we 
find that the CEF premium is negatively related to gross leverage, management fees, cash and bond 
holdings, and positively related to liquidity enhancement, CEF performance and net leverage. These 
results are consistent with our finding that changes in CEF prices and NAVPS are more integrated 
than segmented using the  Kappa test of Kapadia and Pu (2012). 
 The third essay (chapter four) investigates the information content of idiosyncratic 
volatility around the public release of M&A rumors. We examine the releases of hand-
collected initial rumors about potential M&A for 2250 firms. Unlike previous research, we 
find that a strategy of investing in firms with rumors of lower (greater) credibility yields 
negative (positive) changes in idiosyncratic volatilities around the rumor dates and 
subsequent returns. We argue that this asymmetric effect on idiosyncratic volatilities is linked 
to asymmetric changes in the heterogeneity of the probabilities of actual M&A when 
conditioned on rumor credibility. Changes in idiosyncratic volatilities are positively related to 
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the market implicit probabilities of M&A as measured by the ratio of the market values at the 
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Following the seminal work of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) on the 
CAPM, many financial economists and practitioners maintain that only systematic risk is 
priced under the assumption that investors are rational and returns are mean-variance 
efficient. Subsequent asset pricing models also generally assume that idiosyncratic risk (Ivol) 
is not priced. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), among others, find that investors are not nearly 
as diversified as they should be.  If investors do not hold diversified portfolios, are they 
compensated for their exposure to Ivol? Various asset-pricing models for imperfect markets 
(e.g., Merton 1987) predict a positive relationship between the incremental risks from holding 
not fully diversified portfolios and expected returns. In turn, this implies that expected returns 
are positively related to Ivol.  In contrast, Ang et al. (2006, 2009) report a negative 
relationship between lagged Ivol and future returns. Since this finding is counter to 
expectations, it is dubbed the “idiosyncratic volatility puzzle”. The role of idiosyncratic 
volatility increased over the past decade to reflect the limitations of asset pricing models in 
explaining expected returns. In this thesis, we investigate the role of idiosyncratic volatility in 
financial markets.  
In the first essay (chapter 2), we investigate the relationship between Ivol and the future 
returns of individual stocks in the Canadian market. The use of the Canadian market is 
motivated by the evidence of much weaker return reversals in Canada than that documented 
in the US and the industrial composition of the Canadian market which differs markedly from 
that in the US. Our findings suggest that unlike the anomalous findings of Ang et al. (2006, 
2009), there is a positive relationship between Ivol and future returns. Our findings are 
analogous to the findings of Huang et al. (2010) who argue that after controlling for return 
reversals in the US, the negative relationship between Ivol and future returns disappears. Our 
findings are consistent with the theory and are robust to risk loadings, return reversals, 
skewness and illiquidity.  
We further investigate the relationship between extreme daily returns in a month with the 
future returns. Bali et al. (2011) uncover a negative relationship between extreme within-the-
month positive returns and future returns and conjecture that this relationship is what is 
mistakenly explained by Ang et al. (2006) as the Ivol effect. Bali et al. (2011) argue that 
investors distort their beliefs and overweight stocks with extreme lagged daily returns. We 
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hypothesize that this relationship might be a manifestation of the return reversion process in 
the US market. For the Canadian market, we find no sharp reversals in extreme returns. We 
find that the relationship between lagged Ivol and returns does not disappear after controlling 
for extreme positive returns in the prior months. Our results are confirmed using Fama-
MacBeth equally and value weighted two stage regressions and Brennan et al. (1998) two 
stage risk-adjusted regressions. 
In the second essay (chapter 3), we propose a tradeoff model that uses Ivol, among other 
variables, to explain the well documented anomalous negative closed end fund (CEF) 
premium. Many financial academics find the existence of this negative premium inconsistent 
with the market efficiency hypothesis (Cherkes 2012). The market efficiency hypothesis and 
the law of one price imply that the price of a share of the CEF and the CEF’s net asset value 
per share (NAVPS) should be equal in frictionless markets. We investigate this phenomenon 
from an arbitrageur’s perspective and we provide evidence that at least a significant portion 
of the gap of a CEF’s price from its fundamental value is due to limits to arbitrage. It reflects 
the compensation that an arbitrageur would require for the hedgeable and non-hedgeable 
risks arising from the fund’s portfolio composition and its uncertainty. Using the 
idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol) of the net position return obtained from a long/short position in 
the CEF price and its NAVPS, we identify a significant relationship between CEF premiums 
and Ivol differences only when the fund has positive returns in the previous period.  
Our tradeoff model relates the benefits from holding the fund which the literature 
identifies as enhanced liquidity, managerial abilities and leverage, to costs such as 
management fees. The difference between the liquidities of the CEF and its holdings capture 
the liquidity benefit, Jensen’s alpha captures managerial ability benefits and the ratio of non-
common equity to assets (less the cash-to-asset ratio) captures the gross (net) leverage 
benefit. Our findings support the hypotheses that state that CEF premiums are positively 
related to these benefits (net but not gross leverage) and negatively related to management 
fees. We find that the premium not captured by our model is related to the unhedged 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk exposures associated with the net position from risk 
arbitrage between the CEF and its equivalent NAVPS. For the other proxies for the 
uncertainty of holdings, we find that CEF premiums are related negatively to idiosyncratic 
skewness but not related to options holdings.  
The third essay (chapter 4) investigates the information content of idiosyncratic volatility 
3 
 
around the release of rumors of M&A. Unlike earnings announcements, merger and 
acquisition (M&A) announcements are less frequent and more unpredictable events with a 
considerable impact on stock prices, especially for the acquired firms. Thus, being able to 
assess the credibility of rumors about potential M&As could be profitable. Under a rational 
expectations model with normally distributed returns, the absolute expected return 
conditional on the sign of the return increases with return volatility. All else equal, a 
(positive) negative relationship is expected between return volatilities and expected returns 
conditional on (good) bad news (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987). Around M&A rumor dates, 
buyers (sellers) of the potential targets over-weight (under-weight) the probabilities of 
subsequent M&A announcements and/or their values.  
Consequently, buying rumored target firms does not always lead to a negative 
performance, as previously documented (Gao and Oler 2012; Zivney et al. 1997). Target firm 
performance after an M&A rumor depends on its credibility. We use a proprietary hand-
collected database from different sources and with different characteristics to test the level of 
the credibility of types of M&A rumors. We find that good (bad) quality rumors lead to a 
positive (negative) performance. We also find that daily changes in idiosyncratic volatilities 
around initial rumor dates are positively related to the performance of the target firm after the 
rumor release date.  
If the M&A rumors are from more credible sources, then the increased trading for the 
target firms leads to increased Ivol. If rumors increase expectations that actual M&A 
announcements will subsequently follow, this should lead to increased prices for the targets. 
If rumors lack credibility, market participants may diverge in their expectations about future 
M&A announcements, leading to increased idiosyncratic volatilities and possibly decreased 
target prices. We find that idiosyncratic volatilities are positively (negatively) related to the 
performances of the target firms for more- (less-) credible M&A rumors. This relationship is 
further supported by the finding that idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to the 
market-implied probability of a M&A using the run-up to markup price ratio as discussed in 
Betton et al. (2014). This relationship is robust to various firm-specific controls (such as size, 
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2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 Following the seminal work of Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965) and Black (1972) on the 
CAPM, many financial economists and practitioners maintain that only systematic risk is 
priced under the assumption that investors are rational and returns are mean-variance 
efficient. Subsequent asset pricing models also generally assume that idiosyncratic risk (Ivol) 
is not priced. Goetzmann and Kumar (2008), among others, find that investors are not nearly 
as diversified as they should be.  If investors do not hold diversified portfolios, are they 
compensated for their exposure to Ivol?  
 Various asset-pricing models for imperfect markets (e.g., Merton, 1987) predict a positive 
relationship between the incremental risks from holding not fully diversified portfolios and 
expected returns. In turn, this implies that expected returns are positively related to Ivol.  
However, empirical results on the nature of this relationship are mixed and range from a 
significant negative to no to a significant positive relationship. Furthermore, the empirical 
evidence on whether or not there is a trend in Ivol varies from upwards at least during the 
1990’s in Campbell et al. (2001) to no time trend but rather episodic phenomena associated 
partially with retail investors in Brandt et al. (2010).  
 Many studies explain the results of Ang et al. (2006, 2009) that realized Ivol  (RIvol) and 
future returns are negatively related due to return reversals (Huang et al. 2010; Fu 2009). 
These studies argue that the negative relationship disappears after controlling for the prior 
month’s return. Venezia et al. (2011) show that investor-herding, Granger-causes RIvol, 
which leads to lower returns in subsequent periods. The over- and under-reaction of investors 
in some markets is a well-documented phenomenon that has received much interest from 
practitioners and academics.  Academic interest for the U.S. market include studies by De 
Bondt and Thaler (1985, 1987) who find overreaction over periods of a few years, Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993, 2001) who find under-reaction over periods of a few months, and 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Lehmann (1990) who find overreaction over periods of between one 
week and a month. A large number of investors follow contrarian and momentum strategies 
in the US (Goetzmann and Massa 2002) that can lead to risk-adjusted excess returns when 
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investors overreact or underreact to news, respectively (Eggins and Hill 2010). Grinblatt et 
al. (1995) find that over three-quarters of their mutual fund sample engage in momentum 
investing. The pervasiveness of longer-term momentum and shorter-term contrarian trading 
rules (e.g. 6-12 and one month respectively) is demonstrated by the so-called 'quant 
meltdown' of August 2007, when a large number of quantitative managers using such 
strategies experienced significant losses (Khandania and Lob 2007).  
 Herein, we examine the relationship between RIvol and future returns for a non-US 
(Canadian) market where there is evidence of considerably weaker return reversals than those 
documented in the US. Assoe and Sy (2003) find that the returns of a contrarian strategy 
consisting of buying (selling) low (high) return stocks are driven by small stocks and January 
effects.  Using a longer non-overlapping period with a minimum of 12 months, Kryzanowski 
and Zhang (1992) find that a contrarian strategy does not yield positive and significant 
returns as was found in the US.   
 The industrial composition of the Canadian market differs markedly from that in the US. 
According to the TSX group, the Canadian market is the global leader in both the mining and 
oil & gas sectors. It has the highest market capitalization of mining stocks in the world with a 
total market capitalization of 6.9 Billion Canadian dollars where the combined capitalization 
of both the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) and NYSE for this sector is 5.7 Billion 
Canadian dollars. The Canadian market is the leading global market for the number of mining 
companies with a total of 1,618 listed mining companies followed by the ASE with 782.
1
 The 
Canadian market is also the leader in oil & gas listings with 369 such listings which is more 
than the combined total for both the ASX and NYSE. Furthermore, Boyer and Fillion (2006) 
report that commodity prices are more important than the domestic Canadian exchange rate 
and interest rates in explaining the overall performance of the Canadian stock market.   
 Our results are interestingly different for the Canadian versus the US market. First, we are 
unable to confirm for the Canadian market the negative relationship between RIvol and 
subsequent returns documented by Ang et al. for the US market. While Ang et al. (2009) 
included Canada in their international sample, they only included firms available in 
DataStream. In contrast, our sample is more inclusive since it includes all firms that have 
ever been listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX). Using quintiles and deciles based on 
                                                             






different measures of RIvol  (with and without adjustments for serial correlation) we find that 
the differences between the value-weighted (VW) portfolios based on high and low lagged 
RIvol tend to have positive and statistically significant returns, even after controlling for size, 
risk loadings, short- and long-term return reversals, return skewness and illiquidity. 
 Bali et al. (2011) for the U.S. market and Annaert et al. (2013) for the European market 
find that portfolios formed based on lagged extreme returns yield a statistically negative 
performance in the following month due to sharp return reversals. We find that the absence of 
such return reversals in the Canadian market changes their findings of a negative relationship 
between returns and RIvol to a positive one that is robust to the inclusion of extreme returns. 
Using both double-sorted portfolios to control for the effect of extreme returns on RIvol and 
cross-sectional regressions, we find that the estimated coefficients for RIvol are consistently 
positive and statistically significant. 
 Thus, this essay makes three contributions to the literature of Ivol. The first is to use an 
alternative market to test if the sign of the negative relationship between RIvol and future 
returns changes when one moves from the U.S. to the Canadian market. Our findings confirm 
the theoretical expectation of a positive relationship between RIvol and expected returns 
(Merton 1987) in a market characterized by the relative absence of short-term return 
reversals. Thus, our findings may provide an alternative confirmation of the return-reversal 
explanation for the puzzling results of Ang et al. (2006, 2009). Huang et al. (2010) explain 
that studies supporting the negative relationship between RIvol are omitting lagged returns to 
account for the negative first-order autocorrelation in monthly returns. In a weak to non-
existent return reversal market, the relationship between lagged RIvol and returns should be 
positive. We confirm these findings in the Canadian market and show a positive relationship 
between lagged RIvol and monthly returns. 
 Our second contribution relates to the relationship between extreme returns and future 
returns in the Canadian market. Bali et al. (2011) and Annaret et al. (2013) report that stocks 
with extreme positive returns tend to decline in price in the following month leading to 
negative returns. The argument of these studies is focused on the behavioral explanation that 
investors chose to distort their beliefs about future probabilities and overweight stocks with 
small probabilities of large returns (i.e., lottery-like stocks). Conversely, we find that a 
strategy consisting of a long (short) position in lagged high (low) daily extreme positive 
returns yield a positive and significant return. The behavioral explanation proposed by Bali et 
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al. (2011) is based on the anchoring hypothesis where investors change their subjective 
reference point to form their expectations. According to Shiller (1999), if people are not 
independent of each other in forming overconfident judgments about investments, and if 
these judgments change collectively through time, then these “noisy" judgments will tend to 
cause prices of some assets to deviate from their true investment value. In such a setting, 
investing in assets that are currently out of favor and shorting the highly sought after assets 
by most investors should be advantageous. There is evidence that such contrarian investment 
strategies do pay off in the US (De Bondt and Thaler 1985; Fama and French 1992; 
Lakonishok et al. 1994) as smart money does not eliminate these opportunities in the US 
market (Shleifer and Vishny 1997, amongst others). In contrast to the US market, 
Kryzanowski and Zhang (1992) and ourselves in this study provide evidence that a contrarian 
strategy does not yield positive returns in the Canadian market. 
 Our third contribution is to provide an alternative explanation to the relationship between 
RIvol, future returns and extreme returns. By isolating the interaction effect of extreme 
returns on RIvol, we are able to assess the relationship between the two. Our findings suggest 
that highly extreme returns and RIvol have opposite effects on future monthly returns. The 
theory inspired positive relationship between RIvol and future returns is consistently positive 
and significant, where stocks in the highest extreme return decile tend to have a negative 
effect on future returns even after controlling for possible return reversals. These results show 
that when some (mostly small) stocks are subject to the negative relationship outlined in Bali 
et al. (2011), this relationship is not sufficiently strong to affect the whole market.  
 The remainder of this essay is organized in eight sections. Section 2.2 discusses the so-
called idiosyncratic volatility puzzle. Section 2.3 addresses our dataset, the formation of 
Fama-French factors for the Canadian market and the continuation behavior of the Canadian 
market. Section 2.4 describes the different measures of realized idiosyncratic volatilities 
(RIvol) and extreme returns for individual stocks used herein. Sections 2.5 and 2.6 report and 
discuss the results for tests of the relationship between returns and RIvol and extreme returns 
based on the portfolio approach. Section 2.7 reports and discusses the results of time series 
cross sectional regressions of returns on different measures of RIvol and extreme returns. 
Section 2.8 provides a robustness check of the relationship between EGARCH estimated Ivol 




2.2. THE IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY PUZZLE  
 Modern financial theory has long stressed the idea that only systematic risk is priced, and 
that unsystematic risk should be compensated positively by the market if it is priced. 
Consistent with the theoretical models for imperfect markets (e.g., Mao 1971; Levy 1978; 
Kryzanowski and To 1982; Merton 1987),
2
 various authors report that the cross-sectional 
variations in expected returns are positively related to contemporaneous RIvol.
3
 Goyal and 
Santa Clara (2003) find a positive and significant difference in returns between high and low 
RIvol portfolios. In contrast, Ang et al. (2006) report a negative relationship between lagged 
RIvol and future returns for value-weighted portfolios based on sorts of the previous month’s 
RIvol. Since this finding is identified in other markets (e.g., Ang et al. 2009 for the G7 
countries) and is counter to expectations, it is dubbed the “idiosyncratic volatility puzzle”. 
Guo and Savikas (2008) find that the value-weighted RIvol and aggregate stock market 
volatility jointly exhibit strong predictive power for excess stock market returns.  
 The near consensus that a positive relationship exists between contemporaneous RIvol and 
returns (e.g., Fu 2009; Duffee 1995) is expected since monthly returns are the sum of the 
returns used to calculate RIvol. However, the diversion of opinions is mainly focused on 
studies that assume that RIvolt-1 is a good proxy for E(RIvolt). However, the value of RIvolt-1 
depends upon the choice of interval over which it is measured, the frequency of returns used 
and whether it is based on (non-) overlapping periods. The most widely used method is 
within-month, where RIvolt-1 is the standard deviation of the error terms from the regression 
of the daily returns on different factors for that month. Its major drawback is its inability to 
provide a forecast unless the lagged value is an unbiased expectation of its future value.  
 When Fu (2009) uses the best fit from nine estimated EGARCH models as an alternative 
measure to using RIvolt-1 as a forecast for EIvolt, he finds a positive contemporaneous 
relationship between future returns and the EIvol estimate after controlling for size and 
liquidity. Guo et al. (2014) argue that these results arise from a spurious correlation caused 
by the use of the return of month t in the EIvol estimates. Fink et al. (2012) test various 
methodologies for estimating EIvol and conclude that no contemporaneous relationship exists 
between EIvol estimates and contemporaneous stock returns after controlling for return 
reversals and the spurious relationship in the EIvol estimates caused by look-ahead bias. 
Brockman et al. (2009) find a positive relation between stock returns and conditional 
(EGARCH) EIvol for international data. Chua et al. (2010) propose another EIvol measure 
                                                             
2 Kryzanowski and To (1982) compare and reconcile the Mao and Levy models and propose a clinical model. 
3 Examples include Tinic and West (1986), Lehmann (1990) and Spiegel and Wang (2005). 
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which uses the forecasts from modeling RIvol as an AR(2) model to forecast expected Ivol 
and the difference between these forecasts and the actual RIvol as the unexpected Ivol. They 
find that returns are significantly and positively related to both expected and unexpected Ivol.  
 Regardless of the methodology used to estimate future Ivol, various arguments are 
advanced in the literature to refute the existence of this negative relationship. After re-
examining the portfolio methodology adopted by Goyal and Santa Clara (2003) using 
weighted averages, Bali et al. (2005) conclude that the negative relationship is due to small 
firm effects. Similarly, Bali and Cakici (2008) find that the findings of Ang et al. (2006) are 
sensitive to the methodology used to calculate RIvol (monthly versus daily), portfolio 
weightings (equally versus value weighted) and breakpoints (CRSP versus NYSE).  
 Boehme et al. (2009) connect the findings of Merton (1987) and Miller (1977) by 
differentiating between the dispersion of beliefs, high-level volatility according to Diether et 
al. (2002), and short sale constraints.  Boehme et al. (2009) conjecture that these two 
confounding events influence the estimated relationship between expected returns and lagged 
RIvol. When they condition on visibility and the level of short interest, they find that lagged 
RIvol is positively related to expected returns for stocks that have a limited level of investor 
recognition and limited short selling.
4
 Brav et al. (2010) empirically investigate the relation 
between limits of arbitrage, particularly RIvol, and stock return anomalies. They find that 
RIvol is associated with overvaluation anomalies, such as portfolios of small growth stocks 
and 6-months loser stocks, but not undervaluation anomalies, such as value stocks and 6-
months winner stocks.  
 Some studies explain any negative relationship between Ivol and returns as being due to 
return reversals.  Cao and Xu (2010) argue that return reversals are a byproduct of 
overpricing. While investors expect a positive return from Ivol due to their holdings of not 
fully diversified portfolios, limitations to arbitrage (Shleifer and Vishny 1997) and short-
selling constraints lead to stock overpricing (Miller 1977; Jones and Lamont 2002). Together, 
they result in the low returns on the difference between high and low RIvol portfolios 
documented by Ang et al. (2006, 2009). Huang et al. (2010) also argue that sharp reversals of 
returns for stocks with extreme returns lead to a negative relationship between RIvol and 
                                                             
4 RIvol  is measured as the ratio of the standard deviations of the weekly returns for the firm and the CRSP 






 They argue that the negative relation between RIvol and future stock returns 
identified in Ang et al. (2006) is non-monotonic and driven mostly by the highest RIvol 
portfolio.  
 
2.3. SAMPLE, DATA AND FACTORS 
 The data used herein are drawn primarily from the CFMRC database, which contains daily 
(monthly) data on all the stocks listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange (TSX) since January 
1975 (1950). The database is survivorship-bias free and comprehensive because it contains 
delisted companies. Until the end of 2012, this covers 9570 trade days for 5787 companies. 
Risk-free rates are collected from the Bank of Canada website.  
 Since the Fama-French and momentum factors are not available daily for Canada, we 
construct the SMB and HML factors as in Fama and French (1992, 1993), and the momentum 
(WML) factor using the methodology outlined on the website of Kenneth French.
6
 The 
databases used to obtain (or cross check) the book values used to calculate the HML factor in 
decreasing order of priority are the Financial Post database, Compustat (Canadian edition), 
Mergent Online, Stockguide (especially for defunct and delisted firms) and Capital IQ. 
 
2.4. RETURN BEHAVIOR OF CANADIAN STOCKS: SHORT-TERM 
CONTINUATIONS OR REVERSALS? 
 As noted earlier, Huang et al. (2010) and Fu (2009) attribute the negative relation between 
Ivol and future returns found by Ang et al. (2006, 2009) to short-term return reversals in the 
U.S. market. Thus, we begin by examining if the Canadian market is characterized by short-
term return reversals. As such, we revisit the findings of Assoe and Sy (2003) who find that 
the positive performance of a contrarian strategy in the Canadian market is driven by small 
stocks and the January effect over the time period (1964-1998). After forming decile 
portfolios of stocks based on each stock’s monthly return ranking, we follow their procedure 
of tracking the performance of these deciles over the following month. We replicate their 
                                                             
5 They also find that a significant positive relationship between EIvol and returns persists after controlling for 




formation and test procedure first for the whole sample and then for large and small stock 
subsamples based on each stock’s median market value in the portfolio formation month.  
 Table 2.1 reports the results for all the deciles formed based on value and equal weightings 
of its constituent stocks. Consistent with Assoe and Sy (2003), we observe that the positive 
returns from a contrarian strategy as reported in the “10 – 1” row is driven by small stocks. 
The small stock sample shows very sharp return reversals that cannot be found in large 
stocks. The negative returns of the all stocks sample when equally weighted are due to the 
overweighting of small stocks. In untabulated results, we also examine the returns from 
longer term contrarian investment strategies for non-overlapping investment horizons of 12 to 
60 months. We consistently find that portfolios formed from the highest 10% (decile) of 
market-adjusted returns (winners) outperform those formed from the lowest 10% (decile) of 
market-adjusted returns (losers) confirming the results found earlier by Kryzanowski and 
Zhang (1992). All of these results are robust to an examination of the CAPM and Carhart 4-
factor alphas for these decile portfolios.  
[Please place table 2.1 about here.] 
 
2.5. RELATION BETWEEN RIVOL AND FUTURE PORTFOLIO RETURNS 
 Most of the literature on volatility distinguishes between the days-within-the-month RIvol 
and EIvol measures that use a form of conditional forecasting of volatility such as GARCH or 
ARCH. We have two justifications for beginning our investigation with RIvol. First, we 
initially are interested in RIvol pricing in the Canadian market using the same methodology 
outlined in Huang et al. (2010) and Ang et al. (2006), amongst others. Second, we are 
interested in the time-series characteristics of RIvol and its forecasting abilities for expected 
returns, as shown by Fu (2009), amongst others.  
2.5.1 RIVOL Measures 
 To obtain RIvol, we first estimate the following Carhart (1997) model for the excess return 
     for each stock i for each of the days d in month t:   
                                           (2.1) 
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Where      is the excess return of the market portfolio,       and       are the two 
additional Fama-French factors,      is the momentum factor,
 
and     is the error term.
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 The standard deviation of the error terms at a monthly frequency is obtained by 
multiplying the within-month daily standard deviation  (    ) by the square root of the 
number of trading days in the month (T): 
           √∑     
  
      only for T ≥ 15 days (2.2) 
 We also obtain a RIvol adjusted for daily autocorrelations as in Goyal and Santa Clara 
(2003). We first use the approach developed by French et al. (1987) to obtain the variance of 
stock i for month t given by: 
       ∑    
  ∑                     (2.3) 
Decomposing      into its systematic and non-systematic components yields: 
      ∑   
      
      
   ∑                   
    
                 
 ∑        
                     ⏟         
          
 ∑     
    ∑                    ⏟         
            
  (2.4) 
where   is the factor loading of stock i on factor f , and      is the return of factor f  in day    
within month t. The first term of (2.4) is the stock’s systematic risk adjusted for the inter-
month autocorrelation of the factor returns and the second term is the unsystematic risk 
similarly adjusted. Hence, the daily adjusted RIvol becomes:  
          
   
 √∑      
  
     ∑            
 
      (2.5) 
where all the terms are as defined earlier.  
 Descriptive statistics for both RIvol measures are reported in table 2.2, where the total 
number of firm months in the pooled sample is 325,648. The average number of within-
month days used in the calculation of RIvol is 20.2, and about 75% of the RIvol values are 
based on at least 20 daily returns. The mean and median RIvol are 14.59% and 11.14%, 
respectively, and the mean and median-adjusted RIvol are higher at 16.94% and 11.95%, 
                                                             
7 The construction of the daily factors are discussed in section 2.3. 
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respectively.  The average (particularly, adjusted) RIvol is very close to the average RIvol of 
16.87% found by Fu (2009) for the US for the period 1963 to 2006. 
[Please place table 2.2 about here.] 
 The time-series properties of the RIvol series provide insight into the ability of this 
variable to predict stock returns. Based on the last column of table 2.2, we find that the 
autocorrelations of the unadjusted RIvol persist across stocks for at least 12 lags. The first-
order autocorrelation of 0.244 is highly significant and higher orders decay slowly. The 
magnitudes of the autocorrelation coefficients imply a high level of dependency in the time 
series. Fu (2009) reports similar results for US data. To further investigate the process 
generating the RIvols, we calculate the first differences in the natural log of the RIvol and re-
estimate the autocorrelation coefficients for the same lags for both measures of RIvol. From 
the third and fourth rows of table 2.2, we observe that these new series have an average first-
order autocorrelation coefficient of -0.36 and -0.39 for the natural log of the first-order 
differenced RIvol and adjusted RIvol, respectively. The magnitude of the average 
autocorrelation drops more than 90% from the first to the second order, which implies that 
the natural log of first differenced RIvol becomes an MA (1). We also perform a unit root test 
for the RIvol series for the individual stocks using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. We are 
able to reject the existence of a unit root for about 70% of the stocks that have at least 30 
monthly observations.  
 Although Ang et al. (2006) implicitly assume that the time-series of idiosyncratic 
volatilities can be approximated by a random walk, Fu (2009) argues that the implications of 
their results are associated more with a non-random walk series since they form their 
portfolios based on RIvol lagged one month. The implication is that temporal dependency in 
the RIvol series is important when predicting the expected return for the following period. If 
RIvol t-1 is positively related to RIvolt and the relationship between contemporaneous RIvol 
and returns is positive as Fu finds, then the relationship between lagged RIvol and returns 
should be positive and not negative as found by Ang et al. (2006).  
 We further test the autocorrelation characteristics of our RIvol measures for various 
subsamples of large and small stocks delineated by the median market values in a given 
month, and of short- and long-term winners and losers to reflect the expected impact of return 
reversals on the estimated relation between RIvol and returns. As discussed in Fu (2009), 
Huang et al. (2010) and Li (2013), return reversals are responsible for changing the 
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relationship between RIvol and returns from positive to negative. Like the undifferentiated 
sample, all of these subsamples exhibit a positive (not negative) and statistically significant 
autocorrelation in their first lags and a slow decay in subsequent lags.
8
  
2.5.2 Relation between Portfolio Returns and their Lagged RIvol 
 We begin this section by examining the return performances of ten (decile) portfolios 
based on their one-month lagged RIvol as measured by either equation (2.2) or (2.5). Based 
on the results reported in table 2.3, we find that the returns of the value-weighted portfolios 
monotonically increase with increasing values of lagged RIvol, and that this observation 
persists when the sample is split into small and big stocks. A strategy consisting of buying 
high RIvol stocks and shorting low RIvol stocks yields statistically significant returns over the 
subsequent month of 2.87%, 1.78% and 2.88% for the full sample, and the subsamples of 
only big and only small stocks, respectively. However, when the portfolios are formed using 
equal weights, the significantly positive long/short returns become statistically insignificant 
and negative. These findings are robust to an examination of portfolios based on the adjusted 
RIvol. For example, the average return on the long/short value-weighted portfolio based on 
the lagged adjusted RIvol is 2.34%, 1.52% and 1.89% for the full sample, and the big and 
small firm subsamples, respectively.  
[Please place table 2.3 about here.] 
 However, the long/short position is not risk free since its constituent decile portfolios hold 
different stocks. To adjust for their different exposures to systematic risks, we examine the 
alpha estimates after running the difference between the returns of high and low RIvol decile 
portfolios first against the market portfolio and then against the four factors in the Carhart 
model. Based on the results reported in table 2.3 for the ten value-weighted decile portfolios, 
the long/short position yields CAPM and Carhart-adjusted alphas of 1.40% and 1.18% for the 
whole sample, 0.65% and 0.49% for big stocks and 1.01% and 0.82% for small stocks, 
respectively. In contrast, all alphas are negative for the corresponding equally weighted 
decile portfolios. This implies that overweighting small stocks increases the risk profile of 
these portfolios and leads to a negative risk-adjusted performance.   
 We now control for factor loadings, return reversals, momentum, skewness and illiquidity 
by first sorting the samples on each of these controls and then lagged RIvol to form 100 (i.e., 
                                                             
8 Autocorrelation results for the subsamples are available from the authors. 
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10 x 10) value and equally weighted portfolios. Table 2.4 reports the results for the value 
weighted portfolios. Factor loadings are the sensitivities of the individual stock returns to the 
Market, SMB, and HML factors using daily returns over the prior month. Return reversal 
(short term) is the return of a stock over the prior month, and momentum (long term) is the 
cumulative monthly return over the period t-11 to t-2 to capture the argument of Li (2013) 
that reversals could be long or short term. Skewness is used to capture one aspect of lottery-
like stocks which are defined as low priced stocks with high idiosyncratic volatility and 
skewness (Kumar 2009).  The last control variable is the Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure.  
[Please place table 2.4 about here.] 
 Instead of reporting the results for all of the 100 value-weighted portfolios in table 4 for 
each control, we report the returns of the 10 portfolios sorted according to lagged RIvol for 
firms with their intersection with the highest and the lowest control variable deciles. All the 
value weighted portfolios show that a long (short) position in the portfolio with the highest 
(lowest) lagged RIvol decile yields a positive raw return that is statistically significant after 
controlling for risk loadings, return reversals, momentum, skewness and illiquidity.  The risk-
adjusted alphas using the CAPM model or the 4-factor Carhart model confirm the positive 
performances of the portfolios after accounting for the controls, with statistical significance 
for 11 and 9 out of 14 for the CAPM and 4-factor models, respectively.    
 The results for the equally weighted double-sorted lagged RIvol portfolios are reported in 
table 2.5. The returns are statistically significant for portfolios that control for high reversals, 
high momentums and low skewness where the raw returns are positive for the first two 
controls and negative for the third. The same 10 out of 14 risk-adjusted returns are significant 
for each factor model, and all of the significant risk-adjusted returns are negative. Since these 
results are somewhat similar to those of Bali and Cakici (2008), they are consistent with their 
conjecture that the contradictory results reported in Ang et al. (2006) are not robust to 
weighting schemes. Bali and Cakici (2008) find that changing the weighting scheme from 
equal to value weighted changes the results and using the breakpoints from all CRSP versus 
the breakpoints from NYSE only cancels out the negative relationship documented in Ang et 
al. (2006).  




2.6. IS THE RELATION BETWEEN RIVOL AND FUTURE RETURNS ROBUST TO 
THE INCLUSION OF EXTREME POSITIVE RETURNS? 
2.6.1 Literature 
 Bali et al. (2011) conclude that the relationship between RIvol and future returns dissipates 
after controlling for extreme positive returns in the prior month. They argue that the highest 
daily positive return in the lagged month (MAX) explains future cross-sectional returns. They 
explain this finding based on the cumulative prospect theory (Tversky and Kahneman 1992) 
where investors overweight assets with a small probability of a large positive return. Kumar 
(2009) shows that certain groups of individual investors appear to exhibit a preference for 
lottery-type stocks defined as low-priced stocks with high idiosyncratic volatilities and 
skewnesses.  
 Bali et al. (2011) sort US stocks using daily extreme positive returns into different deciles, 
and then calculate their market-weighted returns in the subsequent months. They find that a 
strategy consisting of buying (selling) stocks with the highest (lowest) extreme daily positive 
returns yields a negative risk-adjusted alpha return of -1.18%. The authors argue that the 
robust negative relationship between MAX and cross-sectional returns is not analogous to the 
negative relationship uncovered by Ang et al. (2006, 2009). Bali et al. (2011) acknowledge 
that RIvol and MAX are correlated by design since RIvol is based on the squared residuals of 
the excess returns. Hence, if MAX captures market-participant overreaction, it would lead to 
an increase in RIvol. Hence, Bali et al. (2011) conclude that idiosyncratic volatility is not 
priced in the US market and that the negative relationship uncovered by Ang et al. (2006, 
2009) is just a proxy for MAX. Bali et al. (2011) explicitly argue that under diversified 
investors holding a high level of RIvol should be compensated positively.  Annaert et al. 
(2013) report similar results for the European markets over a period of 30 years. They also 
argue that stocks with high returns tend to be overpriced leading to subsequently lower 
returns.  
 In order to put the explanation put forward by Bali et al. (2011) into perspective, we use a 
simple example to illustrate it. Let us assume that we have two stocks “A” and “B” with the 
same expected return and standard deviation. Unlike stock “B”, stock “A” experiences one 
day with an extreme positive return. A long (short) position in stock “B” (stock “A”) would 
yield a positive risk adjusted return. The authors argue that this result is robust to skewness in 
both of its forms (systematic and idiosyncratic). Hence, few extreme movements in the right 
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tail of the daily return distribution would lead to a future low expected return. If these 
movements are part of the risk profile of the stock, they would be part of the second or third 
moments of the stock distribution.  There should be a direct link between RIvol and MAX, if 
extreme values have enough weight to impact the risk profile of the stock.  
 Behavioral finance might provide some insight into explaining this phenomenon. Two of 
the most prominent concepts in behavioral finance are anchoring and mental 
compartmentalizing.  Shiller (1999) explains that the anchoring and framing phenomena are 
human tendencies to place particular events into mental compartments based on superficial 
attributes. Instead of looking at the big picture, as would be implied by expected utility 
theory, individuals look at individual small decisions separately. Hence, individuals may tend 
to place their investments into arbitrarily separate mental compartments, and react separately 
to the investments based on which compartment they are in. Shefrin and Statman (1994) 
argue that individual investors think naturally in terms of having a "safe" part of their 
portfolio that is protected from downside risk and a risky part that is designed for a chance of 
getting rich. Consequently, investors would tend to react differently towards extreme 
movements. In turn, this could subsequently affect future returns. 
 Given the evidence of the various differences between the Canadian and US markets, we 
further analyze the relationship between the RIvol and future returns after controlling for 
extreme returns.  Thus, in the remainder of this section, we first test if there is a relation 
between extreme returns and future returns, and then test if the positive relationship between 
RIvol and future returns identified earlier persists after controlling for extreme returns. Before 
doing so, we examine the time-series of extreme returns in the Canadian market. 
2.6.2 Persistence in Extreme Returns 
 We examine the level of persistence in extreme positive returns by calculating a transition 
matrix that reports the probabilities of movement between deciles from one month to the 
next. Based on table 2.6, we find that a stock in the highest MAX decile in month t has a 
36.28% probability of remaining there in month t+1, and a 70.24% probability of being in 
one of the highest 3 deciles in month t+1. Similarly, a stock in the lowest decile in month t 
has a 41.33% probability of remaining there in month t+1, and a 76.5% probability of being 
in one of the lowest 3 deciles in month t+1.  
[Please place table 2.6 about here.]  
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 To assess if persistence is exclusive to the MAX series, we calculate the transition matrices 
for two more measures of extreme returns; namely, MIN and MAXDEV. MINi,t is defined as 
the minimum daily return in the month multiplied by -1 (i.e., MINi,t=-min(rd,t) where rd,t are 
the daily returns for a certain stock i in month t). We multiply the minimum by -1 to allow us 
to compare the effect of extreme returns (positive or negative) regardless of the sign.  
MAXDEV is the difference between the daily maximum and minimum returns during the 
month where the latter is not multiplied by -1. Like MAX, the MIN and MAXDEV series 
exhibit persistence from one month to another. To illustrate, the transition matrix for MIN 
reported in table 2.6 shows that a stock in the highest decile (the highest of the lowest 
returns) has a 41.28% chance of being in the same decile in the following month and a 
75.36% probability of being in one of the lowest 3 deciles in the following month. Similarly, 
a stock in the lowest decile (the lowest of the lowest) has a 41.96% probability of being in the 
same decile in the following month and a 77.65% probability of being in one of the highest 
three deciles in the next month. These results imply that extreme-value variables do not 
follow a random walk and might contain information about future returns. These results 
further support our previous findings against return reversals in the Canadian market.  
 To examine the level of time-series predictability for each of these series, we calculate the 
autocorrelations for lags of 1 to 12 months for MAX, MIN and MAXDEV for all of the stocks 
in our sample. Similar to the time series properties of RIvol, we observe a considerable level 
of persistence in the autocorrelations of the MAX, MIN and MAXDEV series. The first-order 
cross-sectional autocorrelations of 0.14, 0.19 and 0.21 for MAX, MIN and MAXDEV, 
respectively, are highly significant and decay slowly with higher orders. The magnitudes of 
the autocorrelation coefficients imply a high level of dependency in the time series for each 
extreme-return measure.   
 We also perform a unit root test for the MAX, MIN and MAXDEV series for individual 
stocks using the Augmented Dickey Fuller test. We are able to reject the existence of a unit 
root in 86.9%, 77.88% and 74.63% of the cases for respectively the MAX, MIN and MAXDEV 
series of the stocks that have at least 30 monthly observations. The average autocorrelations 
coefficients are 0.74, 0.81 and 0.8264 for MAX, MIN and MAXDEV respectively. These 
results are very similar to our findings for RIvol. At this point, we conclude that extreme 
returns do not follow a random walk as they exhibit a considerable level of persistence.  
2.6.3 Relation between Portfolio and Extreme Returns 
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2.6.3.1 Single extreme-return sorts 
 Based on the findings reported above, we expect that hedge portfolios (long high / short 
low) formed based on the extreme return deciles will yield positive returns for both MAX and 
MIN. To test this expectation, we examine hedge portfolios formed from the same samples as 
we examined earlier (all, big and small stocks).  
 We report the results for the ten deciles formed from the whole sample based on MAX, 
MIN and MAXDEV for the full, big and small stock samples in table 2.7. Consistent with 
expectations, we observe that returns and their risk-adjusted counterparts for all value 
weighted hedge portfolios are positive and statistically significant when sorted using MAX, 
MIN and MAXDEV. These results are consistent with the expectation that the relationship 
between extreme returns and future returns is different in the Canadian versus the US market.  
[Please place table 2.7 about here.] 
2.6.3.2 Extreme returns portfolios based on double sorts 
 To isolate the possible effect of return reversals from the performance of the extreme 
return hedge portfolio, we form portfolios for stocks with the highest and lowest lagged 
monthly returns. The columns labeled “high” and “low” in table 2.8 report the returns of 
portfolios of stocks with the highest and lowest lagged monthly returns. Stocks with high 
positive extreme returns do not necessarily have positive monthly returns. A positive return 
jump for one or more days in a month could be offset by one or more daily jumps in returns 
in the opposite direction, which in turn could lead to a negative cumulative performance over 
the month. In the absence of clear evidence of return reversals, it is not clear what the 
expectation is for future monthly returns. However, our findings when using MAX, MIN and 
MAXDEV suggest that high (low) lagged monthly returns lead to positive (negative) future 
returns, which could be explained as some support for the continuation hypothesis. 
According to these results, we can deduce that the predictability of returns is more important 
than one extreme event in the preceding month.  
[Please place table 2.8 about here.] 
 Bali et al. (2011) report that the negative relationship between RIvol and future returns 
disappears after controlling for extreme positive returns. We start by testing if RIvol affects 
our uncovered positive relationship between extreme values and future returns. We first sort 
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our sample into deciles according to the level of RIvol in the lagged month and then sort the 
highest and lowest deciles into deciles according to the level of extreme returns in the lagged 
month. The results reported earlier in table 2.4 on the relationship between lagged RIvol and 
monthly returns identified a positive return even after controlling for different variables. The 
high level of autocorrelation in RIvol would suggest the existence of a positive relationship 
between lagged RIvol and returns regardless of the level of extreme values. Based on table 
2.9, we observe that the raw and adjusted returns of the value weighted hedge portfolio based 
on extreme returns when RIvol is high are positive and statistically significant. The raw and 
adjusted returns of the value weighted hedge portfolio based on extreme returns when RIvol 
is low are either statistically insignificant or negative if statistically significant.  Hence, the 
explanatory power of extreme returns loses power for stocks with low RIvol. The difference 
in performance between equally and value weighted hedge portfolios results captures the 
impact of placing more weight on small stocks which have a different relationship than large 
stock with RIvol after controlling for extreme returns. 
[Please place table 2.9 about here.] 
 We further examine the relationship between RIvol and future returns after controlling for 
extreme returns by sorting the sample according to ranked extreme returns and then sort the 
highest and lowest deciles into ranked lagged RIvol deciles. We report the results of these 
portfolios in table 2.10. The raw and adjusted returns for the value weighted hedge portfolio 
based on lagged RIvol returns for all extreme values are positive and statistically significant 
except for the value weighted portfolio of low MAX. These results are in accordance with our 
findings in table 4, where we find that the relationship between RIvol and future returns is 
robust to the inclusion of other control variables.  These results are also partially in 
accordance with Bali et al. (2011) who report that the relationship between lagged RIvol and 
returns turns (insignificantly) positive when they control for MAX.  The equally weighted 
hedge portfolios for RIvol, after controlling for MAX and MAXDEV, are all negative. 
 [Please place table 2.10 about here.] 
 In summary, the results from using the portfolio methodology show that extreme values 
are positively related to future monthly returns even after we control for return reversals. We 
also find that controlling for extreme returns does not materially change the positive 




2.7. EMPIRICAL FINDINGS BASED ON CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS 
 In this section, we investigate the relationship between average cross sectional returns and 
different measures of RIvol using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology. The standard 
error used to calculate each reported t-statistics is the standard error of the intercept of the 
sixth-order autoregressive process that captures all of the serial dependence in the 
coefficient’s time series. According to Pontiff (1996), these standard errors are not biased by 
serial or cross-sectional correlations.  
2.7.1 Fama-MacBeth Methodology 
 We start by implementing the Fama-MacBeth (1973) estimation procedure similar to that 
in Fu (2009) and Huang et al. (2010). The cross sectional regression model is as follow: 
        ∑                    (2.6) 
where       is the monthly excess return of stock i in month t,        are possible explanatory 
variables of cross-sectional expected returns such as beta, size, book-to-market ratio, and 
idiosyncratic volatility.  
 To obtain the conditional beta, we first run a conditional market model over time horizons 
of 60 months with a minimum of 24 months for each stock to obtain betas for each month 
and each stock. These stocks are ranked first by beta and then by size to form 100 (10×10) 
beta/size portfolios. We then run the excess returns of these equally weighted portfolios 
against the contemporaneous and lagged market excess returns.  Each portfolio’s beta is 
defined as the sum of the slopes of the current and lagged market returns to adjust for the 
effects of non-synchronous trading (Dimson 1979). The beta used in the cross-sectional 
regressions of individual stock returns for each stock is the beta of the portfolio to which it 
belongs. The mean beta of all stocks used in the cross sectional regressions is 1.04 and its 
median is 0.94. Fama and French (1992) use both the log of the market value calculated as 
the price of a firm’s stock multiplied by the number of outstanding shares and the log of the 
ratio of book to market to control for growth. We calculate book to market ratio based on the 
definition provided in the construction of the Fama and French factors and discussed earlier 
in this essay.  
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 Fu (2009) uses two control variables: liquidity and momentum. Huang et al. (2010) 
augment the model and add the prior month’s return to control for return reversals. They 
measure liquidity by the log of average stock turnover and the log of its coefficient of 
variation. Average turnover is the average share turnover during the past 36 months, 
constructed as in Chordia et al. (2001). The motivation for using the coefficient of variation 
of turnover as an additional control variable is based on the finding that both the level and the 
volatility of trading activity are related to average returns in the cross-section.  Easley et al. 
(2002) use the same variables to control for the effects of liquidity. We extend the return 
horizon of the momentum measure to include 10 months prior to t-2 as per Huang et al. 
(2010).  
 As an alternative test of liquidity, we use the modified Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure 
discussed in Brennan et al. (2013). The Amihud (2002) illiquidity measure is given by the 
absolute market return divided by traded dollar share volume over a monthly frequency. 
Brennan et al. (2013) decompose the Amihud measure into elements that correspond to 
positive (up) and negative (down) return days, and find that in general, only the down-day 
element commands a return premium. Further analysis of the up- and down-day elements 
using order flows shows that a sidedness variable, which captures the tendency for orders to 
cluster on the sell side on down days, is associated with a more significant return premium 
than the other component of the Amihud measure. The expected sign of the half Amihud (for 
down return days) is positive. 
 Another control variable that we use is Synchronicity, which measures co-movements 
(Morck et al. 2000) by controlling for the level of firm-specific information incorporated into 
stock prices.  Since    is bounded within the interval [0, 1], Morck et al. (2000) propose the 
use of the following logistic transformation for synchronicity: 
           (    
 (      
 )⁄ ) (2.7) 
where the    for stock i is obtained from regression (1) using the days-within-each-month. 
Higher values of  imply an increase in the co-movements of the stock with the risk factors, 
and thus an increase in synchronicity (Durnev et al. 2003).  Also, higher  values may 
imply a decline in firm-specific variation or noise (Jin and Myers 2006), which leads to lower 
Ivol because firm-specific information is already embedded in stock prices. However, some 
inconsistencies occur with synchronicity as Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) find that non-





information flows or fundamentals is not consistently captured by . Thus, the expected 
coefficient for SYNC is indeterminate if the findings of Asbaugh-Skaife et al. (2006) apply to 
the Canadian market. We calculate the average cross sectional correlations of all the control 
variables discussed earlier and the measures of idiosyncratic volatility. All average 
correlations are low implying the absence of multicollinearity problems in the cross sectional 
regressions.  
 Table 11, columns (1-8) report the average (equally weighted) coefficients of the cross 
sectional regressions of betas, log market value and log book to market value with 
contemporaneous or lagged RIvol, momentum and different liquidity measures. Columns (1-
4) report the average coefficients of regressions using the same liquidity measures as reported 
in Fu (2009). Columns (5-8) report the average coefficients of regressions using the half 
Amihud measure and synchronicity as control variables.  We find that the average stock 
returns are not related to its beta, is negatively related to firm size, and positively related to 
log(BE/ME) so that value firms tend to have higher returns than growth firms. In all 
regressions, we observe a positive and highly significant relationship between the 
contemporaneous RIvols and cross sectional returns. These results are consistent with the 
theoretical models of Mao (1971), Levy (1978), Merton (1987) and Malkiel and Xu (2002), 
and the empirical findings of Lehmann (1990).  
[Please place table 2.11 about here.] 
 Three of the four average cross sectional coefficients of lagged RIvols are statistically 
significant (all positive), confirming our earlier portfolio construction results and excluding 
the possibility that the positive relationship is due to momentum or return reversals in 
individual stock returns. The momentum factor has a significantly positive relationship with 
cross sectional returns, which is consistent with the importance and use of the momentum 
factor as a standard risk factor in the literature. In contrast to the findings of Chordia et al. 
(2001) who find that both the level and the volatility of trading activity are related to average 
returns in the U.S. cross-section, we find that the average turnover and its volatility 
[CV(Turn)] have no statistically significant relationship with average returns for our 
Canadian sample. Similarly, we find no statistically significant relationship between 
synchronicity (SYNC) and average returns for our Canadian sample.  On the other hand, the 
half Amihud illiquidity coefficient is positive and highly significant so that returns increase 




2.7.2 Value-weighted Cross-sectional Regression Findings 
  Fu (2009) argues that the results found in Ang et al. (2006) are due to the RIvols of small 
stocks. The standard Fama-MacBeth methodology resembles estimating an equally weighted 
portfolio since it essentially allocates the same weight to all stocks. To assess the impact of 
such a weighting, we now use the market weight of each stock in each month to weight the 
variance covariance matrix used to estimate the monthly coefficient. Since the times series of 
coefficients are not affected by the weighting scheme, we continue to use the time-series 
average of the cross-sectional coefficients and t-statistics corrected for autocorrelation to test 
for statistical significance.  
 Table 2.11, columns (9-12) report the summary results for the value weighted Fama-
Macbeth regressions using control variables for momentum, return reversal, illiquidity and 
synchronicity. The average weighted cross sectional regressions show that both lagged and 
contemporaneous RIvols are positive and highly statistically significant even after controlling 
for return reversals, momentum and illiquidity. These results are consistent with our earlier 
reported findings that the value-weighted portfolios performed better than the equally 
weighted portfolios formed based on lagged RIvol even after controlling for long- and short-
run return reversals.  
2.7.3 Risk-adjusted Cross Sectional Regressions 
 The Fama-MacBeth (1973) methodology uses the coefficient estimates from the time-
series regression (1) presented earlier in a second-step cross-section regression where the 
significance of the coefficients of the variables generated from a series of second steps are 
tested.   Because the betas in equation (2.6) are estimated with error, Brennan et al. (1998) 
recommend the use of risk-adjusted instead of risk-free excess returns as the dependent 
variable in the second-step cross-sectional regression. The reason is that the use of risk-
adjusted excess returns for individual stocks avoids the measurement error problem that 
occurs when first-step beta estimates are used as independent variables in the second-step 
cross-sectional regressions in the Fama-MacBeth procedure. The second-step cross-section 
regressions are as follows: 
     
     ∑                    (2.8) 
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where     
       ( ̂        ̂      ̂      ̂    ); and        is a set of j control 
variables for stock i at time t.  
 Table 2.12 reports the average (equally weighted) of the coefficients from the cross 
sectional regressions from equation (2.8) using contemporaneous and lagged, adjusted and 
non-adjusted RIvol. Columns (1-4) report the summary results of cross sectional regressions 
of different RIvol measures in addition to turnover, its coefficient of variation and momentum 
factors. Columns (5-8) report the summary results of regressions of RIvol measures, 
momentum factor, negative half Amihud illiquidity measure and synchronicity. Mean 
contemporaneous and lagged RIvol average coefficients are positive and highly statistically 
significant regardless of the control variables used in the cross sectional regressions. The 
average coefficients of the control variables with the exception of synchronicity are 
consistent in their signs and statistical significance with the results reported earlier in table 
11.  
[Please place table 2.12 about here.] 
 The results obtained from the different cross sectional regressions confirm the 
contemporaneous relationship between RIvol and returns (Duffee 1995; Fu 2009; Huang et 
al. 2010), and finds a positive relationship between RIvol and future returns after controlling 
for return reversals (Huang et al. 2010).  
 
2.7.4 Cross Sectional Regressions of Extreme Positive Values, Idiosyncratic Volatilities 
and Returns 
 In this section, we investigate the relationship between the RIvol and future returns in the 
presence of extreme returns. Bali et al. (2011) argue that adding extreme returns to cross 
sectional regressions changes the sign of the coefficient of RIvol from negative to positive but 
stays insignificant. Our findings suggest that this relationship is different in the Canadian 
market where the coefficient of RIvol is positive and statistically significant. As we now 
show, the positive relationship found earlier persists even after adding extreme returns when 
using cross sectional regressions.  
 Table 2.13 reports the average coefficients of the value weighted cross sectional 
regressions.
9
 The first three columns show the results of adding liquidity, momentum, return 
                                                             
9 Similar results are found using equal weighted Fama MacBeth two step regressions. 
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reversals and synchronicity, and each of the extreme variables in turn.  Only MAX and MIN 
are weakly related to future returns (positively and negatively, respectively).  However, the 
significance of MAX and MIN disappears and MAXDEV remains insignificant when lagged 
RIvol is added to the regressions. These results are consistent with our earlier findings using 
univariate and bivariate portfolio analyses.   
[Please place table 2.13 about here.] 
 Table 2.14 reports the results of time series weighted regressions of returns on lagged 
RIvol and other control variables where we isolate the effect of RIvol on firms in the highest 
and lowest deciles of extreme returns. We do so by creating additional variables by 
multiplying dummy variables taking the value of 1 when the firm is in the highest or lowest 
decile for MAX, MIN or MAXDEV and 0 otherwise.  The average coefficients on these 
interactive term variables capture the additional effect of RIvol on firms in these deciles. The 
results show that firms in these deciles exhibit a negative relationship with future returns with 
only three out of six being significant at conventional levels, while RIvol continues to be 
positive and highly significant for stocks in extreme return deciles other than the one under 
consideration. Consistent with the explanation of Bali et al. (2011), we find that there is a 
behavioral reaction of the market to extreme returns. However, this negative relationship is 
mitigated by the positive relationship between RIvol and future returns in the Canadian 
market. We confirm this statement by removing RIvol from the regression and running the 
interactive term consisting of RIvol multiplied by the extreme returns deciles dummy. The 
results show that the average coefficient of the interactive term is negative and statistically 
significant. 
[Please place table 2.14 about here.] 
 
2.8. EGARCH ESTIMATED EXPECTED IDIOSYNCRATIC VOLATILITY (EIVOL) 
2.8.1 Relationship Including EIvol versus RIvol  
 In the spirit of Merton (1987), investors require compensation based on expectations and 
not on realizations. Hence, Fu (2009) argues for tests of the impact of expected idiosyncratic 
volatilities (EIvol) and not RIvol. Both Fu (2009) and Huang et al. (2010) find a positive 
relationship between returns and EIvol.     
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 To capture the time varying property of Ivol, we use conditional volatility measures to 
forecast the following month’s Ivol. While GARCH models are very useful to capture the 
value of conditional volatility, the choice of the number of lags and the GARCH model that 
best fits the characteristics of the time series is an issue in many studies. Pagan and Schwert 
(1990), Engle and Mustafa (1992) and Engle and Ng (1993) test different variations of 
GARCH and conclude that the simplest lag structures are the most efficient models, and that 
the EGARCH model of Nelson (1991) that reflects the “leverage effect” is best. When the 
residuals from equation (2.1) are distributed as              
  , the variance process is given 
by:  
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 Guo et al. (2014) argue that the EIvol estimates reported in Fu (2009) contain a look-ahead 
bias when SAS is used, since the SAS methodology also includes a contemporaneous 
observation. In his rebuttal, Fu (2010) argues that the contrary findings of Gao et al. (2014) 
suffer from the use of estimates from poorly converting models and possibly a low number of 
EGARCH iterations. Fink et al. (2012) test these differences by adding one more data point 
to the estimate while controlling for the number of iterations used. They conclude that the 
look-ahead bias not only has a considerable impact on the EIvol estimate but it induces a bias 
in the relationship between EIvol and expected returns that adversely affects inferences. The 
EIvol estimates reported in table 2 of their paper show that moving from a “biased” EIvol to a 
“bias-free” EIvol affects its standard deviation considerably more than its mean.10 In order to 
avoid any potential bias that may change the results, we model our EGARCH by specifically 
using only data points available publically at time t-1. We also use two different statistical 
software packages (Eviews and Matlab) to cross check our results. 
 Similar to Fu (2009), Huang et al. (2010) and Fink et al. (2012), we use the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) to choose the best forecast from nine EGARCH models for 
various (p, q) lags of (1,1), (1,2), (1,3), (2,1), (2,2), (2,3),(3,1), (3,2) and (3,3) for each one of 
the data points. Thus, the same series of EIvol estimates includes estimates from the nine 
different models depending on the value of their AIC for each month. This methodology is 
purely an econometric procedure with no theoretical merit nor practical merit for most 
investors. AIC is based on the Kullback and Leibler (1951) divergence between the potential 
                                                             




model and the “true” process generating model based on a minimum discrepancy estimation 
approach. Since AIC exhibits a potentially high degree of negative bias in small-sample 
applications (Hurvich and Tsai 1989), various studies use an AIC based on a sample size of 
60 months with 30 months being the minimum number of observations for any particular 
estimation.
 11
 The mean, median and standard deviation of our EIvol60 estimates are 18.96%, 
12.46% and 23.7%, respectively, which indicates that they change considerably across 
estimation periods.  
We also propose and use an alternative methodology where the EIvol estimate at time t is 
based on all available data points since the start of the sample (i.e. January 1, 1975) to t-1, 
which we refer to henceforth as EIvolAll. Using this methodology, we obtain mean, median 
and standard deviations estimates of EIvolAll of 10.35%, 10.14% and 3.75%, respectively. All 
of these statistics are small in magnitude compared to those obtained using the fixed 60-
month period. 
 Next we address the question of whether lagged RIvol is superior to EIvol as a predictor of 
the future Ivol that is contemporaneously related to returns. We use the Root Mean Square 
Error (RMSE) and Mean Absolute Error (MAE) to assess the forecasting ability of the EIvol 
estimates from the EGARCH models versus a simple lagged RIvol when we assume that the 
current RIvol is its “true” estimate. Both criteria give the same rankings of the ability of the 
variables to forecast Ivol based on untabulated results. Lagged RIvol ranks first with the 
lowest RMSE of 0.1037 and lowest MAE of 0.0698, followed by EIvolAll
 
with a RMSE of 
0.294 and a MAE of 0.2564. EIvol60 has an RMSE of 0.3546 and a MAE of 0.2756. 
2.8.2 Relation between EIvol and Returns 
 Using the “best” EIvol estimate from the EGARCH models (9) specified earlier, we again 
form zero investment portfolios with a long and short position in high and low EIvol stocks, 
respectively. For both portfolio weighting schemes (equally and value weighted) and all 
subsamples (all, big and small), returns increase monotonically with an increasing EIvol. 
Based on untabulated results, the non-risk-adjusted performance of the long/short portfolio 
based on value-weighting is a highly statistically significant 1.10% for the full sample and 
1.03% and 1.41% for the subsamples of large and small stocks but all become insignificant 
when risk-adjusted. The corresponding performances of the equal-weighted portfolios are 
                                                             
11 These include Fu (2009), Guo et al. (2014), Fink et al. (2012) and Huang et al. (2010). 
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positive but statistically insignificant with the exception of the non-risk-adjusted performance 
of the long/short portfolio of big stocks. When we use the estimate of EIvol based on 60 
months of returns, the monotonous increase in the portfolio returns based on EIvol disappears 
for all samples regardless of whether they are or are not risk-adjusted.  
 We obtain consistent untabulated results when we account for the impact of short- and 
long-term return reversals. The non-risk-adjusted returns are positive for the long/short 
position in the value- but not equal-weighted portfolios. The risk-adjusted returns for the 
long/short position are statistically insignificant and tend to be negative when we use equal-
weighted portfolios. Hence, the lowest AIC EGARCH model estimate provides a significant 
positive performance for the long/short position only when the portfolios are value weighted 
and the differential performance is not risk adjusted. These results are robust to the choice of 
which EGARCH model is used to generate the EIvol estimates. Based on untabulated results, 
most of the non-risk-adjusted returns on the long/short position based on the EIvol estimates 
from the other nine EGARCH models yield significantly positive returns that either become 
negative or lose their statistical significance when they are risk adjusted.   
To further investigate the relationship between the quality of the EIvol forecasts and the 
performance of the long/short position based on high and low EIvol, we calculate the RMSE 
and MAE for 20 different EIvol models (ten models for both periods of 60 months and using 
all available at time t-1). Based on untabulated results, we find a negative relationship 
between the performance of a long/short position and the two measures of forecast quality 
(RMSE and MAE).  Thus, as expected, the performance of the position increases as the 
forecast quality improves. The correlation between portfolio performance and the RMSE and 
MAE based on EIvolAll is -0.56 and -0.53, respectively, and based on EIvol 60 is -0.32 and -
0.22, respectively.  
 
2.9. CONCLUSION 
 In this essay, we examine the relationship between Ivol and future returns in the Canadian 
market. We argue that the Canadian market is different than the US market including a large 
concentration of firms in the energy and mining industries, a high level of correlation with 
commodities, and the lack of evidence for the existence of sharp return reversals in monthly 
returns. Unlike the anomalous findings of Ang et al. (2006, 2009), we find that RIvol is 
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positively (and not negatively) related to future returns. We explain that our findings are 
analogous to the findings of Huang et al. (2010) who argue that after controlling for return 
reversals in the US, that the negative relationship disappears. Our findings are consistent with 
the theory and are robust to risk loadings, return reversals, skewness and illiquidity.  
 Bali et al. (2011) uncover a negative relationship between extreme within-the-month 
positive returns and future returns and conjecture that this relationship is what is mistakenly 
explained by Ang et al. (2006) as the RIvol effect. Bali et al. (2011) argue that investors 
distort their beliefs and overweight stocks with extreme lagged daily returns. We hypothesize 
that this relationship might be a manifestation of the return reversal process in the US market. 
For the Canadian market, we find no sharp reversals in extreme returns. Unlike Bali et al. 
(2011), after controlling for extreme positive returns in the prior month, we find that the 
relationship between lagged RIvol and returns does not disappear after controlling for 
extreme positive returns in the prior month. Our results are confirmed using Fama-MacBeth 







DOES UNCERTAINTY ABOUT A CLOSED-END FUND’S HOLDINGS LEAD TO A 
DISCOUNT? 
 
3.1. INTRODUCTION  
 Negative closed-end fund (CEF) premiums are ongoing phenomena that many financial 
academics find is inconsistent with the market efficiency hypothesis (Cherkes 2012). In their 
concluding chapter, Brealey et al. (2011) continue to list “why closed-end investment 
companies or any of the other firms sell at a discount on the market values of their assets” as 
the fourth of ten unsolved problems in finance. Many CEFs have the unique characteristics of 
having both their own price and the prices of the majority of their underlying assets 
determined in publicly traded markets (i.e., marked-to-market). The market efficiency 
hypothesis and the law of one price imply that the price of a share of the CEF and the CEF’s 
Net Asset Value Per Share (NAVPS) should be equal in frictionless markets. Although a 
negative premium at issue of up to ten percent of the initial NAVPS can be explained by the 
underwriting fees and start-up costs associated with a CEF IPO, this initial negative price 
premium persists and fluctuates according to a mean-reverting pattern. At the liquidation of a 
CEF with a negative premium, the share price rises and the negative premium disappears 
(Brauer, 1988; Brickley and Schallheim, 1985).   
 In this essay, we advance the argument by Pontiff (2006) and others that one primary 
reason for the existence and persistence of a negative price premium for a CEF is that 
investors face uncertainty about the value created by packaging securities in a CEF. Since a 
CEF can add benefits and costs to the returns of its NAVPS, their effect on a CEF’s premium 
will depend on whether the present value of future benefits less costs is positive or negative. 
Any premium will be less positive or more negative if there is more uncertainty associated 
with primarily the benefits of the CEF as they tend to be more uncertain. For example, if 
arbitrageurs cannot replicate the fundamental value represented by a CEF’s NAVPS because 
of their uncertainty about the CEF holdings, this uncertainty due to limits to arbitrage will be 
captured in the CEF’s premium, and will depend on the time-varying differences between the 
return-generating processes of CEF prices and its NAVPS. In this essay, we use the unhedged 
risk (both systematic and idiosyncratic) associated with an arbitrage position in the CEF and 
its NAVPS to proxy for this uncertainty. 
 Pontiff (2006) argues that the costs of arbitrage consist of transaction and holding costs. 
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Transaction costs are the direct costs that are more easily measurable, such as brokerage fees, 
commissions and market impacts. Holding costs are the opportunity costs of capital, not 
receiving full interest on short-sale proceeds, idiosyncratic costs and recall risk costs. Pontiff 
(2006) claims that CEF mispricing does not disappear even after controlling for transaction 
costs, opportunity costs, and the expected holding period of arbitrageurs even if they are 
efficient. Specifically, Pontiff (2006, p. 49) concludes that:  
“The fact that idiosyncratic risk is an arbitrage cost is commonly misunderstood, and 
because of this, very few studies of market efficiency have examined the impact of 
idiosyncratic risk on mispricing. The empirical studies that have pursued this course 
share a common thread—idiosyncratic risk appears to be the single largest 
impediment to market efficiency.” 
 We argue that the characteristics of the holdings of CEFs affect both the risk of the 
arbitrage position, and the CEF’s future net benefits. We use CEF holdings in cash, bonds, 
options and lottery-like assets to capture some of these characteristics. If CEFs hold stocks 
with lottery-like or jackpot features, these assets are expected to earn lower average returns 
(Kumar et al. 2011; Conrad et al. 2013). Conrad et al. (2013) extract higher distribution 
moments from options prices and find that the skewnesses of individual stocks are priced. 
Similar to out-of-the-money options, lottery-like stocks are defined as stocks with low prices, 
high idiosyncratic volatilities and high idiosyncratic skewness (Barberis and Huang 2008; 
Kumar 2009) and jackpot stocks are those with small probabilities of very high returns.  
 This essay makes five contributions to the literature on CEF premiums. Our first 
contribution is to provide a tradeoff model that incorporates the different CEFs models 
proposed in the literature. We augment the models of Cherkes et al. (2009) and Berk and 
Stanton (2007) by incorporating the work of Pontiff (2006) that adds an unhedgeable risk 
component that is faced by arbitrageurs due to incomplete information. We extend the insight 
of Pontiff (2006) to consider not only the idiosyncratic volatility associated with the CEF’s 
incomplete fundamental value as represented by its NAVPS but also by the idiosyncratic 
volatility of the CEF’s market-determined price. According to Merton (1987), the shadow 
cost of incomplete information depends upon idiosyncratic risk, firm size and investor 
recognition as captured by the relative size of the shareholder base. Of the many studies that 
support Merton’s hypothesis, Bodnaruk and Ostberg (2009) report that zero-cost portfolios 
based on the shadow cost/shareholder base yield positive excess returns that are never 
positively correlated with the market and only modestly explained by the four-factor model.  
 Our second contribution is to link the holdings of the CEF to its premium. Since an 
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arbitrage hedge position between the CEF’s price and its NAVPS will be incomplete, we 
hypothesize that an arbitrageur with such a long-short position is exposed to hedging costs 
and both non-zero systematic and idiosyncratic risks. If the arbitrageur has full knowledge of 
the composition of the assets holdings, this arbitrage-risk exposure and any related premium 
for the CEF become smaller, and in the limiting case of a fully replicating index fund become 
approximately non-existent.  
 Our third contribution is to link the characteristics of the CEF holdings to the premium 
since we argue that arbitrage position risk increases as the CEF holds assets with asymmetric 
returns. While holdings of cash and bonds in an equity fund can provide strategic 
diversification and capital preservation in the case of a market downturn, they also are 
expected to provide lower returns than what an equity investor expects. Thus, an increase in 
these holdings may decrease the value of a CEF. Holding “lottery-like assets” with their low 
prices and low probabilities of potentially extreme positive returns is expected to increase the 
unhedgeable risks as captured by the idiosyncratic skewness of an arbitrage position in the 
CEF and its NAVPS. Increasing the weight of options in a CEF portfolio, especially those 
that are out-of-the-money, should increase the idiosyncratic skewness of the fund, and hence 
the premium demanded by arbitrageurs to hedge their positions (Mitton and Vorkink 2007).  
 Our fourth contribution is to use a more inclusive measure of the liquidity benefits of a 
CEF. Although previous studies discuss the importance of such a measure but only use the 
liquidity of the CEF itself (Datar 2001; Benveniste et al. 2011; Cherkes et al. 2009), we 
believe that we are the first to use the liquidity differential between the CEF and its actual 
holdings to measure the liquidity benefits of a CEF. Our measure is based on the amortized 
spread of the CEF less the weighted amortized spread of the CEF’s holdings.    
 Our fifth contribution is, we believe, to be the first to use the    test of Kapadia and Pu 
(2012) to examine if the changes in CEF prices and their NAVPS are integrated or 
segmented. The results from this test imply that the daily changes in CEF and NAVPS prices, 
on average, are more integrated than segmented, and that the differences in these two prices 
series not attributable to the CEF’s net value-added would disappear given costless and risk-
free arbitrage. This further supports our findings that (a) CEF premiums are less negative or 
more positive with greater CEF liquidity enhancement, better CEF performance and greater 
net leverage, and (b) are more negative or less positive with higher management fees, cash 
and bond holdings, and proxies for more costly and risky arbitrage. 
 The remainder of this essay is organized in eight sections. Section 3.2 reviews the 
literature on the different explanations proposed to explain CEF premiums. Section 3.3 
34 
 
provides a rational trade-off model for the CEF premium and develops the hypotheses. 
Section 3.4 describes the sample, data and the calculation of our idiosyncratic risk (Ivol) 
proxy. Section 3.5 estimates the Pontiff (1996) model using our data set and finds similar 
results as reported by him. Section 3.6 presents our test methodology. Section 3.7 presents 
and discusses our empirical findings.  Section 3.8 presents and discusses the results of 
various robustness tests including a test of whether concurrent changes in the prices of a CEF 
and its NAVPS are integrated or segmented. Section 3.9 concludes the essay. 
 
3.2. EXPLANATIONS PROPOSED FOR CEF PREMIUMS  
 The literature explaining the CEF premium anomaly can be divided into rational 
expectations and behavioral explanations. The former explanations are based on possible 
biases in NAV calculations such in the evaluation of private equity holdings, agency 
problems, the impact of the expense ratio, differences in tax treatment between holding a 
CEF and its portfolio of assets (NAV), the dividend yield, and liquidity. In contrast, 
behavioral explanations refer mainly to the inability to arbitrage differences between the 
value of the CEF (represented by its NAVPS) and its price caused by unpredictable changes 
in investor sentiment. 
 We observe the absence of these effects when a CEF is converted into or merged with an 
open-end fund.  To illustrate, Brauer (1988) finds that a strategy of buying shares of US 
CEFs planning to “open-end” yields significant abnormal returns. Minio-Paluello (1998) 
reports similar results for UK CEFs. Bradley et al. (2010) find that “activist arbitrage”, which 
consists of taking action or exhibiting an active interest to force convergence of CEF prices to 
their fundamental values, does lower the levels of CEF premiums.  
 One possible explanation from the rational expectations family is the agency costs arising 
from the delegation of fund management (Jensen and Meckling 1976). Investors anticipate an 
additional cost to the CEF, which leads to a negative premium. However, Malkiel (1977) 
reports that no correlation exists between the premiums for US CEFs and their management 
expenses as a proportion of NAV. This implies that a negative CEF premium cannot be 
explained solely by the management expense ratio and agency problems. Thompson (1978) 
and Malkiel (1977) find no significant relationship between CEF premiums and their 
performances. Kumar and Noronha (1992) find that differences in fees explain a small 
proportion of the cross-sectional variation in CEF premiums.  
 Agency costs also may exist between small and large shareholders. Barclay, et al. (1993) 
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find that large shareholders secure private benefits from keeping a CEF closed. While 
opening the CEF would automatically lead to the disappearance of its negative premium, 
large block shareholders tend to veto opening the CEF to keep their private benefits. Grullon 
and Wang (2001) argue that the CEF premium and institutional ownership are negatively 
related, as arbitrageurs prefer CEFs with large negative premiums.  
 The level of governance is found to reduce negative CEF premiums. Zhao (2007) finds 
that premiums increase with disclosures of higher ownerships by CEF directors. The size and 
the efficiency of the board are also important determinants of the level of the premium. Del 
Guercio et al. (2003) report that characteristics identified with effective board independence 
are associated with lower expense ratios and value-enhancing CEF restructurings. 
 Deaves and Krinsky (1994) argue that CEF premiums can be explained within a market 
efficiency framework using managerial costs if the relationship between the two is not always 
monotone. The effect of management fees on CEF premiums is affected by endogeneity since 
management fees are lowered in response to high negative CEF premiums (Cherkes 2012, p. 
6). Nevertheless, Kumar and Noronha (1992), Gemmil and Thomas (2002, 2006), Cherkes 
(2001) and Cherkes et al. (2010) provide evidence that fees are an important source of 
negative CEF premiums.  
 Management fees are also related to CEF performance. Building on the work of Ross 
(2002), Berk and Stanton (2007) develop a rational expectations model of a fee-based 
management contract that captures the dynamic relationship between CEF performance and a 
manager’s pay that is able to explain the behavior of the positive premium at the CEF’s IPO 
and its subsequent decrease to a negative value. If the manager’s performance is good (bad), 
the CEF will trade at a positive (negative) premium until the manager’s compensation is 
renegotiated leading to a negative (less negative) premium. In support, Wermers et al. (2006) 
find a dynamic relationship between manager talent and a CEF’s premium. Given their 
similarity to CEFs, Ramadorai (2012) finds a significant relationship between premiums and 
manager skills and compensation, and fund liquidity for a unique data set of hedge funds. 
 The tax liability of unrealized capital gains (referred to as tax efficiency) is another 
possible explanation for CEF premiums. According to Constantindes (1983, 1984), the 
optimal timing strategy is to realize capital losses immediately and to delay the realization of 
capital gains until forced liquidation. Unlike the market, a CEF NAV does not account for the 
potential tax liabilities of fund investors, which increase as the relative sizes of the unrealized 
capital gains in the CEF increase. Under fairly generous assumptions, Malkiel (1977) finds 
that tax liabilities cannot account for more than six percent of the CEF premium (Lee et al. 
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1991, p. 80). Day et al. (2011) find a short- (not long-term) relationship between unrealized 
capital gains and the fluctuations in CEF premiums. These findings are consistent with 
Seyhun and Skinner (1994) who argue that fund investors do not monitor the present value of 
their tax liabilities or adjust their holdings for tax reasons since a large majority (90 percent) 
of investors follow a buy and hold fund strategy.  
 The level of dividends is another possible explanation for CEF premium. Under the 
signaling theory, an increase in the dividend payout foresees an increase in future cash flows. 
Wang and Nanda (2006) and Johnson et al. (2006) find that the announcement of dividend-
plan adoption leads to a less negative CEF premium. However, Nanda and Wang (2011) 
attribute this result to a decrease in agency costs, and not as a signal of future performance 
improvement. Kim et al. (2012) find similar results to Johnson et al. for dividend plans, but 
find no relationship between share repurchases and CEF premiums. 
 The level of the dividend yield is also considered as a limitation to arbitrage between the 
NAVPS and the price of a CEF. Pontiff (1996) argues for the existence of a positive 
relationship between a CEF’s premium and its dividend yield. The higher the dividend yield, 
the lower the duration of the arbitrage position and the lower the cost of arbitrage for 
covering the dividend obligations on the short position of the underlying asset. While Pontiff 
(2006) argues that arbitrageurs avoid shorting low dividend paying stocks because it is 
expensive to do so, Dechow et al. (2001) considers this to be a myth and report that the 
relationship between dividend yields and the cost of arbitrage is insignificant. 
 Another potential explanation of the CEF premium is the liquidity theory that argues that 
premiums decrease with larger differences between the liquidity of the CEF and its 
underlying assets (Datar 2001) due to the greater cost associated with the less liquid arm of 
an arbitrage position. Datar (2001) reports that CEF premiums are related to various 
measures of CEF liquidity.  Benveniste et al. (2011) find that that such bundling in an 
exchange-traded REIT increases the valuation of its illiquid assets by 12% to 22%.  
 Even when informed traders possess information about the systematic factors, the model 
of Subrahmanyam (1991) predicts lower adverse selection costs when trading a single 
security embodying multiple securities compared to trading the individual securities, due to 
the tendency of the directions of different firm value signals to offset each other in a security 
representing multiple securities. Cherkes (2003) argues for a higher or less negative CEF 
premium if a clientele effect is associated with holding a fund of illiquid assets.  Cherkes et 
al. (2009) propose a liquidity-based model that explains the level of the CEF premium as a 
trade-off between the compensation of its managers and the liquidity premium that investors 
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are willing to pay to hold the liquid fund instead of its less liquid underlying assets.  
 Within the behavioral (investor sentiment) family of CEF premium theories, Zweig 
(1973) argues that premiums reflect the expectations of individual investors. Weiss (1989) 
finds larger participations in CEFs by individuals versus institutional investors. Since the 
existence of irrational investors and noise traders make predicting the level of the CEF 
premium extremely difficult if not impossible for rationale investors, such investors are 
deterred from being aggressive arbitrageurs.  Lee et al. (1991) use the CEF premium as a 
proxy for market sentiment, which limits the scope of arbitrage by driving market prices 
away from fundamentals (Shleifer and Vishny 1997).  Lee et al. (1991) argue that CEF 
premium exhibit high levels of correlation, have a tendency to converge towards a grand 
mean and are issued “in waves” when CEFs tend to trade at a premium.  Hwang (2011) finds 
that as the level of popularity of a certain country increases, the premiums of ADRs and 
country CEFs increase.  
 The investor sentiment explanation is debated extensively in the literature. Severn (1998) 
provides evidence that investor sentiment increases CEF risk, although he suggests that using 
large caps as part of the portfolio would diversify away this risk exposure. Flynn (2012) finds 
support for this explanation for CEF premiums using US data.  Chen et al. (1993), Elton et al. 
(1998) and Gemmill and Thomas (2002) do not find support for the investor sentiment 
explanation. Qiu and Welch (2006), Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006), and Ramadorai 
(2012) find no significant relation between CEF premiums and sentiment indices based on 
consumer confidence surveys. 
 
3.3. RATIONAL TRADE-OFF MODEL FOR CEF PREMIUMS 
3.3.1 The Model 
 Rational trade-off theories focus on comparisons of the benefits (enhanced liquidity, 
managerial contribution, and leverage) and costs (managerial fees) associated with a CEF. 
With regard to liquidity, CEFs unlike open-end funds (OEFs) provide small investors with 
access to some otherwise unavailable illiquid assets since CEFs can concentrate their 
investments in illiquid assets due to their protection from liquidity withdrawal shocks (Nanda 
et al. 2000).  Chordia (1996) reports that his sample of CEFs holds predominantly illiquid 
assets, and Deli and Varma (2002) find that CEF premiums are sensitive to CEF liquidity. 
Cherkes et al. (2009) develop a model where CEF premiums depend upon a netting of 
liquidity benefits against the (managerial) fees paid by CEF investors.  
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 Berk and Stanton (2007) extend the model of Ross (2002) to link CEF premiums to 
include not only the costs of management fees but also investor perceptions of the benefits of 
managerial ability. In their model, new managers and investors only learn about the former’s 
abilities with the accumulation of on-the-job performance. Since managers earn guaranteed 
compensation until contracts are renegotiated, the compensations of new managers with 
inferior and superior abilities fall short and exceed their contributions, respectively. Thus, 
newly issued CEF with superior managerial abilities trade at positive premiums prior to 
managerial compensations being renegotiated upwards, and then trade at negative premiums 
thereafter. In their model and ignoring issue costs, the interplay between informational 
asymmetry about managerial abilities, competitive managerial compensations, and 
managerial renegotiations of contracts explains why the positive premium of a CEF at IPO is 
almost always followed by a negative premium. 
 Cherkes et al. (2009) report that the premiums of bond CEF are positively associated with 
fund leverage, and Ramadorai (2012) finds that CEF premiums are negatively impacted by 
increases in short-term interest rates. Elton et al. (2012) conclude that the positive relation 
between leverage and performance, which is greater for bond CEF versus bond OEF, is the 
reason for the existence of bond CEFs.  
 When we combine all of these identified costs and benefits associated with a CEF into one 
model and assume that they are completely identified, the premium for CEF i in period t in a 
frictionless market for arbitrage becomes: 
                                                                            (3.1) 
                                                               
where the NAVPS plus the first four terms on a per-share basis on the right-hand-side (RHS) 
of (1) represents the CEF’s intrinsic value. 
 An arbitrageur could earn the CEF premium minus the expected values of each of the first 
four terms on the RHS side of (3.1) by buying (selling) the CEF and simultaneously selling 
(buying) the equivalent NAVPS when that difference is negative (positive). In determining if 
this strategy could provide the arbitrageur’s required risk-adjusted return, the arbitrageur 
needs to use the appropriate discount rate or rates that reflect the unhedged (arbitrage) risk of 
such a long-short position. Based on our previous discussion, this arbitrage risk is associated 
with the uncertainties associated with an incomplete hedge and the four terms on the RHS of 
(3.1). An arbitrageur’s uncertainty about CEF liquidity benefits depends on the time-varying 
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liquidity differentials between the CEF and its holdings. For simplicity in model 
development, Cherkes et al. (2009) assume that the CEF is highly liquid but note that their 
liquidity premium is the liquidity difference between the fund and its holdings so that the 
CEF premium becomes more positive or less negative with a greater positive liquidity 
advantage of the CEF over that of its holdings all else held equal. In support, Beneviste et al. 
(2001) provide empirical evidence that exchange traded real estate investment trusts (REIT) 
increase the values of their illiquid assets held by them by 12 to 22%. In contrast, and as 
reported in the literature (e.g. Ackert and Tian 2000), passive CEF tracking indexes have 
little or no positive or negative premiums due to the minimal uncertainty about their liquidity 
and managerial abilities (Aber et al. 2009). Thus, any informational asymmetry associated 
with CEF liquidity benefits is decreased somewhat by having continuously updated 
knowledge about CEF holdings. 
 An arbitrageur’s perceived uncertainty about the benefits from the ability of a CEF 
manager to add value is expected to be lower with a better track record over a longer period 
of time. An arbitrageur’s perceived uncertainty about the leverage benefits from using non-
common-equity depends upon whether the CEF not only can obtain such funding on more 
favorable terms (including favorable tax treatment) than its representative investor but also 
on whether such funding is used to fund cash holdings or is invested in other assets whose 
time-varying returns exceed fixed or time-varying funding costs. To illustrate one such 
possible advantage, Elton et al. (2013) explain that favorable tax treatment of preferred 
dividends reduces funding costs to rates close to those on federal funds for bond CEFs and to 
lower than the federal funds rate for muni bond CEFs. However, this literature does not 
assess whether the benefits differ when measured using gross or net leverage where the latter 
is the difference between the book leverage and the cash-to-assets ratio.  
 Unlike the risks associated with the benefits, managerial costs are reasonably stable as a 
proportion of NAV for funds like those examined herein. Thus, as Berk and Stanton (2007) 
show for various managerial contract types, managerial fees tend to exceed managerial 
benefits. All else held equal, an increase (decrease) in the level of risk decreases the expected 
net present value of managerial ability benefits versus managerial costs leading to a less 
positive or more negative (more positive or less negative) premium. Furthermore, since the 
perceived uncertainties are likely to be higher for the CEF benefits versus CEF costs, the 




3.3.2 The Discount Rate for the Risk of the Arbitrage Position  
 We now provide a rationale for the required rate of return that the arbitrageur should use 
to determine if some of the gap between a CEF’s price and NAVPS should be arbitraged 
away. We start with replicating the arbitrage position by calculating the net return from 
holding a long position in the CEF and short position in its NAVPS given by:  
                           (3.2) 
where        is the return of holding CEF stock i in period t and         is the return of the 
equivalent NAVPS short holding for CEF stock i in period t.  
 If the arbitrage is classic in that it is cost- and risk-free and no net benefit is provided by 
the CEF, then the return on the CEF and its underlying assets as captured by the NAVPS 
would be exactly the same. Uncertainty about the CEF’s holdings, its net benefits and the 
inability to replicate the exact return-generating process of the underlying assets of the CEF 
leads to potential differences in both the hedgeable and unhedgeable components of an 
arbitrage strategy. An arbitrageur is very unlikely to be fully hedged due to not having the 
correct hedge ratio or the ability to continuously adjust the hedge (Kapadia and Pu 2012), 
particularly if information on CEF holdings is not updated continuously. In such cases, the 
arbitrageur faces a systematic risk exposure for which the arbitrageur requires compensation. 
This is supported by various studies that argue for the existence of systematic components in 
arbitrage positions related to market conditions that prevent the arbitrage from being perfect 
(e.g., Barberis et al. 2005; Greenwood 2008; and De Jong et al. 2009).  
 We model the net position of the arbitrage as a portfolio of two assets faced by a set of 
systematic risk factors   so that the return-generating process of the arbitrage position in CEF 
i in period t is:   
                                                                           (3.3) 
where         is the excess return of the long/short position in the CEF’s price and its NAVPS, 
f is a vector of systematic risk factors,          is the factor loading of the systematic risk 
factor f of the long/short position for the CEF’s price and its NAVPS, and         is the 
component unexplained by the systematic risk factors f. If the systematic risks are hedged 
perfectly, all          would be equal to zero, leaving the idiosyncratic component as the only 
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source of risk for the arbitrageur.
12
 This is consistent with the use of idiosyncratic volatility 
(Ivol) as a proxy for the holding cost constraint in Gagnon and Karoyli (2010) when 
examining arbitrage profits from the simultaneous purchase and sale of equivalent securities 
in two different markets. According to Deither et al. (2009), arbitrageurs who hold stocks for 
longer (shorter) periods may be more concerned with holding (transaction) costs, where 
holding costs include idiosyncratic risks and lending fees. 
 Pontiff (2006) discusses the treatment of idiosyncratic volatility in the finance literature. 
He argues that while idiosyncratic volatility does not matter in a CAPM framework where 
investors are well diversified, an arbitrageur cannot costlessly diversify away idiosyncratic 
risk regardless of the level of portfolio diversification. To illustrate this point, Pontiff (2006) 
considers a simple market with one risk factor (the market) where an investor is faced with a 
certain number of mispriced securities. A sophisticated investor could create a hedge 
portfolio for the mispriced securities, where a hedge portfolio packages a long position in the 
mispriced security and a short position in the market portfolio proportional to the risk loading 
of the security. Assuming that the hedge is complete, the “packaged” position still bears 
idiosyncratic risk.  Duan et al. (2010) conclude that it is unlikely that lending fees on shorted 
shares can fully explain the lack of arbitrage, and that arbitrage costs represented by 
idiosyncratic volatility are a more likely candidate. 
 Thus, the rate of return required by the arbitrageur holding the long-short position 
becomes: 
                                                    (3.4) 
where   is the sensitivity of the return of the arbitrageur to the unhedgeable risk of the long-
short position, and all the other terms are as previously defined. Thus, an increase in Ivol 
should increase the required rate of return from the arbitrage position leading to a decrease in 
the mispricing portion of the CEF premium from the perspective of the arbitrageur, all else 
held equal. The uncertainty about a CEF’s holdings based on publicly available information 
that is not updated continuously also affects the ability of the arbitrageur to replicate the 
NAVPS suitably.  This limitation in replicating the systematic factors by the arbitrage 
                                                             
12 This does not depend upon the mixed findings on whether idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol) is priced in an asset-
pricing context. For example, Fu (2008) finds that idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol) has a positive premium for 
individual stocks in the US while other studies conclude that the relationship between idiosyncratic volatilities 
and expected returns is negative (Guo and Savickas 2006; Ang et al. 2006, 2009).  
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position, which is captured by         , also leads to an increase in the rate of return required 
from the long-short position.   
 
3.3.3 Hypotheses  
 Our hypotheses follow from the model described above where we argued that the 
premium is a result of a tradeoff between CEF benefits and costs, the risks associated with 
the realization of the net benefits and the costs and risks of arbitraging away any remaining 
mispricing. When the investor has confidence in the manager’s ability to provide positive net 
benefits, the fund should trade at a positive premium based on this benefit. To measure the 
uncertainty for the arbitrageur about CEF mispricing, we use the systematic and idiosyncratic 
risk exposures of taking a long/short position in the CEF and its NAVPS.  
 Hence, our first hypothesis in its alternative form (  
 ) is that the level of the CEF 
premium is related to the risks associated with an arbitrage position undertaken to eliminate 
any CEF mispricing. As noted earlier, an arbitrageur is faced with replicating the systematic 
risk exposures of the arbitrage portfolio and any remaining idiosyncratic risk exposure, which 
would be reduced if the arbitrageur knew the exact composition of the CEF’s portfolio at all 
points in time. We expect a negative relationship between this arbitrage risk and the dollar 
premium.  
 Our second alternative hypothesis (  
 ), which relates CEF benefits to the CEF premium, 
is that the liquidity differential between the CEF and its holdings or its managerial net 
benefits decreases a negative premium or increases a positive CEF premium. Cherkes et al. 
(2009) and Berk and Stanton (2007) argue that CEFs with distributions of liquidity and net 
managerial benefits that differ in their means are associated with different CEF premiums. 
 Our third alternative hypothesis (  
 ) is that arbitrage uncertainty is related to the 
characteristics of CEF holdings. We expect that premiums will be more negative or less 
positive with the greater use of cash, bonds, and lottery-like assets for an equity CEF. We 
conjecture that greater holdings of cash and bonds decrease the present value of future CEF 
benefits by increasing the rate of return that other holdings need to earn. Similarly, we 
conjecture that lottery-like assets increase the asymmetry of the cash flows from the assets 
held by the CEF. This would increase the overall risk of the long-short position and its 




3.4. SAMPLE, DATA AND ARBITRAGE RISK 
3.4.1. Sample and Data 
 We draw our sample of US equity CEFs listed in the US market from the Morningstar 
Direct database. After collecting the detailed historical holdings, our initial sample of 153 
funds is reduced to 93 funds which represent 85% of all domestic equity CEFs in the US.
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Although holdings data became available in 1998, most of the fund holdings are only 
available after 2002. Morningstar collects the data directly from fund managers making the 
information available before being reported officially in the SEC filings. The holdings (asset 
names, dollar values and weights) are reported on a monthly or quarterly basis. According to 
the filters that we set to obtain our sample, most of the weights of the funds are invested in 
US stocks, but there are investments in other asset categories such as bonds, options, swaps, 
and currencies. We manually identify each of the asset types based on the name descriptions 
and other information, and match them to the stocks in the CRSP database. We are able to 
identify a total of 5,567 unique permno CRSP identifiers. We report the descriptive statistics 
for the different asset holdings in table 3.1. The average holdings over the time period are 
83.00% for equity, 8.05% for debt, 4.81% for cash, and 3.61% for options.  
 
[Please place table 3.1 about here.] 
 
3.4.2 Calculation of Arbitrage Risk Proxies  
 To estimate the arbitrage risk proxies discussed earlier for CEFs and months with at least 
15 daily returns, we use the Carhart (1997) 4-factor model:  
                                                                           
      (3.5) 
Where for each day d of month t,        is the net return of the long/short position in CEF i 
and its NAVPS,       is the excess return of the market portfolio,       and       are the 
two additional Fama-French factors,      is the momentum factor,
 14
 and      is the error 
term. We calculate the NAVPS returns using the methodology outlined in Wermers et al. 
                                                             
13 The percentage is calculated based on the average yearly number of closed end funds reported by the 
Investment Company Institute. http://www.ici.org/cef/background/bro_g2_ce 




(2006) and Cherckes et al. (2009) where the expense ratio is incorporated in the NAVPS 
returns. As in Goyal and Santa Clara (2003), we add a second term to capture the covariance 
between lagged returns so that the             from equation (3.6) is given by: 
             √∑     
  
    
  ∑           
 
     (3.6) 
where T is the number of days in the month, and all the other terms are defined as earlier.  
 If the arbitrageur can perfectly hedge the systematic shocks to the net position returns, 
then the arbitrageur is only exposed to idiosyncratic risk. However, as argued earlier, this 
may not be the case if the arbitrageur does not adopt the perfect hedge ratio due to the lack of 
up-to-date information about the holdings of the CEF. Table 3.2 reports the mean and median 
of these monthly factor sensitivities for the net positions for our full sample which indicates 
statistically significant average factor sensitivities for three factors (SMB, HML and WML) 
but not for the market risk factor. These statistically significant average sensitivities show 
that arbitrageurs using a 1-to-1 hedge ratio are not able to completely eliminate the hedgeable 
risk for an arbitrage position involving its CEF and NAVPS using the Carhart 4-factor model.  
 The arbitrageur will always be exposed to idiosyncratic uncertainty. The average monthly 
R-square of equation (3.6) of 28.64% indicates that 71.36% of the return variation for the net 
position            is not explained by the systematic factors and is unhedgeable using 
systematic factor arbitrage. Thus, uncertainty about the holdings of the fund, which also 
creates inaccuracy of the hedge ratio, creates uncertainty about both the hedgeable and 
unhedgeable components of the net position. The average          is 6.98% with a median of 
4.8%. The mean difference (premium) between the prices of a CEF and its NAVPS of -
5.62% is comparable to the values previously reported in the literature (Pontiff 1996; Cherkes 
et al. 2009).  
[Please insert table 3.2 about here.] 
 
3.5. REPLICATION OF PONTIFF’S MODEL USING OUR SAMPLE DATA
 Pontiff (1996) was the first to consider CEF arbitrage risk, as measured by the 
idiosyncratic risk of the NAVPS portfolio, as a limitation for exploiting any potential CEF 
mispricing.
15
 We benchmark our empirical analysis by replicating Pontiff’s (1996) analysis 
(as reported in his table I, p. 1143) using our sample data composed of equity-only funds for 
a different time period. Our findings, which are reported in table 3.3, confirm the negative 
                                                             
15 The concept of arbitrage risk in CEF arbitrage was further explained in Pontiff (2006). 
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relationship between the unhedgeable component and the premium level as identified by 
Pontiff. The median explanatory power of unhedgeable risk, liquidity, transaction costs and 
hedgeable risk in explaining premium variation is around 25%. However, when the control 
variables are excluded, the median explanatory power drops to 2.54%. When we add the 
idiosyncratic skewness of the residuals from the NAVPS returns to the regression as a 
preliminary test of its importance, the median adjusted R-square increases to 46%, and the 
premium and idiosyncratic skewness are positively and significantly related. In the next 
sections, we provide more detailed examinations of the determinants of the variations in CEF 
premiums. 
[Please place table 3.3 about here.] 
 
3.6. METHODOLOGY 
 We run Fama-MacBeth type cross-sectional regressions for each month over the period 
2001:01 to 2010:12. The number of funds with available holding information from 
Morningstar Direct changes over the period. We test the impact on premium levels due to the 
cost of CEF arbitrage as captured by the sensitivities of a CEF’s net position returns to the 
systematic risk factors and its idiosyncratic volatility, the characteristics of its holdings and 
its potential benefits and costs as specified earlier in equation (3.1). We estimate the 
following regression for           
  (i.e., the level or change in the CEF premium when m = 
level and m = change, respectively) for CEF i for month t: 
          
  
           ̂                  ̂                    ̂             
     ̂                                                                
                                                   
                                      (           )  
     (       ⁄ )                                                   
            (3.7) 
  
 The expected mean coefficients are zero for  ̂            , ̂            ,   ̂           , and 
 ̂           (i.e., the factor sensitivity estimates from the 4-factor Carhart model of the net 
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returns of a long/short CEF/NAVPS position obtained from equation (3.5)). The expected 
coefficient is negative for               (i.e., the idiosyncratic volatility of the net returns).  
 The expected coefficient for            (i.e., the CEF’s idiosyncratic skewness) is 
negative if this variable captures the preferences of under-diversified investors. Boyer et al. 
(2010) develop and report empirical support for an equilibrium model that captures under-
diversified investor preferences for idiosyncratic skewness as measured by (also, see Bali et 
al. 2011):  
                
   [(∑       
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)⁄ ]  (3.8) 
where all the terms are as defined earlier.  
 We have no a priori expectation for the coefficient of               (i.e., the total weight 
of a CEF’s holdings of options) since it may signal the level of reliance of the CEF manager 
on “lottery-like” assets (Boyer and Vorkink 2014) or the use of a more cost-effective trading 
strategy for risk management purposes. The average (maximum) weight of the more than 
10,000 different options in our sample of CEF portfolios is 3.61% (7.97%), and the average 
increases to 27.55% when we exclude CEFs with no option holdings. Thus, the average CEF 
that uses options places a heavy reliance on options.  
 The expected coefficient for            (i.e., the weight of cash and cash equivalent 
assets) is, on balance, negative. The effect on the deviations between CEF market prices and 
NAVPS depends upon the net effect of the low uncertainty and high liquidity associated with 
cash holdings versus the decrease in managerial contribution to CEF value if cash is not held 
for strategic purposes. 
 The expected coefficient for             (i.e., the weight of bonds in the CEF) is, on 
balance, negative for similar reasons as for cash.    
 The expected coefficient is negative for gross               (i.e., the ratio of non-
common equity to total assets using CEF financial statements from S&P Capital IQ) and 
positive for net               (i.e., when the cash ratio is removed). Elton et al. (2013) argue 
that CEFs unlike OEFs have the unique ability to finance themselves using instruments in 
addition to common equity so that a CEF’s market price is equal to its NAVPS plus the per-
share value of leverage.  The value of CEF leverage depends upon its cost. It may contribute 
positively to CEF value if the non-common-equity instruments can be financed at lower rates 
than are available to the dominant (individual) investor group in a CEF because their 





 The CEF leverage may contribute negatively to CEF value if used to 
fund cash for the same reasons given earlier for the weight of cash or positively to CEF value 
if used to earn the return differential between their cost and equity returns. Deli and Varma 
(2002) and Cherkes et al. (2009) report that CEF premiums are related to their leverage 
ratios,
17
 and Elton et al. (2013) find that the systematically greater leverages of CEFs 
partially explain the coexistence of otherwise identical CEFs and OEFs for their sample of 
only bond funds where leverage benefits through favorable tax treatment are material.  The 
mean and median non-common equity financing percentages for our CEF sample are 14.03% 
and 9.8%, respectively, with our mean being smaller than that of Cherkes et al. of 16%.  
 The expected coefficient is negative for          (i.e., the difference in the amortized 
spreads between the CEF and its asset holdings) leading to a positive premium if large 
enough (Datar 2001).  Given the liquidity characteristics of a CEF and its asset holdings, this 
variable mimics the same arbitrage strategy of taking a long (short) position in low (high) 
liquidity stocks that Idzorek et al. (2012) find yields a significant abnormal return. The 
inclusion of this variable allows for a test of the hypothesis of Cherkes et al. (2009), among 
others, that CEFs provide investors with the opportunity to hold a portfolio of illiquid stocks 
in a liquid instrument. Arbitrage between the fund and its portfolio also becomes less costly 
with lower liquidity differences between the CEF and its asset holdings. We proxy liquidity 
for the CEF and its asset holdings by the amortized spread measure of Chalmers and Kadlec 
(1998) given for CEF i and month t by:
18
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where |             | and |       | are the effective spread for the CEF and its 
portfolio of assets, respectively;         and     are the number of outstanding shares at 
month end for the CEF and its underlying assets, respectively;         and     are the trading 
volumes for the CEF and its underlying assets, respectively; and w is the weight of each asset 
in the CEF’s holdings.  
                                                             
16 However, extensive use of leverage increases the riskiness of the arbitrage position because the future claims 
of non-common equity would be less volatile than the revenues generated by leveraging the fund (i.e. distress 
costs). The maximum level of leverage in our sample is 36%. 
17 While Cherkes et al. (2009) discuss the impact of leverage on illiquidity, they did not formally incorporate 
leverage into their model. 
18
 The daily closing price is taken as a proxy for the execution price, and the closing mid-spread is used in its 
absence. This measure is only appropriate for assets that trade. 
48 
 
    The expected coefficient is positive for            (i.e., the contribution of the 
management team and others such as trader executors and advisors to CEF performance, 
which is obtained from the Carhart 4-factor model over the five years prior to month t using 
the monthly returns for       ). In the rational models of Berk and Stanton (2007) referred 
to earlier, managerial performance enhancement is positive (negative) for superiorly 
(inferiorly) managed CEFs as their managers are under- (over-) compensated between 
compensation setting dates when the management fees are adjusted upwards (downwards) to 
better reflect the manager’s performance.   
 The coefficients are expected to be positive for   (           ) and        ⁄  (i.e., the 
market value and the inverse of the price for the CEF). These variables are included to 
control for the effect of transaction costs on a CEF’s premium. Pontiff (1996) argues that 
transaction costs are higher for smaller-sized CEFs as measured by market values or share 
prices because smaller CEFs tend to be more illiquid leading to a higher level of persistence 
in their premiums.  
 The coefficient is expected to be positive for         (i.e., the dividend yield for the CEF). 
Early papers considered dividend yield as a transaction cost of arbitrage (e.g., Pontiff 1996) 
which are expected to be higher for dividend-paying firms because stock prices tend to fall by 
less than the dividend that the short-seller is required to pay (e.g., from 0.7653 to 0.8626 for 
taxable and non-taxable cash dividends in Bali and Hite (1998)). Elton et al. (2003) find that 
dividend tax treatment affects CEF prices based on a comparison of the dividend price effects 
for different taxable (Bond) and non-taxable (Munis) CEFs. These differential tax issues 
should be minimized in our sample because our sample consists of only domestic equity 
funds. More recent studies consider CEF dividend yields as signals of value so that CEF 
premiums are expected to increase (become less negative or more positive as the CEF 
commits to distribute more of its cash flows. While Wang (2004) and Johnson, Lin and Song 
(2006) find supportive evidence for this hypothesis, Wang and Nanda (2011) and Cherkes et 
al. (2011) do not. 
 The coefficients are expected to be negative and positive, respectively, for 
              and             (i.e., tenure of the CEF manager in years obtained from 
Morningstar). The positive relation between managerial tenure and CEF premiums depends 
on the benefits of managerial abilities being positively related to managerial tenure and the 
benefits being shared between the manager and the CEF. 
 [Please place table 3.4 about here.] 
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 Table 3.4 reports summary statistics (e.g., median, mean and standard deviation) for all the 
potential determinants of the CEF premiums used in the subsequent empirical tests. As we 
discussed earlier, our average premium is in line with the literature (e.g., Pontiff 1996). The 
standard deviation of the premiums is high reflecting the existence of some deeply discounted 
funds in our sample. We observe that an arbitrageur is exposed to an average monthly 
idiosyncratic risk (       ) of 6.98% with a standard deviation of 4.3%. To put these 
numbers into perspective, Fu (2009) reports that the average monthly idiosyncratic volatility 
for a pooled sample of 2,946,521 firm-month observations is 14.17% with a standard 
deviation of 13.91%.  The average       of -0.014 indicates that the average CEF in our 
sample has little to offer investors who prefer idiosyncratic skewness.  
 The average     of 0.3% indicates that an average CEF has a higher liquidity than its 
underlying holdings. The mean and median            are 5.59 and 5.64 (corresponding to 
267 and 281 million dollars respectively), with a standard deviation of 1.25. The mean and 
median inverse prices (1/P) are 0.06 and 0.08, respectively, with a standard deviation of 0.08. 
The mean and median    are 1.59% and 1.26%, respectively, with a standard deviation of 
1.14%.  
 The mean and median          is 1.59% and 1.26%, respectively, with a standard 
deviation of 1.14%. The mean and median average        is 9.52 and 7.75 years, 
respectively. The mean and median       are -0.44% and -0.42%, respectively, with a 
standard deviation of 0.82%. Thus, the contribution of an average CEF manager for the 
studied period is negative, implying that any value added by the manager does not cover fund 
expenses for the sample of CEFs and time period studied herein. 
[Please place table 3.5 about here.] 
 Table 3.5 reports the average cross-sectional correlation coefficients between each pair of 
explanatory and control variables and their corresponding p-values. Our explanatory 
variables have low levels of correlations implying that multicollinearity should not be a 
concern. As expected, the CEF premium is significantly and negatively correlated at -0.40 
with Ivolnet and marginally significant and positively correlated at 0.21 with managerial 
contribution (Alpha).        is the most correlated dependent variable. It is negatively 
correlated with Ivolnet,            ,   ⁄  and          and, as expected, positively 
correlated with      . The second most correlated dependent variable,         , is 
positively correlated with Ivolnet, and     and negatively correlated with   . The negative 
correlation of -0.326 between Ivolnet and       is consistent with the premise that the 
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nonhedgeable risk of the arbitrage position increases as the performance of the fund 
decreases.  
 
3.7. DETERMINANTS OF CEF PREMIUM LEVELS AND THEIR CHANGES 
 Before proceeding to a presentation and discussion of the empirical results, our estimates 
of the Fama-MacBeth regression coefficients are adjusted for autocorrelation using a method 
first used by Pontiff (1996) and subsequently used by Cornett et al. (2008), Irvine and Pontiff 
(2009), amongst others. The adjusted versions of the coefficient estimates and their standard 
errors are obtained by regressing the time-series of the parameter estimates on an intercept 
term and modeling the residuals as a sixth-order autoregressive process. The standard error of 
the intercept is then the corrected standard error for that coefficient. As long as the sixth-
order autoregressive process captures all of the serial dependence, these standard errors are 
not biased by serial or cross-sectional correlation. 
 Furthermore, in this and subsequent sections of the essay, we not only examine statistical 
significance but also the elasticities of some of the variables that have statistical significance 
using two measures. The first measure is obtained by multiplying the estimated coefficient of 
an independent variable by the ratio of that variable’s mean to the mean of the dependent 
variable. The second measure is obtained by first multiplying the estimated coefficient of the 
independent variable by its mean value to get the absolute reduction in the mean of the 
dependent variable from driving the mean value of the independent variable to zero (as in 
Aggarwal et al. 2009). Then the relative reduction is obtained by dividing this absolute 
reduction by the mean of the dependent variable. 
 
3.7.1 Fama-MacBeth Cross-sectional Regressions for CEF Premiums 
[Please place table 3.6 about here.] 
 The regression results for the monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions of CEF 
premium levels on various potential determinants for the period 2001-2010 are reported in 
table 3.6. We find that the average explanatory power of the regressions increases from a 
mean R
2
 of 12.69% [run (2)] when only         is included to 27.88% [run (3)] when the 
systematic-risk exposures of the arbitrage portfolio are also included to 67% [run (6)] when 
all the potential determinants of CEF premiums considered herein are included. The mean 
coefficient estimate of the sensitivity of the net returns of the long CEF/short NAVPS 
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position on the market, HML and momentum factors are statistically insignificant implying 
that the average factor loadings of these risks do not significantly affect the changes in the 
CEF dollar premium.  However, the significant (negative) coefficient for the SMB factor 
implies that the Fama-French size factor contributes to the cross-sectional variation in CEF 
dollar premiums. This finding of hedging difficulties with the SMB factor is consistent with a 
behavioral explanation of the CEF premium given that Qui and Welsh (2006) find that 
proxies for market sentiment are correlated with small stock returns but not with CEF 
premiums.  
 Since the mean coefficient estimate for         is consistently negative and highly 
significant, CEF premiums become less positive or more negative as idiosyncratic volatilities 
increase. When we multiply the estimated coefficients of         in table 3.6 by the ratio of 
the mean         to the mean CEF premium from table 3.4, we estimate that a 1% change in 
        results in a CEF premium change ranging from 9.74% to 17.64%. We obtain the 
impact when           by first multiplying the estimated coefficients of         from table 
3.6 by the mean         from table 3.4 to get the absolute reductions in the mean CEF 
premium that range from 68.05% to 123.18%. Then we divide these absolute reductions by 
the mean CEF premium from table 3.4 to get the relative increases in the mean CEF premium 
that range from 12.1 to 21.9 times.   
 The mean coefficient estimates for       are consistently negative as expected but their 
statistical significances change considerably between runs 4, 5 and 6. However, the 
importance of       is marginal since a one percentage change in       changes the 
premium by 0.002%. The mean coefficient estimate of          is positive and highly 
significant only in run (5) where its importance is marginal since a one percent increase in 
this variable only increases the premium by 0.06%. The significance for          
disappears when control variables for transaction costs and managerial characteristics are 
included in the regressions.   The mean coefficient estimate of holding cash has its expected 
negative sign but becomes insignificant when all the independent variables are included in 
regression runs (5) and (6). The mean coefficient of        has its expected negative sign 
even after adding all the other control variables. An increase of 1% in bond holdings leads to 
a 0.07% decrease in the CEF premium.  
 The mean coefficient estimate of     is positive and highly significant. When the     
(i.e., the difference in liquidities between the CEF and its asset holdings) is eliminated (i.e., 
      , the mean CEF premium is reduced by 0.2% of its mean value. A one percent 
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change in     would lead to an increase of 1.4% in the CEF premium. This is consistent 
with our expectation and the findings of Datar (2001) and Deli and Varma (2002). The highly 
significant mean coefficient estimate of       of 0.51 implies that a one percent increase in 
the performance of the CEF manager would increase a positive or decrease a negative CEF 
premium by 0.31%. The mean coefficient estimate for gross Leverage is negative and 
significant as expected but becomes marginally significant when all potential determinants 
are considered [run (6)]. Thus, all the three potential benefits of the CEF in the conceptual 
model discussed earlier are statistically significant with their expected signs. Given the same 
level of risk of the arbitrage position, an increase in either liquidity or managerial 
contribution increases the CEF premium while an increase in gross leverage decreases the 
CEF premium.   
 The mean coefficient estimate of            (i.e., natural log of market value as a proxy 
for arbitrage costs) is negative and highly significant as expected, which implies that the CEF 
premium decreases as firm size increases. Thus, a 1% increase in this variable would 
decrease the CEF premium by 0.06%.  The mean coefficient estimate of   ⁄  (i.e., inverse of 
the CEF’s price and another proxy for arbitrage costs) is positive and highly significant. 
Thus, a 1% increase in the inverse of the CEF’s price would lead to a 1.04% increase of the 
CEF premium. The mean coefficient estimate of    (i.e., CEF dividend yield) is positive but 
not significant at conventional levels. While Pontiff (1996) did not find any statistical 
significance for the two size variables [           and   ], he argues that the CEF 
premium would be higher due to the higher cost of an arbitrage trade to take advantage of the 
CEF premium for small and low priced CEFs.
19
  
 The mean coefficient estimate of          is negative and strongly significant as 
expected. A 1% increase in          would only marginally change the CEF premium by 
-0.2%. The mean coefficient estimate for        is positive, and statistically and 
economically significant, since an increase in        by 1% would increase the CEF 
premium by 9.91%.  
 
3.7.2 Fama-MacBeth Cross-sectional Regressions for CEF premiums with Idiosyncratic 
Risk Conditioned on Past CEF Performance 
[Please place table 3.7 about here.] 
                                                             
19 Pontiff (1996) reports that the median and mean R-squares increase from 11.77% to 22.73% and 14.75 to 
27.16%, respectively, with the addition of these three variables: dividend yield, natural log of market value and 
inverse of CEF price. 
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 We now explore the relationship between the premium levels and idiosyncratic volatilities 
when the latter is conditioned on the sign of the change in the CEF price as reported in table 
3.7. Similar to our results in tables 3.6, the average explanatory power exceeds 60% for the 
regression with all potential determinants. When only the arbitrage risk proxies are included 
and         is conditioned using the previous month’s CEF price, the average explanatory 
power increases from 23.55% [table 3.6, run (1)] to 30.20% [table 3.7, run (2)]. Similar to our 
findings in table (3.6), the mean coefficient estimates for the systematic risk factors for the 
net return position are statistically insignificant except for        . The mean estimate of 
       is negative and statistically significant regardless of the sign of the previous month’s 
CEF price change, although the negatively conditioned         loses its significance when all 
CEF premium determinants are included in run (4). The decrease in the premium ranges from 
17.95% to 26.70% for a 1% decrease in a positively conditioned         and from 3.50% to 
4.69% for its negatively conditioned equivalent. When          , we find that the 
premium is positive with maximum absolute value changes of 150% and 30.50% when 
conditioned on positive and negative previous month’s CEF prices, respectively.  
 The results for all the other variables reported in table (3.7) generally are consistent with 
our findings reported earlier in table (3.6). The mean coefficient estimate of gross          
is still significantly negative. Unlike our results reported in table (3.6), the mean estimate of  
    is positive and significant at the 10% level and a 1% change in     now only leads to a 
change of 0.01% in the CEF premium. The mean coefficient estimate of       is positive 
and highly significant so that a 1% increase in       would increase the CEF premium by 
0.13%. Similar to table (3.6), coefficients estimates of             and          are 
negative and statistically significant, while those for     ,    and        are statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels.  
[Please place table 3.8 about here.] 
 At this point, we summarize our findings from tables 3.6 and 3.7 with our expectations for 
each determinant in table 3.8. The principal arbitrage risk determinant represented by 
       is negative and statistically significant for all the regression runs. Only one of the 
hedge completeness proxies for systematic risk exposures (namely,        ) is consistently 
significantly different from zero. Consistent with the first hypothesis, the three CEF benefits 
are statistically significant with their expected signs. Specifically, we find that our proxies for 
relative liquidity (   ) and managerial contributions to value (        ) are associated with 
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an increase in the value of the CEF versus its NAVPS, and that for gross Liquidity is 
associated with a decrease in the value of the CEF versus its NAVPS. In our second 
hypothesis, we argued that if the arbitrageur knows exactly what the CEF holdings are, she 
can more accurately form the arbitrage position. We also argued that the type of the CEF 
holdings increase the cost of the arbitrage position either because of uncertainty and 
asymmetry of the NAVPS returns (        ) or because of their lower expected returns 
(e.g. cash and bonds) compared to the higher expected rate of return expected on an all-equity 
CEF. We could not confirm our hypothesis about the weight of options most likely because 
the mean idiosyncratic skewness is close to zero but do so for cash and bonds where the mean 
coefficient estimates are consistently significant and negative as expected.  
 
3.7.3 Fama–MacBeth Cross-sectional Regressions for Changes in CEF Premiums 
[Please place table 3.9 about here.] 
 Regression results reported in Table 3.9 for month-by-month changes in CEF premiums 
provide insights into the determinants of the mechanism that may cause CEF prices to 
recalibrate to their fundamental values. The average explanatory powers (R
2
) increase from 
10.73% when conditional         is the sole independent variable [run (1)] to 68.56% with 
the inclusion of all potential determinants [run (4)]. The mean coefficient estimate of          
is consistently negative and highly significant (not significant) when conditioned on the 
lagged positive (negative) monthly changes in the previous month’s CEF price.   For the full 
model [run (4) in table 3.9], the magnitude of the         coefficient estimate is considerably 
higher than in the other runs but its sign and statistical significance remain. For this full 
model, a 1% decrease in         would result in a 4.3% decrease in the average monthly 
change in CEF premiums. The average monthly change in CEF premiums decreases by 251% 
(2.5 times) in relative terms if idiosyncratic risk is eliminated (         ). We once again 
observe that only          is significantly different from zero. The mean coefficients of 
     ,         ,         , and     are insignificant at conventional levels.  
 The mean coefficient estimate for          is positive and highly significant in run (3) 
but becomes insignificant in run (4) for the full model. The mean coefficient estimates of  
          ,         , and DY are all insignificant in run (4). The mean coefficient 
estimate of   ⁄  is positive and significant at the 10% level in run (4), which indicates that a 
1% increase in this variable would lead to a 0.05% decrease in the change of the CEF 
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premium. The mean coefficient estimate for        is negative and statistically significant at 
conventional levels.  
 
3.8. TESTS OF ROBUSTNESS 
3.8.1 Fama-MacBeth Cross-sectional Regressions for CEF Premiums over the 
Subperiod of 2006-2010 
 We run cross-sectional regressions over the sub-period 2006-2010 for two reasons. First, it 
provides a test of the relationship between CEF premiums and its determinants that 
encapsulates the financial crisis of 2008-2009. Second, it allows us to use our Data Explorer 
database, whose coverage starts in 2006, to add determinants that further control for the 
ability of investors to short a CEF. Asset mispricing may disappear if short selling is allowed 
and loaning securities is available. Flynn (2010) argues that the level of short selling 
increases with more negative CEF premiums, which should induce a positive relationship 
between the level of the premium and short-selling activity. Thus, as a test of robustness, we 
add controls for the number of short positions in the holdings of the CEF, and the utilization 
rate of shorts for the stocks held by the CEF. Utilization rate is defined as the number of 
shares being borrowed against the total value of the inventory available for lending. We 
expect the deviation of the CEF’s price from its incomplete fundamental value (i.e., NAVPS) 
will be lower with higher utilization rates.   
[Please place table 3.10 about here.] 
 Comparing the results that are reported in table 3.10 with those reported earlier in table 
3.7, we draw four overriding observations. First, the significant negative relationship between 
        and the CEF premium level persists. Second, the explanatory power of our 
determinants is still high (75.92%). Third, the CEF benefits from manager contribution 
become insignificant and from relative liquidity remain positive but only marginally 
significant during this period.  Fourth, the two short-selling proxies do not help in explaining 
the cross-sectional variation in CEF premiums.    
 Specifically, we find that the mean coefficient estimate for         ranges from -13.77 to -
23.29 and is highly significant, which implies that a 1% decrease of         would result in a 
CEF premium increase from 17.10% to 29.68% depending upon the model estimated. The 
incomplete hedge for the systematic risks also persists as a strong and persistent relationship 
continues between the SMB exposure of the net arbitrage position and CEF premiums.  The 
mean coefficient estimates for        and       are negative and statistically significant 
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at the 10% level. Other than            and    , all the other control variables are 
statistically insignificant including the two short-selling proxies. To isolate the effect of the 
great recession from the addition of our short selling proxies we run the cross sectional 
regression over the period 2008-2010. The relationship between         and CEF premium 
does not change and the short-selling proxies remain statistically insignificant. 
 
3.8.2 Correcting for Sentiment and Macro Variables 
 As reported earlier, the proponents of the behavioral theory explanation argue 
that CEF premiums reflect investors’ sentiments about the market. To control for 
sentiment, we use the University of Michigan Household Sentiment Index (UMSI), 
The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) developed by Stock and Watson 
(1999) and the policy Uncertainty Index (PUI) of Baker et al. (2012). The UMSI is 
a regular survey of a large number of households regarding their financial situations 
and economic expectations. This measure is closely related to other survey-based 
measures of investor sentiment (Fisher and Statman 2003; and Qiu and Welch 
2006), and has been shown to be related to investor economic activity (Ludvigson 
2004). Most importantly, Lemmon and Portniaguina (2006) find that this measure 
predicts the returns on small stocks and stocks with low institutional ownership. 
This is consistent with Fisher and Statman (2003), who find that consumer 
confidence does not forecast S&P returns, but can predict returns on NASDAQ and 
small-cap stocks. 
 The CFNAI of economic activity was developed by Stock and Watson (1999), is 
maintained by the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago and is used to control for the business 
cycle in academic research.
20
 The CFNAI is a weighted average of 85 existing monthly 
indicators of national economic activity constructed to have an average value of zero and a 
standard deviation of one. Since economic activity tends to move towards the trend growth 
rate over time, a positive (negative) index value corresponds to growth above (below) the 
trend. The PUI measures policy-related economic uncertainty based on three types of 
underlying components: namely, newspaper coverage of policy-related economic uncertainty; 
the number of federal tax code provisions set to expire in future years; and disagreement 
among economic forecasters as a proxy for uncertainty. 
                                                             
20 Available at: http://www.chicagofed.org/webpages/research/data/cfnai/historical_data.cfm 
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 The macro variables that we control for are the corporate spread and the term structure 
based on data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis (FRED).
21
 The corporate spread is 
the difference between AAA bonds and default-free government bonds, as in Longstaff et al. 
(2005). The term structure variable is the difference between the ten-year constant yield on 
US treasuries and 3-month yield on T-bills. The last additional variable is the Pastor and 
Stambaugh (2003) measure of aggregate liquidity obtained from Wharton Research Data 
Services (WRDS). To isolate the effect of these systematic factors that is not already 
reflected in the previously used fund-specific determinants in our cross-sectional regressions, 
we follow a two-step approach. The first step consists of running each fund-specific 
determinant of CEF i on the sentiment, macro and aggregate liquidity factors. The residuals 
obtained from these regressions represent the “pure” fund-specific determinants after 
removing their systematic components. The second step is to estimate equation (3.7) using 
these “pure” fund-specific determinants. 
[Please place table 3.11 about here.] 
 When we compare these new results reported in table 3.11 with those reported earlier in 
table 3.6 [runs (5) and (6)], we find that the “pure” fund-specific determinants still explain 
more than 50% of the average variations of CEF premiums. This finding supports the rational 
explanation for CEF premiums and is consistent with Chen et al. (1993) and Elton et al. 
(1998). The mean negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate of         persists 
with a 1% decrease in         leading to a decrease of 7.4% in CEF premiums for the full 
model. Like the total effects reported earlier in table 3.6, we find that the coefficient estimate 
for “pure” managerial contribution is positive and significant and those for “pure” gross 
leverage, “pure”       , “pure”       holdings, and “pure”            are negative 
and significant. Unlike the total effects reported earlier in table 3.6, we find that the 
coefficient estimate for “pure” liquidity is still positive but insignificant, that for the 
“pure”     is still significant but now negative, and that for the “pure” DY is still positive 
but now significant. Thus, most of our previous findings are robust to accounting for the 
effects of market sentiment and economic conditions.  
 
3.8.3 Fama-MacBeth Cross-sectional Regressions for CEF Premiums using a “Bottom-
up” Calculation of the Ivol using CEF Holdings 




In theory, a portfolio’s beta is defined as the weighted-average of the betas of its 
components. Thus, computing a fund`s betas using the individual security betas from 
holdings data at a point in time (“bottom-up” approach) or by a time-series regression on 
fund returns (“top-down” approach) should be the same. However, Elton et al. (2011) show 
that this argument would hold under the assumption that a fund`s composition is held 
constant between holding disclosure points and that it is more appropriate to calculate a 
fund’s betas as the weighted betas of the holdings. They argue that using this “bottom-up” 
approach decreases the level of distortion caused by changes in the composition of a portfolio 
over time.  
We estimate that the average change per asset per month in our sample portfolio is 7.52%. 
To assess if this distortion affected our previously reported findings, we use an alternative 
measure of arbitrage risk that we develop based on the holdings of the funds. Instead of 
calculating the idiosyncratic volatility of the net returns of the arbitrage position, we calculate 
the difference between the idiosyncratic volatilities of the CEF (the “top-down” approach) 
and the weighted-average of the individual holdings of the CEF (the “bottom-up” approach).  
For the purpose of this robustness test, we invoke the fairly strong assumption that the 
relative idiosyncratic risk contribution of the non-equity, non-derivative assets in a CEF’s 
portfolio are similar to that from its equity holdings. More formally, our new proxy is given 
by: 
             √∑      
  
     ∑             
 
    √∑   (∑      
   ∑             
 
   
 
   )    
 (11) 
where        (      ) is the daily residual of the 4-factor Carhart model for CEF i (CEF i`s 
holding j) in day d in month t; and T is the number of days during the month.  
[Please place table 3.12 about here.] 
 Table 3.12 reports the results of the mean estimates from cross-sectional regressions using 
this alternative measure of arbitrage risk in the full model for CEF premiums.  Compared to 
the results previously reported in table 3.6, the mean R-square of these new cross-sectional 
regressions decrease from 12.69% (table 3.6, run 2) to 8.88% (table 3.11, run 1). The mean 
coefficient estimates of both measures of          are negative and highly significant. A 1% 
change in       now results in a 7.54% change in the average CEF premium, and the 
absolute increase in the mean CEF premium now is 12.89% when             . 
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 Our hypothesis that the CEF premium includes the present value of the additional benefits 
provided by a CEF is supported by the findings for this alternative measure. The positive and 
significant mean estimate of       shows that the CEF premium increases with a manager’s 
ability to add value to the CEF. We also find that increasing leverage increases the 
opportunity cost for the CEF and consequently decreases a positive or increases a negative 
CEF premium. This explanation is confirmed by the negative and significant mean 
coefficient estimate for         and      . An increase in these holdings affects the 
returns of the CEF and leads to lower positive or more negative premiums. The significant 
positive then negative sign on the coefficient estimate of          indicates that this may 
be due to our treatment of options when estimating the idiosyncratic volatility of the arbitrage 
position. Thus, the use of an alternative method to calculate the idiosyncratic volatility of the 
arbitrage position does not change the results for this variable. Furthermore, we find that the 
CEF premium is still positively related to managerial contribution and negatively correlated 
to an increase of the holding with returns less than what the investor requires.  
 
 3.8.4 Panel Regression for the Determinants of the CEF Premium 
 We now explore the robustness of our results to the use of unbalanced panel data 
regressions. We use panel regressions because they use all cross-sectional and times-series 
data in a single step in order to avoid problems with measurement errors that may be caused 
by the use of the two-step Fama-MacBeth methodology, and various authors (e.g., Skoulakis 
2006) encourage the use of both methods to test the reliability of their results. 
 Thus, we begin by testing whether or not our data are poolable. Testing poolability 
examines if the coefficients of the regressors are the same for the 93 CEFs in our sample. The 
null hypothesis is:                      where the       are the vector of coefficients 
for fund i for all regressors. If the individual error variance components do not follow a 
normal distribution given by           , where  
  is the sample standard deviation of 
residuals and N and T are the number of cross sections and periods respectively, then simple 
OLS may not be used to conduct the Chow test (Baltagi 2001, p. 53). To determine if this 
assumption behind the Chow test is satisfied, we estimate each of the models for the CEF 
premiums using OLS and test for the equality of the residual variances. F-, Siegel-Tukey and 
Levene tests all reject the null hypothesis that the residual variances of the cross sections are 
equal.  When such is the case, Kennedy (2008) recommends the use of SURE (Seemingly 
Unrelated Regressions Estimation) to estimate the cross-sectional SSE (error sum of squares) 
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when conducting the Chow test of poolability. Our model contains two variables, number of 
shorts and utilization rate, which are available only over the sub-period of 2006-2010. Given 
the specification of the SUR estimation that requires at least as many time periods as cross 
sections and their insignificance in a previous test of robustness, we drop these two variables 
when estimating the SUR model with the remaining variables. Using the value of the SSE 
from the SURE and the SSEs of each cross section, we are unable to reject the null 
hypothesis that the coefficients are constant given that the F-value for the Chow test is 0.48.  
 The next step is to identify the possible source of the unobserved heterogeneity to choose 
the optimal effects model to use (random, fixed). The choice of model should have no effect 
on the coefficient estimates of the regressors, as it merely implies the existence of unobserved 
variables whose effects are either constant (fixed effects), random (random effects) or none 
(OLS). We start with the random effects model, which assumes that the unobserved effect is 
random and should be part of the error term of each cross section. We test for this model by 
using the Breusch and Pagan (1979) Lagrange multiplier test and the augmented version of 
the test by Pesaran (2004). We reject the null hypothesis for each test of the null that the 
variances of the unobserved heterogeneity are zero.  
 We next test using a cross-sectional F-test (or the likelihood ratio test) of whether the 
intercept estimates are constant across the funds. While OLS assumes that they are constant, 
fixed-effects estimation does not. The null hypothesis is that all the intercept dummies for the 
cross sections are equal to zero. A F-value of 30.15 leads to a rejection of the null hypothesis. 
Hence, OLS is rejected against both the random- and fixed-effects models. The last test that 
we perform is the Hausman test, which examines the random and period effects. If the null 
hypothesis that an individual effect is uncorrelated with the regressors is rejected, fixed-
effects estimation should be used. If this null is not rejected, then the use of random-effects 
estimation captures the unobservable components. The Hausman test rejects the null 
hypothesis supporting the use of a fixed-effects estimation model for our data set. 
 Before we proceed with the modeling of our panel premium regressions, it is important to 
test the level of autocorrelation in the CEF premium series. We perform a correlogram and 
find that the coefficient of autocorrelation is highly significant with a value of 0.814. This 
finding implies the need to use a lagged premium variable in our estimation to capture this 
effect, thus making our panel regression dynamic. However, the use of a lagged dependent 
variable as an explanatory variable renders the use of least squares no longer consistent as 
this issue is referred to in the literature as the LSDV bias (Hsiao 2003).  Hsiao (2003) shows 
that even Maximum Least Square (MLE) are not consistent when modeling a fixed effects 
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panel with a lagged dependent variable, and only Instrumental Variable GMM would yield 
consistent estimates. We use the Arellano and Bond (1991) difference GMM estimator. We 
form our instrument variables from lagged levels of the endogenous regressors in a two-step 
least square estimation of the GMM criterion.  
   [Please place table 3.13 about here.] 
 We report in table 3.13 the results of the GMM dynamic regression of the CEF premium 
on the previously mentioned determinants. The R-square values increase monotonically from 
65.43% in run (1) to 71.59% in run (3).  The coefficient estimate of the lagged premium 
variable is close to the autocorrelation level found in the correlogram, which proves the 
importance of modeling the panel as a dynamic one. In runs (1) to (3), the coefficient 
estimate for         is negative and statistically significant implying that an increase in the 
arbitrage cost of the position decreases the CEF premium. A one percent increase in         
would lead to a small decrease of 0.01% in the premium, and the premium closes by 0.5% 
when         is forced to zero. The addition of CEF holdings of options, cash and bonds 
increases the explanatory power of the model but only the coefficient on        is 
statistically significant supporting our earlier finding that a high level of bonds in the 
portfolio decreases the level of the premium. The benefits of CEFs in our model show their 
appropriate signs. Our liquidity differential measure and leverage are positive and negative 
respectively; and both are statistically significant. The coefficient estimates are both negative 
and statistically significant for            and   ⁄ . An increase in market value and a 
decrease in the price of the CEF increase the level of a CEF’s premiums.  
 
3.8.5 Gross versus Net Leverage 
 Elton et al. (2012) show that gross leverage is an important distinction between CEF and 
OEF. They find that bonds CEF are outperforming their comparable bonds OEF only because 
they have the ability to raise cheaper funds. However, our findings suggest that equity CEF 
premiums are negatively related to the gross leverage ratio. We explained this result by the 
possible use of leverage as a source of cash.  
 Like some studies in corporate finance that treat cash as negative debt (e.g., Bates et al. 
2009; Acharya et al. 2011),
22
 we use an alternative measure of leverage, called net leverage, 
                                                             
22 Bates et al. (2009) note that when “we consider the average net leverage ratio, which subtracts cash from 
debt, we obtain a dramatically different perspective regarding the time trend in leverage for U.S. firms”.  
Acharya et al. (2011, p. 27) state that the net leverage measure is obviously important “if firms react to 




that is given by the difference between the ratio of non-equity to total assets (gross leverage) 
minus the ratio of cash holdings to total assets. Running the Fama and MacBeth cross 
sectional regression equation (3.7) with net instead of gross leverage, we find that the 
coefficient of net leverage is positive (unlike the previous negative value for gross leverage) 
and significant at the 10% level. This result supports our explanation that leverage adds value 
when its relatively cheaper money is invested in higher returning assets.   
 
3.8.6 Level of Market Integration between a CEF’s Price and its NAVPS  
 Kapadia and Pu (2012) propose a simple non-parametric measure that tests the variation in 
the prices of two assets over a certain time horizon. If two assets are integrated, increases 
(decreases) in both should be simultaneous. Using this logic, we test the level of integration 
between the intrinsic value of the CEF’s portfolio of assets (as represented by its NAVPS) 
and its price (CEF), which should have a high level of integration in a frictionless market. If 
on a given date we have k = 1, . . . , M observations of CEF prices and NAVPS, then: 
  ̂  ∑ ∑  [        
       
   ]
   
   
   
    (3.12) 
where   is the number of periods, and        and      are respectively changes in 
NAVPS and CEF prices over the non-overlapping interval  .This parametric test simply 
calculates the number of times that both changes in the price of CEF and NAVPS are in the 
same direction. We calculate the cross-sectional mean and median percentage changes in the 
price of the CEF and its respective NAVPS that have the same sign across all intervals   for 
all possible          pairs. We find that the percentage of instances where both the CEF 
and NAVPS move in the same (opposite) direction is 67.45% (32.52%) across all 
intervals  .23   
 Kapadia and Pu (2012) use the Kendall correlation to allow for the testing of the 
hypothesis of market integration using standard statistical theory. The Kendall correlation 
consists of calculating the difference between the number of concordant and discordant pairs 
divided by the number of pairs in the whole sample. Kapadia and Pu (2012) argue that a 
measure of concordance can serve as a measure of market integration without any parametric 
assumptions. Unlike alternative measures such as the coefficient of determination, this 
measure is directly linked to pricing discrepancies with no ambiguity in its interpretation. We 
follow the same methodology to obtain Kapadia and Pu’s (2012) equation (2):  
                                                             
23 Tabulated results are available from the authors. 
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   (3.13) 
where C and D refer to the number of concordant and discordant pairs, respectively, in our 
sample. Since the value of   corresponds to the Kendal tau, it is bounded by -1 and +1. If the 
value of   is positive (negative), it implies that there are more (less) concordant pairs than 
discordant ones. Thus,   values of -1 (+1) indicate that the two series are fully segmented 
(integrated) while a value of zero indicates that the two series are not closer to either being 
fully integrated or fully segmented.  
 We test the value of   using a one tail test for the null hypothesis that the two series are 
fully segmented (  :   = -1) and fully integrated (  :   = 1). Kendall and Gibbons (1990) 
argue that a normal distribution approximation can be used for the Kendall tau statistic when 
the number of pairs is large. We calculate   for different time intervals in days   
              and test the statistical significance of each   using a z test where the standard 
error is calculated as        ⁄  √           ⁄ . As expected, we find that the level 
of integration ( ) increases with the time interval used in the calculation. The number of 
concordant pairs increases from 56% to 67% and   increases from 0.19 to 0.28 when we 
move from a 1- to a 25-day interval. Thus, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that these 
two price-change series are fully segmented (  = -1) 98% of the time for the 1-day time 
interval and 100% of the time for the other four time intervals. Similarly, we are able to reject 
the null hypothesis that these two price-change series are fully integrated (  =1) 82% of the 
time for all time intervals. These results imply that the CEF and NAVPS prices, on average, 
are more integrated than segmented, and that the differences in these two prices series not 
attributable to the CEF’s net benefits (over managerial fees) should disappear given costless 
and frictionless arbitrage. Thus, even if the net present value of the net benefits (over 
managerial fees) provided by a CEF is zero, costly and risky arbitrage would still lead to a 
CEF premium.  
 We run cross-sectional regressions of the CEF premium when   is included in the full 
model represented by equation (3.7). This was done using a lagged rolling-window kappa 
estimate with(out) the four benefit/cost variables from our model and the arbitrage proxies for 
tau intervals of one, two and five days. We find no significant relationship between the CEF 
premium and   in any of these estimations most likely because   only captures the 
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3.9. CONCLUSION  
 This essay provides further evidence to help unravel the well-documented closed-end fund 
(CEF) negative premium anomaly. By investigating this phenomenon from an arbitrageur’s 
perspective, we provide additional evidence that at least a significant portion of the gap of a 
CEF’s price from its fundamental value is due to limits to arbitrage. It reflects the 
compensation that an arbitrageur would require for the hedgeable and non-hedgeable risks 
arising from the fund’s portfolio composition and its uncertainty. This is consistent with the 
findings of Ackert and Tian (2000) for exchange traded funds that the premiums disappears 
when the portfolio compositions and weights are known, and the total risk of the portfolio is 
easily hedgeable.  
 Our tradeoff model relates to the benefits from holding the fund which the literature 
identifies as enhanced liquidity, managerial abilities and leverage, and costs such as 
management fees. The difference between the liquidities of the CEF and its holdings capture 
the liquidity benefit, Jensen’s alpha captures managerial ability benefits and the ratio of non-
common equity to assets (less the cash-to-asset ratio) captures the gross (net) leverage 
benefit. Our findings support the hypotheses that state that CEF premiums are positively 
related to these benefits (net but not gross leverage) and negatively related to management 
fees.  
 We hypothesize that the premium not captured by our model is related to the 
unhedged systematic and idiosyncratic risk exposures associated with the net position from 
risk arbitrage between the CEF and its equivalent NAVPS. We identify systematic replication 
risk exposure for the small-minus-big factor as a significant determinant of CEF premiums. 
We attribute this non-zero exposure of the arbitrage position to this systematic risk factor as 
being due to uncertainty about the fund’s holdings which leads to inexact hedge ratios. Using 
the idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol) of the net position return obtained from a long/short position 
in the CEF price and its NAVPS, we identify a significant relationship between CEF 
premiums and Ivol differences only when the fund has positive returns in the previous period. 
                                                             
24 Tabulated results are available from the authors. 
65 
 
For the other proxies for the uncertainty of holdings, we find that CEF premiums are related 









Analysts and market participants generally consider publicly available information 
regardless of its source. Whether the arrival of information included in a rumor changes the 
price of the stock depends on its perceived credibility (reliability or veracity) and its 
anticipated impact on the future cash flows or the discount rate of the firm. Unlike earnings 
announcements, merger and acquisition (M&A) announcements are less frequent and more 
unpredictable events with a considerable impact on stock prices, especially for the acquired 
firms.  Thus, being able to assess the credibility of rumors about potential M&A could be 
profitable.  
In this essay we argue that buying rumored target firms does not always lead to a negative 
performance, as previously documented (Gao and Oler, 2012; Zivney et al. 1997). Target 
firm performance after a M&A rumor depends on its credibility. We use a proprietary 
database hand-collected from different sources and with different characteristics to test the 
level of the credibility of types of M&A rumors. We find that good (bad) quality rumors lead 
to a positive (negative) performance. We also find that daily changes in idiosyncratic 
volatilities around initial credible rumor dates are positively related to the performance of the 
target firm after the rumor release date.  
 Trading rumored target stocks before a potential announcement exposes traders to 
considerable risk given the high level of uncertainty about whether a subsequent M&A 
announcement will actually occur. Gao and Oler (2012) conclude that the increase in trading 
activities in the pre-announcement periods for rumored target stocks is not due to noise nor 
liquidity trading but is due to trading by rational investors who only trade if they are 
compensated for the risk of doing so. Thus, buyers of rumored target firms expect that the 
rumors are reliable and will lead to increased prices at some unspecified future announcement 
dates. In contrast, sellers believe that any price run-ups in the uncertain pre-announcement 
periods will dissipate due to the lack of credibility of the rumors or because the prices 
represent over-valuations of the benefits of the M&A.  
 Under a rational expectations model with normally distributed returns, the absolute 
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expected return conditional on the sign of the return increases with return volatility. All else 
equal, a (positive) negative relationship is expected between return volatilities and expected 
returns conditional on (good) bad news (Diamond and Verrecchia 1987). Around M&A 
rumor dates, buyers (sellers) of the potential targets over-weight (under-weight) the 
probabilities of subsequent M&A announcements and/or their values.  
If the M&A rumors are from more credible sources (henceforth more credible rumors), 
then the increased trading for the target firms leads to increased idiosyncratic volatilities. If 
the rumors increase expectations that actual M&A announcements will subsequently follow, 
this should lead to increased prices for the targets. If the rumors lack credibility (henceforth 
less credible rumors), market participants may diverge in their expectations about future 
M&A announcements, leading to increased idiosyncratic volatilities and possibly decreased 
target prices.  
 There is considerable evidence of a positive target price run-up pre-M&A announcement 
whose beginning date varies, on average, from 7 days (Keown and Pinkerton 1981) to 9 days 
(Gao and Oler 2008) to 15 days  (Jarrell and Poulsen 1989) to 30 days (Borges and Gairifo, 
2013) to 42 days (Schwert 1996) to 60 days (Clements et al. 2007). While some authors 
argue that price run-ups prior to M&A announcements are due to insider trading (e.g., 
Agarwal and Singh 2006), others argue that the run-ups reflect legitimate market 
anticipations by investors resulting from public information that increases the probabilities of 
subsequent takeovers (e.g., Pound and Zeckhauser 1990; Schwert 1996; and King and 
Padalko 2005). If this latter view prevails, then the run-up returns during the periods between 
the initial rumor dates and actual M&A (non-)announcements capture the market’s 
expectation about a possible M&A. 
 We investigate the relationship between M&A probabilities and daily idiosyncratic 
volatilities by calculating market-implied probabilities before M&A announcements. Betton 
et al. (2014) argue against the existence of a positive feedback loop in the market prices of 
M&A targets. Hence, the price run-ups for targets are adjustments in the probabilities that 
subsequent M&A announcements will happen. We conjecture that changes in idiosyncratic 
volatilities are an indicator of the market’s expectations about the values of the targets. 
Consistent with our predictions, we find that the changes in idiosyncratic volatilities around 
the M&A rumor release dates are only (and positively) related to the market implied 
probabilities when conditioned on more credible M&A rumors.   
68 
 
 Thus, the focus of this essay differs considerably from that of most of the M&A literature. 
Our focus is mainly on the information content around the initial rumor dates, the impacts of 
the rumor reliabilities, and the market expectations during the run-up periods defined as the 
periods between the initial rumors and the actual M&A announcement dates. In contrast, 
most of the literature on M&A focuses on market behaviors on and after actual M&A 
announcements, which may be due to some extent to the need to hand collect data on M&A 
rumors. 
 Our contribution to the literature is three-fold. First, we find that market participants 
receive highly uncertain signals about the probabilities of M&A that depend on the credibility 
of the sources of M&A rumors. We are able to examine the market reactions to rumors 
depending on their credibilities since we rely on a large hand-collected database of rumors 
drawn from the print and electronic media beyond the Wall Street Journal (as in Gao and 
Oler, 2012; Zivney et al. 1997).
25
 While Zivney et al. (1996) find that the market-adjusted 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) of a portfolio of rumored stocks has a mean of -4.32%, 
and -1.8% for the 70 trading days and one year after the M&A rumors, respectively, for the 
1984-1988 time period, Gao and Oler (2012) find increased active selling offsets increased 
active buying in target stocks before M&A announcements. Unlike Gao and Oler (2012), we 
find that a strategy consisting of shorting rumored M&A targets leads to a positive return 
only for low-credible M&A rumors. Since more credible rumors lead to positive 
performances, we conjecture that market participants are able to differentiate between 
valuable signals and white noise. We find that more credible rumors always have statistically 
significant probabilities of leading to subsequent M&A announcements, and hence to 
potential premiums for the target-firm stockholders. We also find that the price movements 
around the rumor announcement days exhibit a different behavior for target firms with less 
versus more credible M&A rumors.  
 Our second contribution relates M&A with idiosyncratic-volatility pricing, and enriches 
the debate on the relationship between idiosyncratic volatilities and expected returns. We find 
that idiosyncratic volatilities have a positive relationship with the future returns of targets. 
This adds to the literature during the last two decades, which has witnessed an increase in the 
importance of idiosyncratic volatility in asset pricing and in forecasting future expected 
                                                             
25 The rumor samples for the few existing papers on M&A rumors use the section “Heard on The Street (HOT)”  
or “Abreast of the Market (ATM)” from the Wall Street Journal. Zivney et al. (1996) argue that ATM discloses 
the rumor about a M&A earlier than the HOT used by Pound and Zeckhauser (1990). 
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returns. Various theoretical models predict that an increase in idiosyncratic volatilities lead to 
positive expected returns (e.g., Levy 1978; Kryzanowski and To 1982; and Merton 1987), 
which is supported by empirical findings (e.g., Goyal and Santa-Clara 2003; Fu 2009). Some 
studies conclude that the relationship between idiosyncratic volatilities and expected returns 
is negative (Guo and Savickas, 2006; Ang et al. 2006, 2009), while others conclude that 
idiosyncratic volatility is just noise with no pricing implications (Bali and Cakici, 2008). 
 Our third contribution is to provide a rationale for the positive relationship between 
idiosyncratic volatilities and future returns. We show that the change in idiosyncratic 
volatilities is a manifestation of the market anticipation about a rumor outcome, provided that 
the rumor signal is credible.  We link idiosyncratic volatilities to a market-implied probability 
of an M&A and the change in the level of idiosyncratic volatilities around the initial rumor 
date. We calculate the implied probability as the ratio of the market value of the M&A at the 
announcement and the market value of the M&A rumor signal, assuming no positive 
feedback loop as shown in Betton et al. (2014). We find a statistically significant relation 
between idiosyncratic volatilities and the market-implied probabilities of the M&A, which 
persists even after controlling for information flow, ex-ante market expectations about the 
values of the targets, firm characteristics, and firm specific and sector misvaluation.  
 The remainder of this essay is organized as follows. Section 4.2 details the steps used to 
collect data about the rumors and the matching process for the rumor database. Section 4.3 
discusses the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) of rumored firms and returns of strategies 
consisting of buying rumored firms and selling the market portfolio. Section 4.4 outlines the 
methodology followed to calculate the intraday realized volatilities and discusses the changes 
in idiosyncratic volatilities around the initial rumor dates. Section 4.5 outlines the relation 
between idiosyncratic volatilities and the CAR of rumored firms. Section 4.6 discusses the 
methodology used to calculate implied market probabilities and outlines the cross-sectional 
model to show the relation between idiosyncratic volatilities and the probabilities of M&A. 
Section 4.7 discusses the empirical results of cross-sectional regressions of implied market 
probabilities and idiosyncratic volatilities for a subsample of our database. Section 4.8 
discusses the relation between target misvaluations and implied probabilities. Section 4.9 
concludes the essay. 
 
4.2. SAMPLE SELECTION AND DATA MANIPULATION 
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4.2.1 Construction of the Rumors Database 
Unlike the existing literature discussed earlier, we use our access to a unique hand-
collected database of rumors whose construction is now described.
26
 Since a rumor is not an 
announcement, its wording can be ambiguous and unclear. Thus, a list of identifiers 
(keywords) compiled from a selection of M&A rumors reported in S&P Takeover Talk was 
used to search Factiva, Pro-quest (only for publications/newswires not covered by Factiva), 
S&P Takeover Talk, Capital IQ, Zephyr, SDC and a variety of newswires. Once a M&A 
rumor identifier was found in an article, the article was stored and catalogued. Since rumors 
have a tendency to ricochet throughout other news outlets, a search to identify the first time 
the rumor was published in the 90 days prior was done. Only reports for the same M&A 
rumor with the earliest date were retained. To ensure that the retained rumor date was indeed 
the initial rumor, a continuous search using an additional 90-day window was undertaken. 
  [Please place table 4.1 about here] 
 Our initial sample contains 2,250 rumor events that have no publicly reported rumors in 
the preceding ninety days. The decomposition of this sample by rumor type and the number 
of rumors that materialize in actual announcements using SDC Thomson Reuters for different 
time frames are reported in table 4.1. For this sample of M&A rumors, we find that 1,762 
targets have actual subsequent M&A announcements and that only 361 of these 
announcements occur within one year after the rumor started about a possible M&A. We also 
report the number of acquisitions during the 70 days following the rumor to be consistent 
with Gao and Oler (2012) who categorize a rumor with no announcement after 70 trading 
days as misinformation. Although our sample is 14 times larger than theirs, we have 
approximately the same percentage (12%) of rumored firms announcing a M&A during this 
70-day window. 
 The rumor types obtained from the manual search through the news releases about the 
rumors provide the existence or not of a source of the rumor. We hypothesize that the 
credibility of the rumor depends on the source that issued it. We categorize our rumors into 
more and less credible rumors according to the probability of an M&A announcement 
happening within 70 days or one year after the rumor date. More-credible rumors are those 
emanating from reliable sources, including: (i) firms that indicate their interest in looking for 
                                                             
26 We would like to thank Fred Davis, Thomas Walker for providing us with access to this database. 
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a potential acquirer; (ii) firms that confirm the existence of talks about a possible takeover; 
(iii) rumors disclosed by insiders of the target; (iv) target firms hire financial advisors that 
generally indicate their interests in pursuing “strategic alternatives”; and (v) rumors 
attributable to analysts following the stock. Less-credible rumors are not attributable to actual 
sources, but inferred from stock price movements, changes in options trading, or chatter 
about possible synergies.  
 
4.2.2 Measuring the Credibility of a Rumor  
 We verify our conjecture about the relationship between the source and its credibility by 
calculating the likelihood that the rumor leads to an M&A announcement. We calculate the 
probability of a M&A announcement within 70 days for the total sample, more- and less-
credible rumors and their subcategories. We test the following null hypothesis: H0: 
Pr(Announcement| More credible)= Pr(Announcement| Less credible). Our test statistic is: 






  where  ̂  is the probability of a actual M&A being 
completed or just an announcement for the more-credible rumored sample,  ̂  is the 
probability of a M&A or an announcement for the less-credible rumored sample,  ̂ is the 
estimate of the common proportion under the null hypothesis calculated as 
 ̂                   ⁄   and           are the number of rumors in the more- and 
less-credible rumor samples respectively. We calculate the probabilities and their significance 
for M&A announcements that occur within 70 days and one year after the initial rumors. 
Since M&A announcements do not always result in actual M&As, we also calculate the 
probabilities of actual M&A within a time frame of 18 months.  
[Please place table 4.2 about here] 
 Table 4.2 reports the probabilities of an announcement or M&A for all, more credible and 
less credible subcategories. The likelihood of a M&A for a more-credible rumor (15.04%) is 
approximately double that for a less-credible rumor (8.8%) within 70 days of the initial rumor 
release date (same period as in Gao and Older, 2012). The corresponding probabilities are 
19.97%and 11.74% for one-year post-rumor.  These differences are statistically significant at 
1%. We obtain statistically significant differences for the various subcategories of the more-
credible rumors and their likelihoods. For announcements within 70 days of the rumor date, 
the announcement likelihoods with the greatest to least likelihoods are for rumors confirmed 
by targets (24.56%), rumors indicating a financial advisor is hired by the target (19.85%), 
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rumors attributed to an insider (19.09%), rumors initiated by the target itself (16.79%), and 
finally rumors initiated by an analyst (12.13%). All of these probabilities are statistically 
different at the 1% level, and statistically different than those associated with less-credible 
rumors within 70 days at 1%, except for the last most-credible rumor category (analyst is the 
rumor source), which is significant at the 5% level.  
 We also find consistent results using a one-year window as in Pound and Zeckhauser 
(1990) to calculate the probability of a subsequent M&A announcement. The probability of 
an M&A announcement for more- versus less-credible rumors is approximately double 
(19.97% vs. 11.74%). Although all the respective percentages are higher, the ranking of the 
credibility of the various categories of more-credible rumors does not change with this longer 
window. The announcement likelihoods with the greatest to least likelihoods are for more-
credible rumors confirmed by targets (28.07%), rumors indicating a financial advisor is hired 
by the target (26.59%), rumors attributed to an insider (22.51%), rumors initiated by the 
target itself (16.79%), and finally rumors initiated by an analyst (21.88%). These 
probabilities are statistically larger at the 1% level than that for the less-credible rumors 
within the one year. 
 
4.3. RETURNS OF TRADING STRATEGIES PREDICATED ON RUMORS  
 We begin this section by calculating the returns of trading strategies based on rumors. The 
first methodology is a conventional event study by calculating the CARs using a Carhart 
(1997) model for different event windows. We use an estimation window of [-125; -5] to 
avoid contaminating the factor loadings with possible non-media whispers about the rumor 
earlier than our release date. We obtain the time series of the Fama-French factors and the 
momentum factor from the website of Kenneth French. The second methodology consists of 
calculating the buy-and-hold abnormal returns (BHAR) from buying the rumored firms and 
shorting the S&P 500 portfolio.  Gao and Oler (2012) propose a similar strategy consisting of 
shorting the rumored firms and investing in the market portfolio, which they argue is more 
realistic than CAR. Our strategy differs from that of Gao and Oler (2012) because our 
objective is to estimate the values of the rumors and not to bet against the benchmark-
adjusted performance of the rumored firms.  
 We report the CAR and BHAR for four different event windows: three around the rumor 
date: [-1; +1], [-1; +5], [-5; +5] and a longer time span similar to Gao and Oler (2012): [+1; 
+70]. Table 4.3 reports the Carhart model CARs, and the BHAR performance of the long-
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short strategy. Both strategies yield statistically significant positive returns for all samples for 
the three short-term windows. The CAR for the total sample is 4.16%, 3.83% and 3.54% with 
highly significant t-values for event windows [-1; +1], [-1; +5] and [-5; +5] respectively. The 
long-short strategy yields slightly higher and highly significant returns of 4.34%, 4.42% and 
4.31% for the same three event windows.  The performance of less-credible rumor firms is 
always significantly higher for these three windows than that for the more-credible rumored 
firms. Their CAR differences for windows of [-1; +1], [-1; +5] and [-5; +5] are 1.04%, 1.11% 
and 1.12% with t-values of 2.52, 2.16 and 2.24, respectively. We observe similar results for 
the BHAR where the differences are 1.10%, 1.54% and 1.90% with t-values of 2.75, 3.11 and 
3.54, respectively. Thus, less-credible rumored firms yield higher CARs around the rumor 
ADs due to their greater risk given their lower credibility. This result could be explained by 
the anticipation of the rumor before it becomes public.  
[Please place table 4.3 about here] 
 We observe mixed results when we examine the abnormal returns over the longer event 
window of [1, +70] used by Gao and Oler (2012) and Zivney et al. (1996). We find that the 
marginally significant (t-value of -1.89) and negative CAR of -1.73% for the total sample is 
due to the significantly negative CAR of -3.45% (t-value of -2.48) for the sample of more-
credible rumor firms and an insignificant positive BHAR of 0.06% for the sample of less-
credible rumored firms.  However, these results are not robust. We now find that the 
marginally significant (t-value of 1.95) and positive BHAR of 0.47% is due to the now 
significantly positive BHAR of 1.97% (t-value of 2.38) for the sample of more-credible 
rumored firms and an insignificant positive BHAR of 0.31% for the sample of less-credible 
rumored firms. Since the CARs are benchmark-adjusted unlike the BHAR, these results 
suggest that the risk induced by the rumor itself has increased over the longer window.  
4.4. REALIZED BETAS AND VOLATILITIES 
 We hypothesize that the change in the ratios of idiosyncratic to total volatilities provides 
information about the market expectations about the values of the rumors. To obtain 
conditional measures of volatilities and betas, we use intraday data with the same sampling 
frequency. Patton and Verardo (2012) estimate the change in betas around earnings 
announcements by calculating realized betas (      
 
4.4.1 Calculation of Realized Betas using Intraday Data 
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 The choice of sampling frequency is important when using intraday data to calculate daily 
betas. Market microstructure effects can adversely affect the behavior of realized variances 
and realized betas as the sampling frequency increases. The sources of such market 
microstructure effects include price discreteness (e.g., Harris, 1990, 1991), and other trading 
mechanism designs (Black, 1976; Amihud and Mendelson, 1989). As advocated by Andersen 
et al. (2000, 2001, 2003), one possible solution to microstructure-induced biases is sparse 
sampling where returns are computed at arbitrarily selected lower frequencies, such as every 
5 or 15 minutes, instead of at every tick. However, Aït-Sahalia et al. (2005) show that this is 
not an adequate solution to the problem. If a stock trades infrequently relative to the market 
portfolio, it leads to a bias towards zero, known as the “Epps effect” (Epps, 1979; Hayashi 
and Yoshida, 2005). Patton and Verardo (2012) use a 25-minute sampling frequency for 
intra-day returns to balance possible measurement errors with the need to avoid the 
microstructure biases that arise at the highest frequencies. Patton and Verardo (2012) argue 
that although there is a possible loss of accuracy of the estimator because of the lower 
number of observations per day, this frequency allows microstructure effects to be minimized 
leading to better daily beta estimates. 
 We use the methodology outlined in Patton and Verardo (2012) to calculate daily realized 
betas using intraday returns.
27
 Modeling the return-generating process as a multivariate 
stochastic process for asset i yields a daily beta that is robust to jumps in intraday data given 
by:  
     
  (        
 ) (     
 )⁄  (∑            
 
   ) (∑      
  
   )⁄    (4.1) 
where                           when the return of asset   is either security i  or market 
m during intraday interval k on day t, and S is the number of intraday periods.  
 Patton and Verardo (2012) argue that the quantity of interest when calculating daily betas 
using high frequency data is the integrated covariance matrix of daily returns, which is the 
stochastic integral of the instantaneous covariance over the period t-1 to t. This matrix can be 
estimated consistently by the N-by-N “realized covariance” matrix as the number of intraday 
returns diverges to infinity. Barndorf–Nielson and Shephard (2004) provide a central limit 
theorem for the realized covariance, and show that the asymptotic distribution of realized 
betas for stock i on day t is: 
                                                             
27 Their work uses the econometric contributions of Anderson et al. (2003) and Barndorff-Nielsen and Shephard 
(2004) on estimating volatilities and covariances for high frequency data. 
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→  (      )  as  →       (4.2) 
which implies  that      
           , where              ⁄  .  
 We obtain 16 intra-day returns for stocks in the TAQ database by using quotes every 25 
minutes between 9:45am and 4:00pm and overnight from 4:00 pm on the previous day to 
9:45am on the current day in order to capture information arrival overnight. We use the 
exchange-traded fund tracking the S&P 500 index (SPDR, traded on Amex with ticker SPY, 
and available on the TAQ database) to measure the market return, as in Bandi and Russell 
(2006) and Todorov and Bollerslev (2010). Trading in this fund is very active. Since it can be 
redeemed for the underlying portfolio of S&P 500 stocks, arbitrage opportunities guarantee 
that the fund’s price has minimal deviation from the fundamental value of the underlying 
index.  
 The realized variance (RV) of the market index and each individual stock is calculated as 
the squared sum of the 25-minute log returns: 
       ∑        
  
          (4.3) 
where all the terms are as previously defined. 
 
4.4.2 Changes in Realized Idiosyncratic Volatilities around the Rumor Dates 
 Roll (1988) attributes the low explanatory power of asset pricing models to arbitrage 
trading activities based on private information. Based on findings that support this conjecture, 
Durnev et al. (2003) argue that the ratios of firm specific to total volatilities contain 
information about future earnings. If the rumor represents a release of (mis)information that 
is based on private information, then it could lead to an increase in the proportion of 
idiosyncratic to total volatility (Roll 1988). This ratio is calculated for firm i and day t as 
follows: 
                
    
      
     
       (4.4) 
where     
  is the intraday beta; and       and      are the intraday realized volatilities of the 
market index and firm i, respectively. 
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4.4.3 Changes in Volatilities around the M&A Rumors 
 To examine the behavior of volatilities around the M&A rumor dates we use the changes 
in total, systematic, and idiosyncratic volatilities. To this end, we regress each volatility 
measure on event-day dummies. We illustrate the specification for idiosyncratic volatilities as 
follows: 
               ∑       
  
              ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅          (4.5) 
where τ is the rumor day, D is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 over the estimation 
period and zero otherwise, and      is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for each of 
the 11 days in the event window centered on the date of the rumor (i.e., when d=0 in  +d).  
         ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ is the estimated average of the idiosyncratic to total volatility ratio over the 
estimation period from 125 days before to 25 days after the rumor dates. The regression 
estimate of    represents the change in the IV ratio in excess of the average          ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ for 
day d.  
 Table 4.4 reports the average daily changes in the ratios of idiosyncratic to total volatilities 
over the event window of [-5, +5]. The increase in the idiosyncratic volatility ratios start two 
days before the publication of the rumors and peak on the rumor dates. This implies the 
possibility of informed trading before the rumors are circulated in the media. The changes in 
the idiosyncratic volatility ratios persist until the fifth day after the rumors first becomes 
public. The overall sample shows a mean increase of 5.28% (t-value of 13.07) for rumor AD. 
Furthermore, 95% of the rumored firms have an increase of at least 4.49%.  
[Please place table 4.4 about here] 
 The more-credible rumored firms experience a relatively smaller abnormal IV ratio than 
the less-credible rumored firms for all the days in the event window. The mean abnormal IV 
ratios are 4.36% and 6.36% for the more- and less-credible rumored firms, respectively, for 
the rumor AD. The difference between the change in the IV ratios for the more- and less-
credible rumored firms are statistically significant. These results lend support to our 
hypothesis that less-credible rumored firms experience greater informational asymmetries 
than more-credible rumored firms. In the next section, we further analyze the relation 




4.5. CROSS-SECTIONAL REGRESSIONS OF THE PERFORMANCE OF 
RUMORED FIRMS 
Earlier, we reported that more-credible rumored firms experience lower benchmark-
adjusted abnormal returns and lower levels of idiosyncratic to total volatility ratios than less-
credible rumored firms. We argued that the increase in the IV ratios is a risk that investors are 
expecting to be compensated for. To further examine the relation between IV and the 
performances of rumored firms, we run cross-sectional regressions of CARs and BHARs on 
the ratios of idiosyncratic to total volatilities and additional control variables; namely: Book 
to market ratio B/M and the log of the market value of the firm ln(size). We use 
COMPUSTAT to calculate the book to markets ratios using the book value as of the fiscal 
year ending in calendar year t-1 divided by the market value (stock price time shares 
outstanding) in December t-1. Following Fama and French (1993), book value is the book 
value of stockholder’s equity plus deferred taxes and investment credit, if available, minus 
the book value of preferred stocks depending on availability using redemption, liquidation or 
par-value in this order.  We run the CARs and BHARs for the individual rumored firms over 
the different event windows on the changes in their IV ratios. The first regression shows the 
relation between the performances of the rumored firms and their IV ratios only. The second 
regression examines the same relation but with the addition of the two control variables (B/M 
and ln(size)).  
[Please place table 4.5 about here] 
Table 4.5 reports the results of the regressions for each of the CAR and BHAR for more-
credible rumored firms. The coefficient estimates for the IV ratio represent the impact of the 
change in abnormal returns as a function of the change in the level of the IV ratio on the day 
rumors were released. The coefficient estimates for the IV ratio are 0.06 with a t-stat of 1.97, 
0.084 with a t-stat of 1.82, and 0.108 with a t-stat of 1.68 for the CARs over event windows 
of [-1; +1], [-1; +5] and [-5; +5], respectively. Adding the control variables B/M and ln(size)  
to the regressions does not qualitatively change the relationship between the IV ratios and 
CAR for event windows [-1; +1] and [-1; +5]. The coefficients of B/M and ln(size)  are 
negative implying that value stocks (high B/M) and large firms tend to have lower CAR. The 
results of the regressions for BHAR and the IV ratios (including the control variables) are 
similar. The estimated coefficients of the IV ratios are positive and statistically significant at 
the 10% level and the estimated coefficients of both control variables are negative. To 
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calculate the standard errors of the coefficients, we use White heteroscedasticity-consistent 
estimator (HAC), which accounts for both heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation.  
[Please place table 4.6 about here] 
The regression results reported in table 4.6 for the CARs and BHARs for the less-credible 
rumored firms show a different (negative) relation with their IV ratios for event windows [-1; 
+1] and [-1; +5] that is significant at the 0.10 level. As the level of information asymmetry 
increases, the abnormal returns around the rumor dates become more negative. The estimated 
coefficient for the IV ratios become insignificant in all regressions for the [-5; +5] and [1; 
+70] event windows.  
 
4.6. IMPLICIT MARKET PROBABILITY OF M&A AND THE IV RATIO 
4.6.1 Market-implicit Probability of a M&A 
The change in the market value of the target firm after the first rumor about a possible 
M&A is released is subject to the credibility of the signal about the value of the synergies 
created by the M&A and the probability that the M&A will materialize.  Betton et al. (2014) 
argue against the existence of a costly feedback loop where the bid price is positively related 
to the increase in the target market value before the bid announcement. They assume that the 
signal released in the market does not change the market expectation about the value of the 
synergy before the bid announcement, and thus that a rumor signals a change in the 
probability of a M&A materializing. 
 Investors keep updating their posterior probability distribution that the deal will 
materialize. If market participants were able to extract reliable signals before the 
announcement of a M&A, the price run-up would be larger leading to a decrease in the 
surprise effect of the announcement itself. The substitution hypothesis, developed by Schwert 
(1996), advocates that there is a one-to-one linear relationship between the increase in the 
value of the run-up and a decrease in the value of the markup. Betton et al. do not find a one-
to-one substitution between the run-up and markup. A major finding of Betton et al. is that 
the rejection of the existence of a costly feedback loop causes the premium to increase with 
the value of the run-up. This implies that the market expectation of the value of any synergies 
depends on the expected fair value of the synergy.  
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 All available signals gathered by investors help them form the probability that the bidder’s 
gain from the M&A is positive where π=Prob (Synergy value>Cost of acquisition). Prior to a 
M&A announcement, investors form expectations about the value of a possible bid based on 
information gleaned from the market. Even on the day of the announcement, the increase in 
the value of the target is an expectation that the value of the bid will materialize or even be 
exceeded.  
 Under a rational expectation hypothesis with no feedback loop for M&A deals, the 
relationship between the markup and run-up would be defined as follows: 
 
     
  
 
   
 
     (4.6) 
where    and    are the estimates of the premium and the run-up respectively; and   is the 
probability that the bid will be announced.  
 For our purposes, we measure the value of the premium as the expected market value of 
the M&A deal when it is announced. Schwert (1996) argues that the market expectation of 
the deal should include the change in price as a result of the anticipation of the deal and the 
change in the price after the announcement. We calculate the markup             directly by 
calculating the CAR around the takeover announcement date [-1; +1], where the run-up is 
calculated as the CAR over the period between the rumor date and two days before the 
announcement date. Calculating the implicit probability of an announcement requires 
knowing the market’s expected value of the synergies created by the M&A,   , and the run-
up amount   . Hence, we calculate the implied probability for a limited subsample that has 
an announcement within one year of the rumor date and also has a minimum of 21 days 
between the rumor and the announcement dates. These two conditions are satisfied by 233 
firms.  
4.6.2 Cross-sectional Regressions of Market-implied Probabilities 
 We run the following regression of the market-implied probabilities of M&A on the 
changes in the IV ratios for target firm i:  
                                                    




where          is the market-implied probability of a takeover of firm i calculated using 
equation (4.6), where           is calculated as the CAR around the M&A announcement 
day given by CAR [-1; 1], and     is the run-up return calculated as the CAR during the 
period from the rumor date +1 to two days prior to the M&A announcement. With regard to 
the other independent variables in (4.7),       is the number of days between the rumor date 
and the M&A announcement date for target firm i,         is the number of rumors 
appearing between the initial rumor and the M&A announcement date for target firm i,     
is the book to market ratio for target firm i calculated as of the last available book value and 
last end of year market value before rumor date for target firm i.           is the natural 
logarithm of market value of the target firm i 41 days before its initial rumor date, 
          is the number of analysts following target firm i,      is the coefficient of 
variation of the last I/B/E/S summary estimates for target firm i,            is the last 
I/B/E/S consensus estimate for long term growth reported before the rumor is made public for 
target firm i.  
 We use three different categories of control variables; namely, the information flow during 
the post rumor pre-announcement period, market expectations before the rumor 
announcement period, and firm characteristics. There are two measures of information flow 
during the post-rumor pre-announcement period of the M&A:       and        . The 
proxies for period length are for the arrival of information and the time available to 
disseminate the information. If markets are efficient, information is quickly impounded into 
the price of an asset. If no new information enters the market after the initial rumor, then the 
length of the period should be irrelevant. Hence, our use of the number of days is a measure 
of information flow about a potential M&A during a potential pre-announcement period. The 
        variable refers to the number of identified rumors in the hand-collected database 
used herein about a possible M&A during the period between an initial rumor and the M&A 
announcement date. If the information conveyed by a subsequent rumor is important in 
evaluating the success (failure) of the M&A, then its relation with the implicit probability 
would be positive (negative).    
 The second set of control variables are market expectations about the target firm. We use 
the consensus estimates of analysts from I/B/E/S as a proxy for market expectations about the 
target firm. The expected growth potential of the target as well as the level of consensus 
about that growth provides information about the likelihood of the success of the M&A. We 
81 
 
collect the last available I/B/E/S consensus estimates about long-term growth of the target 
before the initial rumor date.           represents the arithmetic mean of the available 
long-term growth estimates. We expect that firms with long-term potential growth are more 
likely to be potential targets with an increased probability of actually being acquired.       is 
the coefficient of variation calculated as the ratio of the standard deviation to the mean long-
term I/B/E/S consensus estimates. The higher the level of dispersion the more uncertainty 
there is about the future earnings of the target firm. We expect that firms with high levels of 
earnings uncertainty will have higher levels of uncertainty about the M&A success. The 
variable           controls for the firm’s level of visibility. The higher the number of 
analysts following the target firm, the better the market expectations should be about the 
value creation associated with the M&A. Hence, we expect a positive relationship between 
the number of analysts and the probability that the M&A succeeds.  
 The last set of control variables are the characteristics of the target firm, which are widely 
used in the asset-pricing literature to capture the size and growth potential of firms. Small 
firms are expected to have good growth potential and easy targets for acquisition given their 
size. Our expectation is that the higher the market to book ratio, the higher the perceived 
growth of the firm. Since acquirers are more likely to be interested in firms with high growth 
potentials, we expect implied probabilities to be negatively related to size, and to the B/M 
ratios.  
   [Please place table 4.7 about here] 
 Based on Table 4.7, most of the correlations between the variables are small and not 
statistically significant. The correlations between the IV ratio and the other control variables 
are only statistically significant for the number of rumors (       ). Since the IV ratio 
precedes the release of subsequent rumors after the initial rumor, this suggests a leading 
relationship between the IV ratios and the number of rumors during the run-up period. The 
positive relationship between ln(size) and the number of rumors is consistent with the belief 
that large firms tend to attract more media attention.  
 The information flow variables are not correlated with a non-significant 0.05 correlation. 
This reinforces our earlier claim that an increase in the length of the run-up period does not 
increase the flow of information about the rumor. With regard to significant correlations 
between the earnings expectations variables, the dispersion in the earnings forecasts of 
analysts is positively correlated with the number of analysts (0.392; p-value of 0.000) and 
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long-term growth is positively correlated with the dispersion in the earnings forecasts of 
analysts (0.15; p-value of 0.038). Both of these positive correlations are consistent with 
expectations.  The correlation between B/M and          (-0.25; p-value of 0.008) is 
consistent with the previous literature that reports a positive relation between firm growth and 
firm size (Fama and French, 1992, 1993). In untabulated results, we estimate the correlation 
matrices for more- and less-credible rumored firms separately. The results differ only in the 
relationship between the implied probabilities and IV ratio. For the more-credible rumored 
firms, the correlation is positive and significant at 10%, where it is insignificant for the less-
credible rumored firms.. 
 
4.7. CROSS SECTIONAL REGRESSION RESULTS   
 Summary results from regressing the measure of the implicit probability of an M&A on 
the change in the IV ratio and the other control variables are reported in Table 4.8. In the first 
regression, the estimated coefficient for the non-conditioned IV ratio is positive (9.73) and 
statistically significant (t-value of 2.01), remains significant (t-value of 2.215) and increases 
in magnitude to 12.31 for the more-credible rumors, and remains positive but becomes 
insignificant for the less-credible rumors.  
[Please place table 4.8 about here] 
 When the variables to control for information flow during the pre-M&A announcement 
period (        and      ) are added to regression run (2), the coefficient of the IV ratio 
remains positive and significant (t-value of 1.980), and the estimated coefficient of -0.006 for 
the number of rumors is not significant (t-value of -0.014).  When the other control variables 
are also added in regression runs (3) and (4), the magnitude of the estimated coefficient for 
the IV ratio becomes significant at the 0.01 level instead of the 0.05 level. Except for the 
natural log of target size, which is significant in regression (3) but not regression (4), all the 
other estimated coefficients for the control variables are not significant.   
 While the estimated coefficients for the IV ratios are positive for both types of rumors, 
they are only significant for more-credible rumors when we separate the IV ratios based on 
whether the M&A rumor is more- or less-credible. Furthermore, none of the estimated 




4.8. MISVALUATIONS AND M&A PROBABILITIES 
4.8.1. Estimation of Misvaluations  
 A growing body of literature argues that mispricing is an M&A motivation. Rhodes-kropf 
and Viswanathan (2005), RKV henceforth, provide a test of two alternative competing 
explanations about M&A waves and their motives. They find that the neoclassical 
explanation that M&A lead to a reorganization of the assets in a certain industry is not the 
only reason for M&S waves. They find that acquiring firms are overvalued significantly by 
approximately 20% more than targets according to their (M/B) ratios, and misvaluations 
explain about 15% of sector merger activity. They also find that firm-specific overvaluations 
are more important than sector overpricing. RKV find that sectors with high levels of 
common misvaluation components tend to experience higher levels of M&A activities.  
 We hypothesize that the level of mispricing has an effect on the probabilities of M&A 
announcements after the release of M&A rumors. We expect that the probabilities of firms 
being taken over is higher with higher levels of target underpricing. Although RKV suggest 
that the markets make mistakes in estimating either cash flows or discount rates or both, and 
that such mispricing could be firm-, industry-, or market-specific, we use a firm-specific 
misvaluation variable developed by RKV.  
 RKV develop a model based on a decomposition of the market to book ratio to capture 
possible mispricings. Assume that the “true” value of a firm is a linear function of firm i in 
sector j using accounting data at time t:                  . Since mispricing could be sector- 
or market-wide, firm relative mispricing is zero. RKV argue for the existence of a mispricing 
wave that changes over time. The sector-wide long-term valuation captures the movement of 
this wave and allows for a decomposition of the mispricing into firm- and sector-specific 
mispricings. The sector-wide fundamental value is also the time series average value of the 
firms in that sector, since an average value of the coefficients for the accounting variables is 
used to calculate the overall sector “true” value. The last component is what RKV called 
long-term value to book value, where the value is calculated based on long-term estimates of 
the sector and firm accounting variables.  
 The overall decomposition is as follows:  
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 (4.8) 
where     and      are the natural logarithms of market and book values of firm i at time t;   
is the linear function for “true” value; and   is the sensitivity of the value   to the accounting 
variable  . 
 The empirical implementation of this decomposition requires few assumptions about the 
determinants of the value of the firm. RKV propose that the value of a firm is the value of the 
actual assets (i.e., book value) plus the discounted added value created by those assets in the 
future obtained by multiplying the book value by the difference between the return on equity 
and cost of capital, or:        ∑
           
      
 
  
     . RKV propose three models for the 
valuation of the firm. The first model assumes that the book value is the only independent 
variable, the second model is the first one with the addition of net income, and the third adds 
leverage to the second model.  Similarly to Hertzel and Li (2010), we use the third model to 
estimate the true value of the firm as: 
                                 |  |                  |  |    (       ) 
                           (4.9) 
where     is the natural log of the book value of firm i at time t,    |  |    is the natural log 
of the absolute value of net income,       is a dummy variable that take the value of 1 when 
net income is positive and zero otherwise, and        is the leverage ratio.          are the 
sensitivities of the values of firms to different accounting variables in industry j in year t. 
RKV identify firm-specific mispricing with respect to the industry average as the difference 
between the actual value of the firm and the fitted value from equation (4.9) using the firm’s 
accounting data in year t and industry-specific estimates of  ̂       . The second type of 
mispricing is industry mispricing explained as a short-term deviation of the industry from its 
long-term average. This deviation is also referred to in RKV as the time series sector error. 
Calculating this latter value requires the use of the average sensitivities for the industry over 






 ̂        , and we use the average sensitivities to forecast the value of the firm using the 
industry averages. The time series sector error is the difference between the firm value 
calculated using time-varying sensitivities and the firm value using the period average 
sensitivities.  
 
4.8.2 Empirical Implementation 
 The implementation of the model requires the use of all firms in the COMPUSTAT/CRSP 
universe to calculate the industry and market-relative pricing of different accounting 
variables. We download all the firms in COMPUSTAT and categorize them into the 12 
Fama-French industries obtained from the Kenneth French website. We match the 
COMPUSTAT sample of firms to CRSP in order to obtain the closing prices and the 
outstanding number of shares required to calculate the market values of these firms (as 
previously defined). Net incomes and book values are taken directly from COMPUSTAT and 
Leverage is calculated as: 1-(book equity/book value). The resulting sample after matching 
all firms between CRSP and COMPUSTAT is 155,420 firm-years spanning over the period 
1990 to 2011.  
[Please place table 4.9 about here] 
 Table 4.9 reports the summary statistics for the average sensitivities  ̅        for each 
industry j when equation (4.9) is estimated cross-sectionally for each year for a 10-year 
period prior to the date of the rumour announcement. Our findings are in line with the RKV 
findings about the relationship between firm values and book value and net income but differ 
with respect to leverage.                   and       are all positive and highly 
significant, where the leverage average coefficient oscillates between significantly negative 
for industries 1, 6, 10, and 12 to  not significant for industries 4, 7, and 9 to significantly 
positive for the rest of the industries. These differences could be explained by the behavior of 
firms during the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) where interest rates were at a historical low. 
Obreja (2013) argues that during countercyclical periods firms tend to create value by stock 
repurchases of depressed equities using lower cost debt, which leads to a positive relationship 
between debt and firm values. 
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 Using these fitted values, we calculate two different measures of misvaluation: firm 
specific and time-series sector errors. Firm-specific errors are calculated as the component of 
the market-to-book ratio that is due to the deviation of the firm from its industry average. 
Hence, we use contemporaneous accounting variables and cross-sectional estimates of the 
coefficients to estimate the following implied value of the firm: 
      ( ̂                |  |            |  |    (       )       ), where all the variables 
are as defined earlier. The time-series sector error is the component of the market-to-book 
ratio that captures the relative misvaluation of the sector. It is calculated as the difference 
between the implied firm value using contemporaneous accounting variables and cross-
sectional sensitivities and a times-series average implied valuation  
         ( ̂                |  |            |  |    (       )       ) 
                                ( ̅              |  |            |  |                    ). (4.10)     
 RKV report that firms in overvalued sectors tend to engage in more M&A activities, 
where relatively overvalued firms acquire less overvalued ones. Since the firm-specific error 
should be lower for target firms relative to its industry, the probability of a takeover should 
increase as the level of overvaluation increase. RKV argue that firm errors are different 
between acquirers and targets, and that a high level of firm-specific error implies a high 
probability that a firm will be involved in a M&A or that it will be an acquirer. Since our 
simple is limited to target firms only, we initially test our hypothesis by comparing the 
average difference between the firm-specific error for every firm with its corresponding 
average industry firm-specific error, which would show the relative misvaluation of our 
targets versus its sector. We find statistically insignificant differences between the firm error 
component of rumored firms and their corresponding industries, which suggest that rumored 
firms are not particularly undervalued within their industries.  
[Please place table 4.10 about here] 
We further test the importance of misvaluations in explaining the implied 
probabilities of announcements of takeover rumor of firms. Table 4.10 reports the results of 
regressing the implied probabilities on the misvaluation estimates and the relation between 
implied probabilities, idiosyncratic volatilities and misvaluation estimates. The positive 
relationship between Betton et al. implied probabilities and changes in idiosyncratic 
volatilities around the rumor release dates is still positive and statistically significant at the 
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10% level even after adding firm error and time-series industry error components of the 
market-to-book ratio. Other coefficients on size, number of rumors, number of days, number 
of analysts, and IBES estimates remain statistically insignificant.  
 
4.9. CONCLUSION   
 In this essay we tested the hypothesis that the uncertainty associated with M&A rumors 
affects stock prices (and idiosyncratic volatilities) around the release dates of the initial 
rumors. We categorize the hand-collected rumor database based on the credibility of the 
rumors where the more-credible group of rumors comes from identifiable sources. We 
calculate the probabilities of subsequent M&A announcements and find that more-credible 
rumors have significantly higher probabilities of leading to such announcements within the 
70 days after the initial rumors are made public. Furthermore, we find that the credibility 
level is positively related to the performances of target firms over the period of 70 days after 
the initial rumors are made public.  
 Any change in stock prices and its direction depends upon the aggregate effect of the 
heterogeneous beliefs about the ultimate fate of the rumored target M&A. We find that 
idiosyncratic volatilities are positively (negatively) related to the performances of the target 
firms for more- (less-) credible M&A rumors. This relationship is further supported by the 
finding that the ratio of idiosyncratic volatility is positively related to the market-implied 
probability of an M&A using the run-up to markup price ratio as discussed in Betton et al. 
(2014). This relationship is robust to various firm-specific controls (such as size, book to 








 Financial theory has generally under-played the role of idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol) in 
financial markets and assumed that Ivol has no effect on the pricing of assets and no effect on 
the risk preferences of investors since they are mean-variance rational optimizers. However, 
more recent developments in financial economics find that realized Ivol (RIvol) is important 
and should be considered. In the first essay, we examined the relationship between Ivol and 
future returns in the Canadian market. We argued that the Canadian market is different than 
the US market due to a large concentration of firms in the energy and mining industries, a 
high level of correlation with commodities, and with little evidence for the existence of sharp 
return reversals in monthly returns. Unlike the anomalous findings of Ang et al. (2006, 
2009), we found that RIvol was positively (and not negatively) related to future returns. We 
explained that our findings are analogous to the findings of Huang et al. (2010) who argued 
that the negative relationship disappears after controlling for return reversals in the US. Our 
findings are consistent with the theory for the relation between Ivol and returns, and are 
robust to risk loadings, return reversals, skewness and illiquidity.  
 Bali et al. (2011) uncover a negative relationship between extreme within-the-month 
positive returns and future returns and conjecture that this relationship is what is mistakenly 
explained by Ang et al. (2006) as the RIvol effect. Bali et al. (2011) argue that investors 
distort their beliefs and overweight stocks with extreme lagged daily returns. We 
hypothesized that this relationship might be a manifestation of the return reversal process in 
the US market which we found is not the case in the Canadian market. Unlike Bali et al. 
(2011), we found that the relationship between lagged RIvol and returns does not disappear 
after controlling for extreme positive returns in the prior month. Our results are confirmed 
using Fama-MacBeth equally and value weighted two stage regressions and Brennan et al. 
(1998) two stage risk-adjusted regressions. 
 In the second essay, we provided evidence that Ivol, which is used to proxy for uncertainty 
about CEF holdings, partially explains the well documented negative CEF premium. We 
investigated this phenomenon from an arbitrageur’s perspective, and provided additional 
evidence that at least a significant portion of the gap of a CEF’s price from its fundamental 
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value is due to limits to arbitrage. This gap reflects the compensation that an arbitrageur 
would require for the hedgeable and non-hedgeable risks arising from the fund’s portfolio 
composition and its uncertainty. This is consistent with the findings of Ackert and Tian 
(2000) for exchange traded funds that the premiums disappear when the portfolio 
compositions and weights are known, and the total risk of the portfolio is easily hedgeable.  
 Our tradeoff model included benefits from holding the CEF, which the literature identifies 
as enhanced liquidity, managerial abilities and leverage, and costs such as management fees. 
The difference between the liquidities of the CEF and its holdings capture the liquidity 
benefits, Jensen’s alpha captures managerial ability benefits, and the ratio of non-common 
equity to assets (less the cash-to-asset ratio) captures the gross (net) leverage benefit. Our 
findings support the hypotheses that state that CEF premiums are positively related to these 
benefits (net but not gross leverage) and are negatively related to management fees.  
We hypothesized that the premiums not captured by our model are related to the unhedged 
systematic and idiosyncratic risk exposures associated with the net position from risk 
arbitrage between the CEF and its equivalent NAVPS. We identified the systematic 
replication risk exposure for the small-minus-big factor as a significant determinant of CEF 
premiums. We attributed this non-zero exposure of the arbitrage position to this systematic 
risk factor as being due to uncertainty about a fund’s holdings which leads to inexact hedge 
ratios. Using the idiosyncratic volatility (Ivol) of the net position return obtained from a 
long/short position in the CEF price and its NAVPS, we identified a significant relationship 
between CEF premiums and Ivol differences only when the fund has positive returns in the 
previous period. For the other proxies for the uncertainty of holdings, we find that CEF 
premiums are related negatively to idiosyncratic skewness but not related to options holdings.  
 In the third essay, we tested the hypothesis that the uncertainty associated with M&A 
rumors affects stock prices (and Ivol) around the release dates of the initial rumors. We 
categorized the hand-collected rumor database based on the credibility of the rumors where 
the more-credible group of rumors was from identifiable sources. We calculated the 
probabilities of subsequent M&A announcements and found that more-credible rumors have 
significantly higher probabilities of leading to such announcements within the 70 days after 
the initial rumors are made public. Furthermore, the credibility level of a rumor is positively 




 Any change in stock prices and its direction depends upon the aggregate effect of the 
heterogeneous beliefs about the ultimate fate of the rumored target M&A. We found that 
Ivols are positively (negatively) related to the performances of the target firms for more- 
(less-) credible M&A rumors. This relationship is further supported by the finding that the 
ratio of Ivol is positively related to the market-implied probability of an M&A using the run-
up to markup price ratio as discussed in Betton et al. (2014). This relationship is robust to 
various firm-specific controls (such as size, book to market, long-term growth expectations), 
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Table 2.1. Performance of a short-run contrarian strategy in the Canadian market 
This table reports the value and equally-weighted returns for ten deciles for Canadian stocks sorted by their lagged monthly returns and then by size where big 
refers to stocks with market capitalizations higher than the 50th percentile in any given month and small to the remaining stocks in that month. Quintiles 1 and 10 
are composed of the stocks with the lowest and highest lagged monthly returns, respectively. The p-values of the differences between the highest and lowest 
decile portfolios are reported in the parentheses. “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
 
 Lagged Return Decile 
  
Value Weighted Equally Weighted 
All Big  Small All Big  Small 
1 (Lowest) 3.10% 2.46% 6.17% 2.69% 1.30% 5.63% 
2 1.81% 1.91% 2.25% 0.90% 1.20% 1.20% 
3 1.83% 1.80% 2.19% 1.09% 1.28% 1.13% 
4 1.77% 1.62% 1.99% 1.06% 1.13% 0.92% 
5 1.57% 1.56% 1.10% 1.07% 1.31% 0.30% 
6 1.67% 1.62% 1.32% 1.20% 1.21% 0.48% 
7 1.64% 1.60% 1.48% 1.35% 1.35% 0.62% 
8 1.65% 1.61% 2.05% 1.38% 1.25% 0.89% 
9 1.71% 1.68% 1.93% 1.39% 1.45% 0.37% 
10 (Highest) 3.07% 2.57% 1.95% 1.22% 1.78% -1.01% 
10-1 
-0.03% 0.10% -4.18% -1.47% 0.48% -6.61% 
(0.9442) (0.7580) (0.0000)a (0.0000) a (0.1061) (0.0000) a 
α CAPM 
-0.52% -0.41% -4.69% -1.98% -0.01% -7.09% 
(0.1955) (0.2211) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.9613) (0.0000) a 
α  4-Factor 
-0.63% -0.48% -4.84% -2.07% -0.10% -7.18% 




Table 2.2. Time series properties of realized idiosyncratic volatilities  (RIvols) 
This table summarizes the time-series properties of individual stock realized idiosyncratic volatilities (RIvols). The sample consists of all stocks reported in the 
CFMRC for the period January 1975 to December 2012. The non-adjusted RIvol is estimated as the square root of the residuals of the regression of daily excess 
returns for every month from                                         multiplied by the square root of the number of days in the month. The 
Adjusted RIvol is calculated using the same residuals, and applying the following formula:         
   
 √∑     
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   . “a”, “b” and “c” indicate 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 
N Mean Median Skew 
Autocorrelation lags 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 








































       
   






































      
        














































       
   
         
   






































Table 2.3. Returns of portfolios formed based on lagged realized idiosyncratic volatilities 
This table reports the value-weighted returns for ten deciles for Canadian stocks sorted by their realized idiosyncratic volatilities (RIvol) derived from the Carhart 
model and then each of them is sorted into ten size deciles. In the table, big refers to stocks with a market capitalizations higher than the 90th percentile in any 
given month and small refers to stocks with a market capitalizations lower than the 10th percentile in any given month for each of the lagged RIvol deciles. The 
adjusted lagged RIvol is the adjusted realized idiosyncratic volatility.         
   
 (∑     
  
     ∑           
 
   )
   
 where      are the residuals from the 
regressions using daily returns in the Carhart 4 factor model:                                       . Deciles 1 and 10 are composed of the 
stocks with the lowest and highest lagged RIvol, respectively. The p-values of the differences between the highest and lowest portfolios are reported in the 
parentheses. “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.   
Lagged 
RIvol Decile 
         RIvol 
VW EW VW EW 
All Big Small All Big Small All Big Small All Big Small 
1 (Lowest) 1.55% 1.53% 0.79% 1.08% 1.21% -0.07% 1.29% 1.31% 0.81% 1.04% 1.07% 0.23% 
2 1.42% 1.50% 1.31% 1.10% 1.15% 0.58% 1.56% 1.50% 0.94% 1.11% 1.20% 0.23% 
3 1.50% 1.39% 1.07% 1.23% 1.26% 0.16% 1.73% 1.55% 1.16% 1.24% 1.18% 0.18% 
4 1.85% 1.68% 1.70% 1.34% 1.49% 0.60% 2.00% 1.87% 0.56% 1.27% 1.40% -0.40% 
5 1.87% 1.85% 1.39% 1.29% 1.42% 0.16% 2.16% 1.99% 1.32% 1.34% 1.43% -0.05% 
6 1.93% 1.92% 1.47% 1.16% 1.37% 0.17% 2.37% 2.10% 1.73% 1.16% 1.33% 0.16% 
7 2.39% 1.95% 1.71% 1.14% 1.29% 0.23% 2.58% 2.23% 1.73% 1.13% 1.43% -0.14% 
8 2.67% 2.30% 1.58% 0.83% 1.30% -0.56% 2.14% 2.32% 1.88% 0.79% 1.31% -0.21% 
9 2.83% 2.59% 2.04% 0.88% 1.09% -0.13% 3.47% 2.58% 2.77% 0.63% 1.25% 0.21% 
10 (Highest) 3.89% 3.05% 2.62% 0.55% 1.22% -0.30% 4.16% 3.09% 3.55% 0.86% 1.19% 0.39% 
10-1 
2.34% 1.52% 1.89% -0.53% 0.00% -0.18% 2.87% 1.78% 2.88% -0.18% 0.12% 0.30% 
(0.0000)a (0.0001) a (0.0044) a (0.1664) (0.9944) (0.7641) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0001) a (0.7012) (0.7137) (0.6491) 
α CAPM 
1.40% 0.65% 1.01% -1.39% -0.84% -1.00% 1.98% 0.88% 1.99% -1.07% -0.75% -0.57% 
(0.0044) a (0.0642) c (0.1145) (0.0001) a (0.0020) a (0.0859)c (0.0003) a (0.0192) b (0.0061) a (0.0118)b (0.0085) a (0.3675) 
α  4-Factor 
1.18% 0.49% 0.82% -1.67% -1.02% -1.19% 1.66% 0.73% 1.70% -1.43% -0.95% -0.88% 
(0.0087) a (0.1226) (0.1849) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0361) b (0.0007) a (0.0332) b (0.0147) b (0.0000) a (0.0001) a (0.1428) 
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Table 2.4. Returns of value-weighted doubled sorted portfolios of lagged adjusted realized idiosyncratic volatilities and other control variables 
This table reports the value-weighted returns for ten deciles for Canadian stocks sorted first by their realized idiosyncratic volatilities (RIvol) derived from the 
Carhart model and then separately in deciles by risk loadings, lagged monthly returns, the returns from 11 months prior ending 2 months prior to month t, 
skewness of daily returns over the previous month, and the Amihud illiquidity measure. High refers to stocks with values higher than the 90th percentile in any 
given month and low refers to stocks with values lower than the 10th percentile in any given month. The adjusted lagged RIvol is calculated as       
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 where      are the residuals from regressions using daily returns in the Carhart 4 factor model:              
                         . Deciles 1 and 10 are composed of the stocks with the lowest and highest lagged RIvol, respectively. The p-values of the 
differences between the highest and lowest portfolios are reported in the parentheses. “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 




Beta SMB HML Reversal Momentum Skewness Illiquidity 
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
1 (Lowest) 1.60% 2.27% 1.58% 0.90% 1.58% 0.23% 1.57% 1.50% 1.30% 1.29% 1.90% 1.28% 1.47% 1.54% 
2 1.43% 1.49% 1.44% 1.38% 1.41% 1.45% 1.43% 1.40% 1.48% 1.49% 1.94% 1.17% 1.34% 1.42% 
3 1.53% 1.68% 1.51% 0.41% 1.50% 3.24% 1.47% 1.44% 1.76% 1.59% 2.00% 1.18% 1.61% 1.48% 
4 1.89% 1.45% 1.90% 2.23% 1.92% 1.83% 1.88% 1.73% 1.95% 1.77% 2.52% 1.38% 1.68% 1.91% 
5 1.90% 1.91% 1.86% 1.60% 1.88% 1.77% 1.80% 1.65% 2.13% 1.94% 2.52% 1.42% 1.77% 1.82% 
6 1.96% 2.17% 2.00% 1.47% 1.93% 2.08% 1.95% 1.72% 2.26% 2.08% 2.53% 1.44% 1.94% 2.01% 
7 2.44% 1.78% 2.37% 2.10% 2.32% 2.70% 2.03% 1.93% 2.57% 1.93% 3.62% 1.36% 2.35% 2.19% 
8 2.80% 2.77% 2.82% 2.64% 2.84% 3.00% 2.86% 2.15% 2.47% 2.12% 3.41% 2.01% 2.33% 2.79% 
9 2.85% 2.49% 2.66% 3.90% 2.43% 4.87% 2.72% 1.97% 2.91% 2.58% 3.92% 1.54% 2.69% 2.58% 
10 
(Highest) 
3.71% 4.67% 3.87% 4.45% 3.27% 6.24% 3.77% 3.16% 4.02% 3.23% 5.49% 2.27% 3.52% 3.89% 
10-1 
2.11% 2.70% 2.29% 3.57% 1.69% 5.95% 0.23% 0.15% 0.83% 0.65% 3.59% 1.00% 2.05% 2.35% 
(0.0000)a (0.0256)b (0.0000) a (0.0014) a (0.0006) a (0.0161) b (0.0164) b (0.0325) b (0.0000) a (0.0001) a (0.0000) a (0.0502)c (0.0001) a (0.0000) a 
α CAPM 
1.16% 2.13% 1.35% 2.85% 0.76% 5.35% 1.26% 0.80% 1.81% 1.10% 2.63% 0.06% 1.14% 1.40% 
(0.0130) b (0.0758) c (0.0047) a (0.0082) a (0.0921) (0.0308) b (0.0051) a (0.1051) (0.0006) a (0.0970) c (0.0000) a (0.8982) (0.0231) b (0.0027) a 
α  4-Factor 
0.94% 1.84% 1.16% 2.67% 0.58% 4.81% 1.03% 0.60% 1.49% 0.80% 2.37% -0.15% 0.88% 1.20% 
(0.0262) b (0.1200) (0.0088) a (0.0117) b (0.1534) (0.0450) b (0.0115)b (0.2919) (0.0017) a (0.2482) (0.0000) a (0.7261) (0.0563) c (0.0048) a 
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Table 2.5. Returns of equal-weighted doubled sorted portfolios of lagged realized idiosyncratic volatilities and other control variables 
This table reports the equal-weighted returns for ten deciles for Canadian stocks sorted first by their realized idiosyncratic volatilities (RIvol) derived from the 
Carhart model and then separately by risk loadings over the last month, lagged monthly returns, returns for the 11 months prior through the 2 months prior to 
month t, skewness of daily returns over the previous month, and Amihud illiquidity measure. High refers to stocks with values higher than the 90th percentile in 
any given month and low refers to stocks with values lower than the 10th percentile in any given month. The adjusted lagged RIvol is calculated as         
   
 
(∑     
  
     ∑           
 
   )
   
 where      are the residuals from regressions using daily returns and the Carhart 4 factor model:              
                         . Deciles 1 and 10 are composed of the stocks with the lowest and highest lagged RIvol, respectively. The p-values of the 
differences between the highest and lowest portfolios are reported in the parentheses. “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% 





Beta SMB HML Reversal Momentum Skewness Illiquidity 
High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low 
1 (Lowest) 1.25% 2.02% 1.23% 0.33% 1.17% -0.28% 1.12% 1.00% 1.04% 1.02% 1.74% 0.68% 1.05% 1.12% 
2 1.21% 0.67% 1.21% 0.86% 1.19% 1.04% 1.11% 1.05% 1.13% 1.08% 1.80% 0.84% 1.00% 1.12% 
3 1.36% 1.00% 1.33% -0.05% 1.32% 2.38% 1.24% 1.15% 1.31% 1.16% 1.95% 0.84% 1.23% 1.26% 
4 1.45% 0.54% 1.46% 0.97% 1.39% 1.41% 1.38% 1.14% 1.26% 1.10% 2.26% 0.83% 1.34% 1.37% 
5 1.44% 0.79% 1.42% 0.46% 1.40% 0.60% 1.41% 1.26% 1.47% 1.27% 2.10% 0.74% 1.23% 1.33% 
6 1.32% 1.01% 1.37% 0.35% 1.29% 1.08% 1.27% 1.08% 1.29% 0.97% 2.03% 0.59% 0.98% 1.27% 
7 1.38% 0.40% 1.30% 1.48% 1.29% 1.08% 1.20% 0.89% 1.16% 0.79% 2.29% 0.38% 0.99% 1.22% 
8 1.01% 2.58% 1.00% 0.49% 1.02% 1.61% 1.06% 0.73% 1.22% 0.76% 1.94% 0.01% 0.95% 1.03% 
9 1.03% 0.32% 0.87% 1.24% 0.74% 2.60% 1.18% 0.52% 0.94% 0.29% 1.95% -0.33% 0.66% 0.95% 
10 
(Highest) 
0.93% 1.58% 0.83% 0.70% 0.65% 1.86% 0.90% 0.22% 1.04% 0.62% 2.39% -1.02% 0.40% 0.70% 
10-1 
-0.31% -0.23% -0.40% 0.29% -0.52% 1.56% 0.29% 0.27% 0.43% 0.25% 0.65% -1.69% -0.65% -0.42% 
(0.4385) (0.8299) (0.2991) (0.7651) (0.1640) (0.3798) (0.0201)b (0.0303) b (0.0030) a (0.1005) (0.1357) (0.0000)a (0.0883) (0.2677) 
α CAPM 
-1.17% -0.83% -1.25% -0.26% -1.37% 0.98% -1.07% -1.60% -0.90% -1.26% -0.22% -2.52% -1.48% -1.29% 
(0.0017) a (0.4241) (0.0004) a (0.7874) (0.0001) a (0.5794) (0.0015) a (0.0000) a (0.0266) b (0.0033) a (0.5837) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0002) a 
α  4-Factor 
-1.45% -1.13% -1.52% -0.47% -1.62% 0.66% -1.36% -1.86% -1.25% -1.59% -0.54% -2.78% -1.77% -1.57% 
(0.0000) a (0.2576) (0.0000) a (0.6207) (0.0000) a (0.7065) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0001) a (0.0000) a (0.1019) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0000) a 
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Table 2.6. Transition matrix for extreme returns 
This table reports the probabilities of stocks moving across deciles. MAX (MIN) refers to the highest (lowest) daily 
returns in the month prior, and MAXDEV is the difference between the highest and lowest daily returns in a given 
prior month. The shaded area represents the probability that a stock in a specific decile in month t remains in the 
same decile in month t+1.  
 




41.33% 20.80% 13.08% 8.78% 5.83% 3.70% 2.44% 1.54% 0.90% 0.54% 
2 21.27% 22.49% 17.61% 12.93% 9.34% 6.39% 4.25% 2.68% 1.65% 1.00% 
3 13.89% 17.63% 17.88% 14.69% 11.70% 8.68% 6.38% 4.26% 2.75% 1.47% 
4 8.78% 13.99% 15.32% 15.44% 13.32% 10.84% 8.62% 6.35% 4.46% 2.50% 
5 5.73% 9.66% 11.97% 14.28% 14.14% 13.17% 11.23% 8.78% 6.51% 4.00% 
6 3.76% 6.86% 9.51% 11.45% 13.41% 14.41% 13.19% 11.77% 9.25% 6.06% 
7 2.52% 4.55% 6.73% 9.39% 12.12% 14.04% 14.91% 14.48% 12.72% 8.94% 
8 1.52% 2.78% 4.66% 6.89% 9.97% 12.73% 15.13% 16.84% 16.50% 13.21% 
9 1.05% 1.81% 2.92% 4.58% 6.77% 9.94% 13.94% 17.59% 21.04% 20.75% 
10 
(Highest) 




41.28% 23.17% 13.71% 8.49% 5.33% 3.22% 1.98% 1.26% 0.85% 0.54% 
2 21.32% 23.07% 18.79% 13.48% 9.24% 6.20% 3.71% 2.40% 1.42% 0.79% 
3 12.76% 17.86% 18.08% 16.11% 12.56% 9.26% 6.24% 4.04% 2.40% 1.26% 
4 7.51% 12.59% 15.68% 15.81% 14.83% 12.34% 8.98% 6.17% 4.14% 2.14% 
5 4.96% 8.73% 11.85% 14.03% 14.94% 14.08% 11.82% 9.55% 6.34% 3.56% 
6 3.15% 5.46% 8.33% 11.43% 13.73% 15.12% 14.49% 12.54% 9.90% 5.98% 
7 1.92% 3.53% 5.63% 8.49% 11.56% 13.71% 16.45% 16.11% 13.59% 9.14% 
8 1.16% 2.35% 3.77% 6.30% 8.63% 11.74% 15.25% 18.12% 18.39% 13.87% 
9 0.97% 1.41% 2.34% 3.83% 6.17% 9.12% 13.40% 17.89% 23.15% 21.83% 
10 
(Highest) 




49.00% 22.50% 12.28% 6.76% 3.76% 2.10% 1.24% 0.67% 0.39% 0.34% 
2 22.48% 25.83% 19.50% 12.92% 8.41% 4.86% 2.66% 1.52% 0.82% 0.47% 
3 12.19% 20.02% 20.46% 16.80% 12.10% 7.98% 4.91% 2.77% 1.54% 0.86% 
4 6.88% 13.55% 17.03% 17.93% 15.16% 11.77% 7.84% 5.14% 2.79% 1.50% 
5 4.01% 8.36% 12.71% 16.14% 16.56% 14.64% 11.63% 8.40% 4.92% 2.55% 
6 2.15% 5.07% 8.17% 12.28% 15.54% 16.67% 15.27% 12.19% 8.33% 4.31% 
7 1.19% 2.75% 5.25% 8.38% 12.48% 16.12% 17.70% 16.21% 12.94% 7.13% 
8 0.81% 1.50% 2.93% 5.35% 8.82% 13.02% 17.20% 19.47% 18.62% 12.49% 
9 0.57% 0.82% 1.62% 3.04% 5.23% 9.01% 14.08% 19.65% 24.67% 21.77% 
10 
(Highest) 
1.02% 0.55% 0.83% 1.35% 2.41% 4.57% 8.41% 14.38% 25.14% 43.19% 
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Table 2.7. Returns of portfolios formed based on lagged daily extreme returns 
This table reports the equal- and value-weighted returns for ten deciles for Canadian stocks sorted by their extreme returns (MAX, MIN and MAXDEV), and then 
by size. Big refers to stocks with market capitalizations higher than the 90th percentile in any given month and small refers to stocks with market capitalizations 
lower than the 10th percentile in any given month, respectively. MAX (MIN) refers to the highest (lowest) daily returns in the prior month, and MAXDEV is the 
difference between the highest and lowest daily returns in a given prior month. The p-values of the differences between the highest and lowest portfolios are 






MAX MIN MAXDEV 
Value Weighted Equal Weighted Value Weighted Equal Weighted Value Weighted Equal Weighted 
All Big Small All Big Small All Big Small All Big Small All Big Small All Big Small 
1 
(Lowest) 
1.43% 1.43% 1.05% 1.09% 1.21% 0.28% 1.35% 1.31% 0.62% 1.03% 1.04% -0.01% 1.32% 1.27% 0.89% 1.07% 1.10% 0.24% 
2 1.60% 1.49% 0.98% 1.22% 1.22% 0.18% 1.60% 1.53% 0.79% 1.18% 1.26% 0.001% 1.54% 1.52% 1.22% 1.20% 1.21% 0.36% 
3 1.55% 1.61% 1.22% 1.21% 1.30% 0.37% 1.65% 1.66% 1.26% 1.19% 1.22% 0.18% 1.75% 1.68% 1.14% 1.22% 1.34% 0.22% 
4 1.81% 1.73% 1.15% 1.25% 1.40% -0.06% 2.14% 1.69% 0.77% 1.44% 1.30% -0.52% 1.91% 1.70% 0.59% 1.28% 1.31% -0.47% 
5 2.00% 1.77% 1.36% 1.17% 1.26% -0.06% 2.35% 2.01% 0.88% 1.39% 1.48% -0.52% 2.10% 1.88% 1.22% 1.35% 1.34% -0.35% 
6 1.95% 1.96% 1.42% 1.11% 1.28% 0.07% 1.95% 2.22% 1.70% 1.14% 1.61% 0.06% 2.22% 2.03% 2.24% 0.99% 1.34% 0.48% 
7 2.36% 1.89% 2.01% 1.07% 1.28% 0.23% 2.32% 1.97% 2.33% 0.91% 1.30% 0.33% 2.67% 2.08% 1.46% 1.23% 1.40% -0.09% 
8 2.43% 2.27% 1.09% 1.02% 1.27% -0.70% 2.31% 2.23% 2.03% 0.82% 1.45% -0.53% 2.36% 2.41% 2.05% 0.88% 1.39% -0.23% 
9 3.05% 2.31% 1.31% 0.81% 1.25% -1.02% 2.89% 2.26% 2.64% 0.65% 1.16% -0.17% 2.92% 2.48% 2.53% 0.68% 1.19% 0.01% 
10 
(Highest) 
3.75% 3.05% 2.87% 0.64% 1.27% 0.08% 3.06% 2.50% 3.74% 0.88% 1.00% 1.37% 3.69% 2.78% 3.27% 0.69% 1.17% 0.01% 
10-1 





















 (0.4004) (0.8225) (0.6474) 
α CAPM 





























































Table 2.8. Returns of value-weighted doubled sorted portfolios of lagged extreme returns and high/low monthly returns 
This table reports the equal and value weighted returns for ten deciles of Canadian stocks first sorted by their lagged monthly returns, and then by their extreme 
return measures, where MAX (MIN) refers to the highest (lowest) daily returns in the prior month, and MAXDEV is the difference between the highest and lowest 
daily returns in the prior month. High (low) refers to stocks with returns in the highest (lowest) decile for the prior month. The p-values of the differences 
between the highest and lowest portfolios are reported in the parentheses. “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 






MAX MIN MAXDEV 
Value Weighted Equal Weighted Value Weighted Equal Weighted Value Weighted Equal Weighted 
High 
         
Low 
         
High 
         
Low 
         
High 
         
Low 
         
High 
         
Low 
         
High 
         
Low 
         
High 
         
Low 
         
1 (Lowest) 1.58% 1.01% 1.35% 0.60% 1.52% 0.91% 1.30% 0.57% 1.44% 0.97% 1.28% 0.70% 
2 1.85% 0.89% 1.69% 0.37% 1.79% 0.90% 1.62% 0.40% 1.79% 0.96% 1.58% 0.51% 
3 1.91% 0.78% 1.85% 0.02% 2.11% 0.80% 1.89% 0.10% 2.05% 0.80% 1.78% 0.14% 
4 2.23% 0.64% 2.13% -0.35% 2.41% 0.74% 2.24% -0.20% 2.38% 0.66% 2.13% -0.15% 
5 2.68% 0.51% 2.54% -0.75% 3.03% 0.46% 2.74% -0.76% 2.74% 0.34% 2.46% -0.71% 
6 2.81% 0.01% 2.82% -1.54% 2.87% -0.20% 2.90% -1.50% 3.08% -0.03% 2.93% -1.38% 
7 3.77% -0.21% 3.45% -2.13% 3.48% -0.32% 3.32% -2.26% 4.01% -0.56% 3.45% -2.24% 
8 4.21% -1.17% 3.91% -3.23% 3.97% -1.18% 4.00% -3.33% 4.39% -1.25% 4.03% -3.37% 
9 5.18% -1.74% 5.08% -4.46% 5.01% -1.65% 4.97% -4.63% 5.37% -2.46% 5.09% -4.79% 
10 (Highest) 7.60% -3.64% 7.84% -6.87% 7.30% -3.19% 7.62% -6.87% 8.36% -4.05% 8.10% -7.23% 
10-1 





















































α  4-Factor 





























Table 2.9. Returns of value-weighted doubled sorted portfolios of lagged extreme returns and high/low RIvol 
This table reports the equal and value weighted returns for ten deciles of Canadian stocks first sorted by their RIvol, and then by their extreme return measures. 
MAX (MIN) refers to the highest (lowest) daily returns in the prior month, and MAXDEV is the difference between the highest and lowest daily return in the prior 
month. High (low) refers to stocks with RIvol in the highest (lowest) decile for the prior month. The p-values of the differences between the highest and lowest 





MAX MIN MAXDEV 

























1 (Lowest) 1.59% 1.44% 1.40% 1.15% 1.58% 1.33% 1.34% 1.06% 1.49% 1.31% 1.32% 1.12% 
2 1.71% 1.55% 1.43% 1.22% 1.76% 1.46% 1.43% 1.21% 1.79% 1.55% 1.47% 1.25% 
3 1.89% 1.53% 1.48% 1.24% 1.84% 1.71% 1.46% 1.23% 1.82% 1.60% 1.42% 1.17% 
4 2.04% 1.65% 1.45% 1.12% 2.48% 1.79% 1.91% 1.29% 2.21% 1.75% 1.54% 1.27% 
5 2.04% 2.00% 1.35% 1.16% 2.25% 2.17% 1.51% 1.33% 2.17% 1.86% 1.57% 1.18% 
6 2.45% 1.67% 1.49% 0.81% 2.18% 1.77% 1.38% 1.00% 2.53% 1.90% 1.34% 1.05% 
7 2.48% 2.05% 1.50% 0.82% 2.66% 1.99% 1.28% 0.58% 2.93% 1.99% 1.60% 0.69% 
8 2.85% 1.70% 1.49% 0.37% 2.51% 2.01% 1.21% 0.30% 2.61% 2.16% 1.31% 0.43% 
9 3.56% 2.00% 1.55% -0.14% 3.16% 1.52% 1.22% -0.26% 3.34% 1.62% 1.37% -0.30% 
10 (Highest) 4.38% 1.75% 1.65% -0.98% 3.51% 1.27% 2.01% -1.07% 4.50% 1.31% 1.75% -1.43% 
10-1 
2.78% 0.32% 0.25% -2.13% 1.93% -0.05% 0.67% -2.13% 3.01% 0.00% 0.43% -2.54% 
(0.0000)a (0.3749) (0.5958) (0.0000) a (0.0003) a (0.8730) (0.1586) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.9933)  (0.3870) (0.0000) a 
α CAPM 
1.85% -0.49% -0.62% -2.91% 2.14% 0.21% 0.92% -1.83% 2.05% -0.88% -0.47% -3.36% 
(0.0006) a (0.1378) (0.1612) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.4916) (0.0406) b (0.0000) a (0.0003) a (0.0119)b (0.3064) (0.0000) a 
α  4-Factor 
1.57% -0.62% -0.98% -3.07% 1.93% 0.13% 0.62% -1.95% 1.74% -1.05% -0.83% -3.52% 
(0.0013) a (0.0404) b (0.0052) a (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.6631) (0.0965)c (0.0000) a (0.0007) a (0.0010)a (0.0233) b (0.0000) a 
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Table 2.10. Returns of value-weighted doubled sorted portfolios of lagged RIvol and high/low extreme returns 
This table reports the equal and value-weighted returns for ten deciles for Canadian stocks first sorted by their realized idiosyncratic volatilities (RIvol) derived 
from the Carhart model and then separately by MAX, MIN and MAXDEV. High refers to stocks with values higher than the 90th percentile in any given month and 
low refers to stocks with values lower than the 10th percentile in any given month. The adjusted lagged RIvol is is calculated from:         
   
 (∑     
  
    
 ∑           
 
   )
   
 where      are the residuals from regressions using daily returns and the Carhart 4 factor model:                            
           . MAX (MIN) refers to the highest (lowest) daily returns in the prior month, and MAXDEV is the difference between the highest and lowest daily 
return in a given month. Quintiles 1 and 10 are composed of the stocks with the lowest and highest lagged RIvol, respectively. The p-values of the differences 
between the highest and lowest portfolios are reported in the parentheses. “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively.   
 
Lagged RIvol  
Deciles 
MAX MIN MAXDEV 

























1 (Lowest) 2.57% 1.45% 1.85% 0.83% 1.07% 1.64% 0.94% 1.42% 1.92% 1.52% 1.45% 1.05% 
2 2.36% 1.40% 1.95% 1.06% 0.93% 1.53% 0.78% 1.32% 1.72% 1.44% 1.38% 1.13% 
3 2.52% 1.41% 1.97% 1.12% 1.33% 1.50% 1.11% 1.49% 2.10% 1.46% 1.60% 1.28% 
4 2.37% 1.70% 1.91% 1.13% 1.42% 1.94% 1.20% 1.69% 1.95% 1.80% 1.58% 1.34% 
5 2.50% 1.63% 1.79% 0.98% 1.61% 1.94% 1.18% 1.74% 2.13% 1.76% 1.51% 1.30% 
6 2.38% 1.78% 1.54% 0.88% 1.64% 2.20% 1.10% 1.77% 2.02% 1.98% 1.33% 1.26% 
7 2.99% 1.66% 1.41% 0.53% 2.51% 2.25% 1.13% 1.81% 2.81% 1.88% 1.26% 1.02% 
8 2.89% 2.05% 1.33% 0.13% 2.56% 3.11% 1.13% 1.94% 2.73% 2.57% 1.22% 0.83% 
9 3.15% 1.61% 1.07% -0.53% 2.91% 3.19% 0.91% 1.91% 3.00% 2.25% 0.96% 0.41% 
10 (Highest) 4.36% 1.16% 1.28% -2.22% 4.18% 4.30% 1.20% 2.18% 4.21% 2.20% 1.23% -0.70% 
10-1 
1.79% -0.29% -0.57% -3.05% 3.11% 2.66% 0.25% 0.75% 2.28% 0.68% -0.21% -1.75% 
(0.0011)a (0.4428) (0.1634) (0.0000) a (0.000)a (0.0000) a (0.5316) (0.0143)b (0.0000) a (0.0767)c (0.5961) (0.0000) a 
α CAPM 
0.95% -1.15% -1.34% -3.82% 2.27% 1.78% -0.53% -0.08% 1.46% -0.17% -0.98% -2.52% 
(0.0707) c (0.0007) a (0.0006) a (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.1728) (0.7741) (0.0063) a (0.6381) (0.0124) b (0.0000) a 
α  4-Factor 
0.71% -1.30% -1.63% -3.97% 2.03% 1.59% -0.82% -0.28% 1.23% -0.31% -1.27% -2.67% 
(0.1414) (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0000) a (0.0001) a (0.0000) a (0.0149) b (0.2117) (0.0127) b (0.3321) (0.0002) a (0.0000) a 
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Table 2.11. Time-series averages of the cross-sectional equal and value weighted Fama-MacBeth regressions of returns on the idiosyncratic volatility 
measures and control variables  
Time-series averages of the parameter estimates for the series of cross-sectional regressions using turnover and its coefficient of variation as control variables similar to Fu (2009) 
are reported in this table. BETA, ME and BE/ME are estimated as in Fama and French (1992). The not adjusted RIvol is estimated as the square root of the residuals of the 
regression using daily excess returns for every month in                                           multiplied by the square root of the number of days in the 
month. The adjusted RIV is calculated as         
    (∑      
  
     ∑             
 
   )
   
. RET (-2,-11) is a momentum variable calculated as the cumulative return of each stock 
from month t-11 to t-2. The liquidity control measures are TURNOVER and CV(TURN) as in Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). They are respectively the log of a stock’s 
average turnover and its coefficient of variation over the 36 months previous to month t .  Half Amihud (-) is the modified illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) as in Brennan et 
al. (2013). Synchronicity SYNC is the logistic transformation of the R-square from the Carhart 4-factor model. The average R2 values are reported in the table. t-values are reported 
in the parentheses. The coefficients are the means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted for autocorrelation as in Pontiff 
(1996). “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Model 
Equal Weighted Value Weighted 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) 
Intercept 
-0.029 -0.025 -0.003 -0.001 -0.155 -0.085 -0.069 -0.042 -0.092 -0.066 -0.075 -0.055 
(-2.986)a (-2.290)b (-0.467) (-0.085) (-15.333) a (-12.684) a (-9.768) a (-7.860) a (-9.929)a (-7.361) a (-6.356) a (-5.270) a 
Beta 
-0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.004 -0.009 -0.007 -0.005 -0.003 -0.005 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 
(-2.183)b (-1.959)b (-1.347) (-1.094) (-5.758) a (-4.563) a (-3.416) a (-2.515)a (-2.082) b (-0.521) (-0.850) (0.119) 
Log(ME) 
0.001 0.002 0.145 0.121 0.001 0.000 0.401 0.372 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(1.973)b (2.460)a (0.511) (0.408) (1.897)c (1.683) (2.274)b (2.208)b (0.653) (0.624) (1.096) (0.452) 
Log(BE/ME) 
-0.005 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 
(-0.897) (-0.083) (-0.339) (0.067) (0.816) (1.017) (0.859) (1.354) (-0.126) (-0.214) (-0.208) (-0.386) 
RIvol t 
0.113    0.324 
   
0.362    
(4.298) a    (12.877) a 
   
(9.179) a    
        
   
 




 1.862   




 (6.914) a   
RIvol t-1 




  0.180  




  (4.352) a  
          
   
 
   -0.072 
   
0.031    0.676 
   (-0.437) 
   
(4.972)a    (2.879) a 
Ret (-2,-11) 
0.177 0.169 0.175 0.171 0.171 0.169 0.177 0.178 0.191 0.197 0.205 0.210 
(13.136) a (12.568) a (11.374) a (10.903) a (24.770) a (26.955) a (32.000) a (33.097) a (26.773) a (27.316) a (26.801) a (27.903) a 
RET t-1 
-0.228 -0.222 -0.206 -0.212 -0.203 -0.204 -0.208 -0.201 -0.212 -0.212 -0.227 -0.225 
(-8.190) a (-8.187) a (-9.885) a (-8.973) a (-22.557) a (-21.909) a (-20.065) a (-20.257) a (-13.648) a (-13.352) a (-12.923) a (-13.072) a 
Turnover 
0.007 0.005 0.001 0.001         
(1.148) (0.874) (0.071) (0.034)         
CV(Turn) 
0.000 -0.001 0.003 0.003         
(0.203) (-0.228) (0.569) (0.545)         
Half 
 Amihud (-) 
    0.008 0.005 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.003 0.003 
    (12.173) a (9.840) a (10.656) a (8.578) a (10.992) a (8.678) a (6.522) a (5.741) a 
SYNC 
    0.003 0.001 -0.005 -0.004 -0.002 -0.004 -0.007 -0.005 
    (1.407) (-0.154) (-2.154)b (-1.778)c (-0.585) (-1.261) (-2.233)b (-1.706)c 
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Adj. R2 32.86% 33.87% 29.67% 30.55% 32.10% 32.49% 27.69% 27.90% 62.95% 62.29% 61.42% 60.89% 
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Table 2.12. Time-series averages of the cross-sectional regressions for risk-adjusted excess returns and RIvol 
and control variables  
Time-series averages of the parameter estimates for the series of cross-sectional regressions of risk-adjusted returns on 
idiosyncratic volatilities and various control variables are reported in this table. The non-adjusted RIvol is estimated as the 
square root of the residuals of the regression using daily excess returns for every month in:                 
                          multiplied by the square root of the number of days in the month. Adjusted RIvol is 
calculated as         
    (∑      
  
     ∑             
 
   )
   
. The liquidity control measures are TURNOVER and 
CV(TURN) as in Easley, Hvidkjaer and O’Hara (2002). They are respectively given by the log of a stock’s average 
turnover and its coefficient of variation over the 36 months previous to month t. RET (-2,-11) is a momentum control 
variable calculated as the cumulative return of each stock for month t-11 to t-2. The coefficients are the means of the 
cross-sectional regression coefficients. Half Amihud (-) is the modified illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) as in 
Brennan et al. (2013). Synchronicity SYNC is the logistic transformation of the R-square from the Carhart 4-factor model. 
The average R
2
 values are reported in the table. t-values are reported in the parentheses. The standard errors used in the t-
tests are adjusted for autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Intercept 
-0.025 -0.006 -0.005 0.001 -0.159 -0.088 -0.100 -0.072 
(-8.056)a (-3.539) a (-1.907) (0.301) (-9.834)a (-10.413) a (-13.620) a (-13.632) a 
RIvol t 
0.377 
   
0.551 
   
(9.425) a 
   
(13.470) a 
   
        
   
  
1.933 





   
(10.217) a 
  
RIvol t-1   
0.089 





   
(9.848) a 
 
          
   
    
0.334 
   
0.413 
   
(2.458) a 
   
(5.206) a 
RET t-1 
-0.203 -0.204 -0.208 -0.201 -0.212 -0.212 -0.227 -0.225 
(-22.557) a (-21.909) a (-20.065) a (-20.257) a (-13.648) a (-13.352) a (-12.923) a (-13.072) a 
RET (-2,-11) 
0.016 0.012 0.018 0.019 0.008 0.008 0.012 0.013 
(3.496) a (2.882) a (4.063) a (4.234) a (2.649) a (3.075) a (4.611) a (4.661) a 
Turn 
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 
    
(1.704)c (1.567) (1.529) (1.587) 
    
CV turn 
0.001 0.004 0.006 0.006 
    
(0.268) (1.060) (1.203) (1.373) 





    
0.007 0.005 0.006 0.005 










SYNC     
0.002 -0.001 -0.004 -0.004 
    
(2.075)b (-1.393) (-4.554) a (-5.037) a 
Adj. R2 10.61% 13.39% 5.10% 6.09% 11.21% 12.85% 4.98% 4.87% 
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Table 2.13. Time-series averages of the cross-sectional equal and value weighted Fama-MacBeth regressions 
of returns on lagged idiosyncratic volatility measures, extreme returns, and control variables  
Time-series averages of the parameter estimates for the series of cross-sectional regressions using turnover and its 
coefficient of variation as control variables similar to Fu (2009) are reported in this table. BETA, ME and BE/ME 
are estimated as in Fama and French (1992). The adjusted lagged realized idiosyncratic volatility is calculated as 
        
   
 (∑     
  
     ∑           
 
   )
   
 where     are the residuals from regressions using daily returns in 
the Carhart 4 factor model:                                       . MAX (MIN) refers to the 
highest (lowest) daily returns in the prior month, and MAXDEV is the difference between the highest and lowest 
daily returns in a the prior month. RET (-2,-11) is a momentum control variable calculated as the cumulative return 
of each stock for month t-11 to t-2. Half Amihud (-) is the modified illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) as in 
Brennan et al. (2013). Synchronicity SYNC is the logistic transformation of the R-square from the Carhart 4-factor 
model. The average R2 values are reported in the table. t-values are reported in the parentheses. The coefficients are 
the means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted for 
autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
-0.051 -0.021 -0.049 -0.056 -0.034 -0.054 
(-3.545)a (-1.422) (-3.256) a (-3.791) a (-2.058) (-3.335) a 
Beta 
-0.002 -0.001 -0.002 0.000 0.001 0.000 
(-0.626) (-0.146) (-0.671) (-0.070) (0.367) (0.114) 
Log(ME) 
0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001 0.000 
(0.397) (-1.126) (0.363) (-0.216) (-1.211) (-0.134) 
Log(BE/ME) 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 
(-0.166) (-0.205) (-0.167) (-0.914) (-1.116) (-1.034) 
RIvol t-1 
      0.407 0.443 0.383 
      (1.735)c (2.188)b (1.819)c 
MAX 
0.039     0.029     
(1.694)c     (1.161)     
MIN 
  -0.057     -0.016   
  (-1.698) c     (-0.454)   
MAXDEV 
    0.011     0.016 
    (0.700)     (1.014) 
RET (-2,-11) 
0.200 0.202 0.200 0.202 0.205 0.203 
(26.968) a (28.669) a (27.298) a (26.485) a (27.232) a (26.565) a 
RETt-1 
-0.236 -0.244 -0.238 -0.241 -0.238 -0.243 
(-13.984) a (-13.814) a (-14.261) a (-12.299) a (-11.411) a (-12.534) a 
Half 
 Amihud (-) 
0.003 0.002 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(4.541) a (3.885) a (4.921) a (5.602) a (5.638) a (5.775) a 
SYNC 
-0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.007 -0.004 
(-0.300) (-0.529) (-0.301) (-0.835) (-2.063) (-1.184) 




Table 2.14. Time-series averages of the cross-sectional equal and value weighted Fama-MacBeth 
regressions of returns on control variables and idiosyncratic volatility measures conditioned 
on extreme returns  
Time-series averages of the parameter estimates for the series of cross-sectional regressions using turnover and 
its coefficient of variation as control variables similar to Fu (2009) are reported in this table. BETA, ME and 
BE/ME are estimated as in Fama and French (1992). The adjusted lagged realized idiosyncratic volatility is 
calculated as         
   
 (∑     
  
     ∑           
 
   )
   
 where      are the residuals from the regression 
using daily returns in the Carhart 4 factor model:                                       . 
MAX1 (MAX10) are dummy variables that take the value of 1 when the highest daily return of stock i in month 
t is in the lowest (highest) decile and zero otherwise. MIN1 (MIN10) are dummy variables that take the value of 
1 when the lowest daily return of stock i in month t is in the lowest (highest) decile and zero otherwise. 
MAXDEV1 (MAXDEV10) are dummy variables that take the value of 1 when the difference between the 
highest and lowest daily returns of stock i in month t is in the lowest (highest) decile and zero otherwise.  RET 
(-2,-11) is a momentum control variable calculated as the cumulative return of each stock for month t-11 to t-2. 
Half Amihud (-) is the modified illiquidity measure of Amihud (2002) as in Brennan et al. (2013). 
Synchronicity SYNC is the logistic transformation of the R-square from the Carhart 4-factor model. The average 
R2 values are reported in the table. t-values are reported in the parentheses. The coefficients are the means of the 
cross-sectional regression coefficients. The standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted for autocorrelation as 
in Pontiff (1996). “a”, “b” and “c” indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
Model (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 
-0.047 -0.063 -0.057 -0.056 -0.055 -0.059 
(-4.231)a (-5.458) a (-5.414) a (-5.346) a (-5.348) a (-5.113) a 
Beta 
0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000 
(0.010) (0.261) (-0.083) (-0.168) (-0.014) (-0.061) 
Log(ME) 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
(-0.426) (0.860) (0.144) (0.238) (0.199) (0.785) 
Log(BE/ME) 
0.000 -0.005 -0.005 -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 
(0.037) (-0.890) (-0.868) (-0.156) (-0.160) (-0.795) 
RIvol t-1 
0.543 0.620 0.662 0.656 0.625 0.652 
(2.413) a (2.597) a (2.835) a (2.832) a (2.423) a (2.621) a 
RIvol t-1*MAX1 
-5.310 
     (-0.493) 




    
 
(-0.165) 




   
  
(-0.156) 
   
RIvol t-1*MIN1 
   
-10.570 
  




    
-9.529 
 




     
-2.333 
     
(-2.482) a 
RET (-2,-11) 
0.212 0.206 0.205 0.210 0.213 0.208 
(23.698) a (30.006) a (30.107) a (25.350) a (24.685) a (30.865 ) a 
RETt-1 
-0.230 -0.218 -0.207 -0.224 -0.230 -0.214 
(-11.475) a (-12.597) a (-13.011) a (-12.312) a (-11.003) a (-11.728) a 
Half 
 Amihud (-) 
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
(5.421) a (6.688) a (6.543) a (5.818) a (5.903) a (6.204) a 
SYNC 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007 -0.006 
(-1.907) a (-2.566) a (-3.412) a (-2.289) a (-2.550) a (-2.684) a 







Table 3.1: Summary statistics for the asset holdings of closed-end funds 
 
This table reports the mean, median, maximum and minimum holdings of all closed-end equity funds (CEF) in 
our sample over the period 2001:01 to 2010:12.  
 
 
US equity Cash 
Foreign 
equity Options Swaps Currencies Debt Unidentified 
Mean 77.56% 4.81% 4.78% 3.61% -1.62% 0.26% 8.35% 2.26% 
Median 77.84% 5.78% 5.47% 2.57% 0.00% 0.02% 8.09% 2.31% 
Maximum 102.32% 13.37% 9.38% 7.97% 5.62% 1.82% 18.87% 4.42% 
Minimum 68.23% -4.41% 0.15% -0.06% -32.19% -0.71% 3.30% 0.00% 
 
Table 3.2: Summary statistics for various measures of the idiosyncratic volatilities of equity CEF 
 
This table presents the summary statistics for arbitrage risk proxies calculated from daily net returns of the 
simultaneous long position in CEF i and short position in its equivalent NAVPS i for each day of month 
t (        
).We use these returns in the following Carhart (1997) 4-factor model for each CEF i with at least 15 
daily returns in month t:  
       
                                                                         where      
is the excess return of the market portfolio,       and      are two additional Fama-French factors,      
is the momentum factor, and     is the error term. Based on Goyal and Santa Clara (2003), we add a second 
term to capture the covariance between lagged returns so that             becomes: 
            √∑     
  
     ∑           
 
   . Significance of the means and medians are tested using t-tests and 
Wilcoxon Rank tests, respectively. The superscripts a and b represent significance at the 1% and 5% levels, 
respectively. N refers to the sample size.  
 
Variables N Mean Median St. Deviation 
        7940 -0.14 -0.046 6.028 
        7940 -0.771
a -0.035a 16.553 
        7940 -0.708
a -0.006a 16.45 
        7940 -0.598
a -0.023a 13.068 
        7940 6.98%
a 4.80%a 13.78% 
Premium 
Level 8419 -5.62%
a -6.74%a 18.18% 
Difference 8322 -0.12%





Table 3.3: Absolute premium regressions as in Pontiff (1996)  
 
This table reports the average coefficients of the cross-sectional regressions of the absolute level of CEF discounts and 
arbitrage costs as in Pontiff (1996). The estimated regression is: 
                     (       ⁄ )        (      
   )        (      
      )                
         
       ⁄  is the inverse of the price of CEF i in month t-1;       
    is the standard deviation of CEF i's NAVPS at time t-1 based 
on the previous three months;   (      
      ),   ( ̂     
   ) and           
   are the natural logs of the standard deviations of the 
residuals, the explained portion and the skewness of the residuals, respectively, of the regression of the NAVPS returns on 
the CRSP equally-weighted index.      , which is included in regressions (1) and (4), is not part of Pontiff’s (1996) table I. 
The t-values using adjusted standard errors are reported in the parentheses. a, b and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% 




(1) (2) (3) (4) 








       ⁄  




      
    




  (      









  ( ̂     
   ) 




          
    
0.008 
(3.71)a 
  0.010 
(1.92)b 





Table 3.4:  Descriptive statistics for the variables 
This table reports the mean, median and standard deviation of each of the various variables used in subsequent 
cross-sectional and panel regressions.         is the premium for CEF i in month t measured as  the ln of the 
ratio of the CEF price to its NAVPS;                     ⁄  ;  ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and 
 ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a long CEF and short 
NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t;         is the auto-correlation-adjusted 
idiosyncratic volatilities of the daily returns of the net returns on an arbitrage position for  CEF i in month t; 
      is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model regression 
for CEF i in month t;          is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in month t;       is the weight 
of cash and cash equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t;        is the weight of bonds in the 
portfolio of CEF i in month t;      is the difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset 
holdings in month t, where the amortized spread of the CEF is defined as 
        
   [∑ |             |        
 
    
] [              ]⁄  where        is the mid-spread,        is the 
traded volume of the CEF, and        is the number of outstanding shares;  
         is the ratio of non-common equity to total assets;       is the conditional alpha for CEF i in month t 
based on the returns for the 60 months including month t;             is the natural log of the market value of 
CEF i in month t;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in 
month t;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t;        is the tenure of the manager of CEF i 
in month t;       is the value of a stock being utilized for securities lending against total value of inventory 
available for lending in month t; and        is the number of stocks shorted by CEF i in month t. In the 
subsequent regressions the variables other than Premium are lagged one month. 
 
 Median Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
         -5.62% -6.74% 18.18% 
 ̂       -0.14 -0.046 6.028 
 ̂       -0.771 -0.035 16.553 
 ̂       -0.708 -0.006 16.45 
 ̂       -0.598
a
 -0.023 13.068 
        6.98% 4.80% 13.78% 
      -0.003 -0.014 2.77 
         3.61% 2.57% 3.1% 
      4.81% 5.78% 4.06% 
       8.35% 8.09% 13.30% 
    0.08% 0.30% 7.05% 
         14.03% 9.8% 8.98% 
      -0.42% -0.44% 0.82% 
         ) 5.64 5.59 1.25 
  ⁄  0.06 0.08 0.08 
   1.34% 3.42% 5.19% 
         1.26% 1.59% 1.14% 
       7.75 9.52 6.65 
      6.59% 19.51% 25.72% 
       22 21.98 18.54 
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Table 3.5: Correlation matrix of the various variables  
This table reports the correlation coefficients between the various variables used in subsequent cross-sectional and panel regressions.         is the premium for CEF i in month t measured as 
the ln of the ratio of the CEF price to its NAVPS;                     ⁄  ;  ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the 
net returns of a long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;        
  and        
  are the auto-correlation-adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the 
returns of a long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i  in month t-1 when the dummy variable D takes the value of 1 for positive price changes in month t-1 and the value 0 for negative 
price changes in month t-1 for CEF i, respectively;         is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model regression for CEF i in month t-1;  
          is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in month t-1;       is the weight of cash and cash equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;          is the ratio of 
total assets minus total common equity to total assets in CEF i in month t-1;      is the difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in month t-1, where the 
amortized spread is defined as         
   [∑ |             |        
 
   ] [              ]⁄  where        is the mid spread,        is the trading volume, and         is the number of 
outstanding shares;       is the conditional alpha for CEF i in month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1;             is the log of the market value of CEF i in 
month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t-1;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in month t-1;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1;        is the tenure 
of the manager of CEF i in month t-1. The p-values for tests of statistical significance are reported in the parentheses. a, b and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
          ̂        ̂        ̂        ̂                                                                    ⁄              
 ̂       
-0.028 
(0.81) 
               





              









             









            













           













          















         

















        



















       





















      



























     

























    































   



















































































































Table 3.6:. Determinants of closed-end fund (CEF) premiums based on monthly Fama-MacBeth 
cross-sectional regressions using lagged Ivol net 
 
This table reports the mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the discount for CEF i in month t 
given by:  
                   ̂                  ̂                    ̂                  ̂                              
                                                                
                                                         (           )
      (       ⁄ )                                                       
 ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a 
long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;         is the auto-correlation-
adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the daily returns of the net returns on an arbitrage position for  CEF i in month t-1; 
      is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model regression for CEF i in 
month t-1;           is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in month t-1;        is the weight of cash and cash 
equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;        is the weight of bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-
1;             is the ratio of total assets minus total common equity to total assets in CEF i in month t-1;     is the 
difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in month t-1;        is the conditional alpha for 
CEF i in month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1;             is the natural log of the market 
value of CEF i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the price of CEF i in month t-1;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in 
month t-1;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1; and        is the tenure of the manager of CEF i in 
month t-1. The reported coefficients are the means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The standard errors used in 
the t-tests are adjusted for autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). The t-values are reported in the parentheses. a, b and c 
represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 







 -0.021 (-1.089) -0.054 (-2.441)
a
 0.017 (0.741) 
 ̂       
0.002 ( 0.363) 
 
0.000 (0.050) 0.002 (0.207) 0.011 (1.499) 0.01 (1.036) 



















-0.003 (-0.681) -0.004 (-0.847) 0.007 (1.592) 0.006 (0.839) 
 ̂       
0.001 (0.157) 
 
0.005 (0.843) -0.001 (-0.382) 0.012 (1.079) 0.009 (0.926) 












      
   
-0.001 (-0.737) -0.002 (-2.059)
b
 -0.002 (-1.613) 
         
   
-0.004 (-0.972) 0.002 (2.792)
a
 0.001 (0.898) 
      
   
-0.005 (-2.010)
b
 -0.001 (-0.132) -0.001 (-1.349) 
          
-0.002 (-3.685)
a























           





  ⁄  





        
0.026 (0.132) 
         





       







 23.55% 12.69% 27.88% 36.00% 53.00% 67.00% 
Median R
2
 14.99% 1.54% 18.30% 27.00% 50.00% 66.00% 
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Table 3.7:. Relationship between closed-end fund (CEF) premiums and lagged Ivolnet conditioned on 
sign of lagged price change 
 
This table reports the mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for CEF i’s premium for month t 
given by: 
                 ̂                  ̂                    ̂            
      ̂                              
                         
                          
                                                                     
                                       (           )       (       ⁄ )             
                                          
 ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a 
long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;        
  and        
  are the auto-
correlation-adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the returns of a long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i  in month t-1 
when the dummy variable D takes the value of 1 for positive price changes in month t-1 and the value 0 for negative price 
changes in month t-1 for CEF i, respectively;         is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model regression for CEF i in month t-1;           is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in 
month t-2;       is the weight of cash and cash equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;        is the 
weight of bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;            is the ratio of total assets minus total common equity to 
total assets in CEF i in month t-1;     is the difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in 
month t-1;       is the conditional alpha for CEF i in month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1;  
           is the natural log of the market value of CEF i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t-
1;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in month t-1;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1; and        is 
the tenure of the manager of CEF i in month t-1. The reported coefficients are the means of the cross-sectional regression 
coefficients. The standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted for autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). The t-values are 
reported in the parentheses. a, b and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   -0.05 (-3.912) -0.053 (-4.557)
 a -0.04 (-2.857) a 0.007 (0.245) 
 ̂       
 
-0.005 (-0.734) -0.006 (-0.926) 0.01 (0.951) 
 ̂       
 
0.001 (0.317) -0.002 (-0.507) -0.011 (-2.643)
 a 
 ̂       
 
-0.003 (-1.135) -0.002 (-0.632) 0.009 (1.33) 
 ̂       
 
0.005 (0.942) 0.002 (0.435) -0.002 (-0.234) 
       
  -14.467 (-4.882)
a -16.418 (-4.671) a -17.006 (-4.584) a -21.503 (-3.665)
 a 
       
  -2.844 (-2.797) a -4.376 (2.629) a -3.782 (2.257)b -3.463 (-0.406) 
        -0.001 (-0.686) -0.002 (-1.9)
 c 
           -0.004 (-2.304) a 0.001 (1.581) 
        -0.004 (-3.239) a 0.001 (-0.927) 
         -0.001 (-2.36) a -0.001 (-2.194) 
            -0.078 (-2.295) 
       0.009 (1.903)
 c 
         0.037 (3.275)
 a 
              -0.008 (-1.865)
 c 
  ⁄     0.224 (1.647) 
      -0.013 (-0.047) 
            -0.002 (-5.699)
 a 
          -0.006 (-0.674) 
Mean R2 30.00% 43.31% 50.00% 72.31% 
Median R2 22.00% 40.29% 46.00% 72.53% 
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Table 3.8:  Recap of the relationships between CEF premiums and their determinants  
This table reports a recap of all expected relationships and our findings between premiums and their determinants.  ̂       
, ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a long CEF 
and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;        
  and        
  are the auto-correlation-
adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the returns of a long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i  in month t-1 when the 
dummy variable D takes the value of 1 for positive price changes in month t-1 and the value 0 for negative price changes in 
month t-1 for CEF i, respectively;        is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-
factor model regression for CEF i in month t-1;           is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in month t-1;  
      is the weight of cash and cash equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;         is the weight of 
bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;         is the ratio of total assets minus total common equity to total assets in 
CEF i in month t-1;     is the difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in month t-1;       
is the conditional alpha for CEF i in month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1:             is 
the natural log of the market value of CEF i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t-1;    is the 
dividend yield of CEF i in month t-1;          is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1; and        is the tenure 
of the manager of CEF i in month t-1.  
 Premium 
 Expected Sign Reasoning Findings 
 ̂       -/+ 
Arbitrage risk 
Insignificant 
 ̂       -/+ - 
 ̂       -/+ Insignificant 
 ̂       -/+ Insignificant 
        - - 
       
  - - 
       
  - +/ Insignificant 
      - Uncertainty - 
         -/+ Uncertainty/cost Insignificant 
      - 
Cost to  the arbitrage 
position 
- 
       - - 
         - - 
    + Liquidity benefit + 
      + Managerial benefit + 
           - 
Transaction cost 
- 
  ⁄  + + 
   + Transaction cost/Signaling Insignificant 
         - Managerial cost - 








Table 3.9:. Determinants of changes in closed-end fund (CEF) premiums based on monthly Fama-
MacBeth cross-sectional regressions using Ivol net 
This table reports the mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the premium for CEF i in month t 
given by: 
                  ̂                  ̂                    ̂            
      ̂                              
                         
                          
                                                                     
                                       (           )       (       ⁄ )             
                                          
 ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a 
long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;        
  and        
  are the auto-
correlation-adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the returns of a long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i  in month t-1 
when the dummy variable D takes the value of 1 for positive price changes in month t-1 and the value 0 for negative price 
changes in month t-1 for CEF i, respectively;         is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model regression for CEF i in month t-1;          is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in 
month t-1;       is the weight of cash and cash equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;        is the 
weight of bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;         is the ratio of total assets minus total common equity to 
total assets in CEF i in month t-1;      is the difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in 
month t-1;       is the conditional alpha for CEF i in month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1;  
           is the natural log of the market value of CEF i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t-
1;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in month t-1;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1; and        is 
the tenure of the manager of CEF i in month t-1. The reported coefficients are the means of the cross-sectional regression 
coefficients. The standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted for autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). The t-values are 
reported in the parentheses. a, b and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   0.002 (0.643) 0.001 (0.635) -0.004 (-0.941) -0.016 (-1.844)
c 
 ̂       
 
-0.003 (-1.091) 0.004 (2.328) a -0.002 (-0.82) 
 ̂       
 
0.002 (0.486) -0.009 (-3.617) a -0.011 (-1.803)
c 
 ̂       
 
-0.001 (-0.409) 0.004 (2.189)b 0.003 (1.612) 
 ̂       
 
0 .001 (0.054) 0.011 (5.465)a 0.002 (0.502) 
       
  -1.106 (-3.796)a -1.126 (-2.756) a -24.008 (-14.912) a -7.409 (-6.62)
 a 
       
  0.270  (0.984) 0.405 (1.085) 0.269 (1.549) 0.919 (1.415) 
      
 
 -0.002 (-4.331)
 a -0.001 (-0.796) 
         
 
 0.009 (85.851)
 a 0.001  (1.041) 
      
 
 0.001  (-4.232)
 a -0.001 (-2.82)
 a 
       
 
 0.001  (0.995) 
0.001  (-0.055) 
         
 
 0.023 (3.327)
 a 0.019 (1.534) 
    
 
 0.006 (3.156)
 a 0.003 (1.403) 
      
  
0.001  (0.014) 0.006 (1.334) 
           
   
0.002 (1.295) 




0.101  (1.792)c 
   
   
-0.014 (-0.384) 
         
   
0.001  (1.038) 
       
   
-0.004 (-2.059) b 
Mean R2 10.73% 30.20% 54.95% 68.56% 




Table 3.10: Determinants of CEF premiums based on monthly Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional 
regressions using lagged arbitrage risk measures over the sub-period 2006-2010 
This table reports the mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the discount for CEF i in month t 
given by: 
                 ̂                  ̂                    ̂            
      ̂                          
                       
                        
                                                                     
                                       (           )       (       ⁄ )             
                                                                           
 ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a 
long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;        
  and        
  are the auto-
correlation-adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the returns of a long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i  in month t-1 
when the dummy variable D takes the value of 1 for positive price changes in month t-1 and the value 0 for negative price 
changes in month t-1 for CEF i, respectively;         is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model regression for CEF i in month t-1;           is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in 
month t-1;       is the weight of cash and cash equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;        is the 
weight of bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;          is the ratio of total assets minus total common equity to 
total assets in CEF i in month t-1;      is the difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in 
month t-1;       is the conditional alpha for CEF i in month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1; 
            is the log of the market value of CEF i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t-1;   
is the dividend yield of CEF i in month t-1;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1;        is the tenure 
of the manager of CEF i in month t-1;       is the value of a stock being utilized for securities lending against total value of 
inventory available for lending in month t-1; and        is number of stocks shorted by CEF i in month t-1. The reported 
coefficients are the means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted 
for autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). The t-values are reported in the parentheses. a, b and c represent significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
   -0.060 (-2.825)
a -0.091 (-2.541) a -0.093 (-2.254) b -0.020 (-0.519) 
 ̂       -0.012 (-2.498)
 a 
 
-0.016 (-2.613)a -0.002 (-0.084) 
 ̂       -0.007 (-1.96)
b 
 
-0.006 (-1.724) -0.006 (-1.763)c 
 ̂       0.001 (-0.004) 
 
-0.001 (-0.262) 0.005 (0.343) 
 ̂       0.003 (1.148) 
 
0.002 (0.627) 0.009 (1.195) 
       
  -13.770 (-4.841) a -13.136 (-3.772) a -13.625 (-4.070) a -23.296 (-2.682) a 
       
  1.087 (3.378) a 0.506 (2.684)a 0.567 (2.115) 3.318 (1.788)c 
       
  
-0.001 (-0.389) 
          
  
0.001 (0.406) 
       
  
-0.001 (-1.678)c 
        
  
-0.001 (-1.827)c 
          
  
-0.062 (-0.716) 
     
  
0.009 (1.695)c 
       
  
0.028 (0.901) 
            
  
-0.008 (-2.597) a 
  ⁄   
  
0.277 (0.732) 
    
  
0.095 (0.507) 
          
  
-0.002 (-0.389) 
        
  
-0.006 (-0.659) 
       0.000 (-0.782) 0.000 (-0.456) 0.001 (0.389) 
        0.001 (1.223) 0.001 (1.293) 0.001 (0.389) 
Mean R2 28.77% 25.75% 34.73% 75.92% 
Median R2 26.26% 21.32% 34.40% 76.37% 
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Table 3.11: Sentiment-adjusted determinants of closed-end fund (CEF) discounts based on monthly 
Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions using lagged Ivol net 
 
This table reports the mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the discount for CEF i in month t 
given by: 
                 ̂            
       ̂            
       ̂            
       ̂            
               
  
               
                   
                
                 
                    
  
              
                 
         (           
 )       (       
 ⁄ )              
                    
 
                 
       
The superscript   refers to the residuals obtained from running the determinant series on three sentiment indicators 
[University of Michigan Household Sentiment Index (UMSI), The Chicago Fed National Activity Index (CFNAI) and the 
policy Uncertainty Index (PUI)], two macroeconomic indicators [corporate spread is the difference between AAA bonds and 
default-free government bonds, and the term structure is the difference between the ten year constant yield on US treasuries 
and 3-month yield on T-bills], and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) measure of aggregate liquidity.  
 ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a 
long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;         is the auto-correlation-
adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the daily returns of the net returns on an arbitrage position for  CEF i in month t-1; 
      is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model regression for CEF i in 
month t-1;           is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in month t-1;        is the weight of cash and cash 
equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;        is the weight of bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-
1;          is the ratio of total assets minus total common equity to total assets in CEF i in month t-1;     is the difference 
in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in month t-1;       is the conditional alpha for CEF i in 
month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1;             is the natural log of the market value of 
CEF i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the price of CEF i in month t-1;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in month t-1; 
         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1; and        is the tenure of the manager of CEF i in month t-1. 
The reported coefficients are the means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The standard errors used in the t-tests 
are adjusted for autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). The t-values are reported in the parentheses. a, b and c represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
 Regressions 
 (1) (2) 
   -0.009 (-0.427) 0.501 (13.914)
 a 
        0.018 (3.284)
a 0.016 (0.931) 
        -0.019 (-4.777)
 a 0.017 (1.578) 
        0.011 (3.682)
 a -0.01 (-2.296)b 
        0.038 (5.887)
 a 0.003 (0.156) 
        -7.510 (-4.854)
 a -6.033 (-8.874) a 
      0 (-0.019) -0.006 (-3.243)a 
         0.007 (5.592) a 0.138 (26.461) a 
      -0.002 (-5.26)a -0.001 (-2.656) a 
       -0.001 (-1.436) -0.001 (-1.827) b 
         -0.164 (-3.571) a -0.091 (-2.265)b 
    0.072 (7.006)a 0.001 (0.426) 
      0.003 (0.316) 0.104 (10.063) a 
           
 
-0.071 (-13.537) a 
  ⁄  
 
-0.677 (-5.227) a 
   
 
1.268 (7.168)a 
         
 
0.001 (-0.477) 
       
 
-0.100 (-11.941)a 
Mean R2 39.00% 56.00% 




Table 3.12: Relationship between closed-end fund (CEF) premiums and an alternative measure of 
arbitrage risk  
 
This table reports the mean coefficients of Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions for the premium of CEF i 
in month t given by: 
                                                                               
                                                                     (           )  
     (       ⁄ )                                                        
         is the difference between the weighted-average, auto-correlation-adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of 
the daily returns on the stocks held by CEF i in month t-1 and CEF i’s auto-correlation-adjusted idiosyncratic 
return volatility in month t-1;       is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model regression for CEF i in month t-1;           is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in 
month t-1;        is the weight of cash and cash equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;  
       is the weight of bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;          is the ratio of total assets 
minus total common equity to total assets in CEF i in month t-1;     is the difference in the amortized spreads 
between CEF i  and its asset holdings in month t-1;       is the conditional alpha for CEF i in month t-1 based 
on the returns for the 60 months including month t-1;            is the natural log of the market value of CEF 
i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t-1;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in month 
t-1;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1; and        is the tenure of the manager of CEF 
i in month t-1. The reported coefficients are the means of the cross-sectional regression coefficients. The 
standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted for autocorrelation as in Pontiff (1996). The t-values are reported 
in the parentheses. a, b and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
Variable 
Regression 
(1) (2) (3) 
   -0.015 (-1.09) -0.021 (-1.62)
  0.193 (4.70) 
      -7.546 (-6.67)a -6.184 (-5.71)a -5.085 (-5.68) a 
      
 
-0.003 (-3.04)a -0.002(-1.31) 
         
 
0.026 (0.68) -0.029(-9.48) a 
      
 
-0.003 (-1.72)c -0.002(-2.01) 
       -0.001 (-1.436) -0.001 (-1.827) b 
           -0.103 (-2.69) a 
    
  
0.255 (1.35) 
        0.047 (1.98)b 
           
  
0.153 (0.52) 
  ⁄  
  
-0.036 (-2.79) a 
   0.069 (0.45) 
           0.008 (0.63) 
         -0.002 (-3.76) a 
Mean    8.88% 14.75% 54.25% 




Table 3.13:. Dynamic GMM panel regression of CEF premium 
This table reports the coefficients of Dynamic GMM panel regression for the premium CEF i in month t given by: 
                                                                                                   
                                                                                    
                                                         (           )       (       ⁄ )
                                                       
 ̂       , ̂      ,   ̂      , and  ̂      are estimated factor loadings of the 4-factor Carhart model of the net returns of a 
long CEF and short NAVPS position for CEF i based on the daily return in month t-1;         is the auto-correlation-
adjusted idiosyncratic volatilities of the daily returns of the net returns on an arbitrage position for  CEF i in month t-1; 
      is the idiosyncratic skewness of the daily residuals from the Carhart (1997) four-factor model regression for CEF i in 
month t-1;           is the weight of options in CEF i’s portfolio in month t-1;        is the weight of cash and cash 
equivalent assets in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-1;        is the weight of bonds in the portfolio of CEF i in month t-
1;          is the ratio of total assets minus total common equity to total assets in CEF i in month t-1;      is the 
difference in the amortized spreads between CEF i  and its asset holdings in month t-1;      is the conditional alpha for 
CEF i in month t-1 based on the returns for the 60 months prior to month t;             is the natural log of the market 
value of CEF i in month t-1;   ⁄  is the inverse of the  price of CEF i in month t-1;    is the dividend yield of CEF i in 
month t-1;         is the management fees of CEF i in month t-1; and        is the tenure of the manager of CEF i in 
month t-1. The standard errors used in the t-tests are adjusted for autocorrelation and herterosckedasticity (HAC). The t-
values are reported in the parentheses. a, b and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 Regressions 
 (1) (2) (3) 
           0.896 (40.431)
a 0.859 (24.589) a 0.796 (14.27) a 
        0.001 (1.178) 0.001 (0.96) 0.003 (1.349) 
        0.001 (-0.823) 0.001 (-0.465) -0.001 (-1.717)
c 
        0.001 (1.625) 0.001 (2.097)
 b 0.001 (0.347) 
        0.001 (1.656) 0.001 (0.827) 0.001 (1.020) 
        -0.374 (-3.94)
 a -0.254 (-1.903) -1.045 (-3.613) a 
       0.011 (0.414) 0.01 (1.011) 
          0.001 (-1.023) 0.001 (-0.432) 
       0.001 (-0.618) 0.001 (1.020) 
        -0.001 (-2.915)a -0.001 (-2.772) 
           -0.058 (-2.370) b 
      0.003 (3.739) a 
        0.001 (0.191) 
             -0.008 (-2.297)b 
  ⁄    -0.338 (-2.901) a 
     -0.122 (-1.593) 
           -0.005 (-1.950)c 
         0.001 (0.043) 
Mean R2 65.43% 68.04% 71.59% 










Table 4.1: Descriptive statistics for the rumor database 
This table reports the number of rumored target firms over the sample period (2004-2011) categorized by year, initial rumor to announcement day (AD), and type of rumors.  
 
 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 Total 
Number of firms 158 164 220 236 258 409 369 436 2250 
Firms with announcements 87 89 108 114 125 184 176 172 1055 
Firms with an effective date of a M&A 67 59 63 65 64 63 64 46 491 
M&A AD within 70 days of the rumor 29 30 33 30 37 34 47 32 272 
M&A  AD within 1 year of the rumor 39 37 49 40 47 48 59 42 361 
More-credible rumors:          
    Insider cited 64 64 44 30 49 48 18 34 351 
    Confirmed by target 27 18 17 11 10 2 17 12 114 
    Analyst is source 82 47 90 112 72 79 52 76 610 
    Target has a financial advisor 27 30 32 24 46 37 23 48 267 
    Initiated by target 38 45 33 41 65 66 35 70 393 
Less-credible rumors 26 33 60 71 90 246 272 275 1073 
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Table 4.2: Summary statistics for the M&A rumored target firms 
This table reports the summary statistics of the M&A rumored sample of target firms categorized by type of rumor and the percentages of M&A announcements within 70 
days and one year of the initial M&A rumor. % of announcement is the probability of an announcement within 70 days and one year of the date of the rumor release date. % 
M&A completed is the probability that the M&A will be completed. The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics testing the null hypothesis: Pr(M&A Announcement 






  where  ̂  is the probability of a actual M&A 
being completed or just an announcement for the more-credible rumored sample,  ̂  is the probability of a M&A or an announcement for the less-credible rumored sample,  ̂ 
is the estimate of the common proportion under the null hypothesis calculated as  ̂                   ⁄   and           are the number of rumors in the more- and 





# of Announcements within # of 
completed 
M&A 
% of Announcements within % of 
completed 
M&A 70 days One year 70 days One year 













Less-credible rumors 1073 95 126 172 8.85% 11.74% 16.03% 












































































Table 4.3: Cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and Long stock-short market strategy around rumor announcement dates 
This table reports the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) and the abnormal returns for the long-short strategy for rumored target firms over different event windows. CAR 
is calculated using the Carhart 4-factor model, and the long-short strategy consists of buying the rumored firm and selling the market portfolio. Difference is obtained by 
subtracting the CAR or BHAR for the less-credible rumors minus it corresponding value for the more-credible rumors. The event windows are [-1; +1], [-1; +5], [-5; +5] and 
[+1; +70]. The coefficients of the Carhart model are estimated over an estimation window of [-125; -5]. T-values, which are shown in the parentheses, are computed from 




Window All More-credible Less-credible Difference 
CAR 






 1.04% (2.52) 






 1.11% (2.16) 






 1.12% (2.24) 
[+1; +70] -1.73% (-1.891) 0.06% (0.053) -3.45% (-2.477)
 a
 -3.51% (1.899) 
N 
 
2250 1177 1073   
BHAR 






 1.10% (2.75) 






 1.54% (3.11) 






 1.90% (3.54) 




 0.31% (0.908) -1.66% (2.307) 
N  2250 1177 1073  
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Table 4.4: The change in the ratio of idiosyncratic to total volatility around the rumor announcement date 
 
This table reports the changes in the ratios of idiosyncratic to total volatilities where the ratio is calculated as:                   
           ⁄         is the intraday beta 
calculated as the covariance between stock i and the market index using returns based on 25 minute intraday intervals.       and       are the realized daily intraday 
volatilities for stock i and the market, respectively. The change in the ratio of idiosyncratic to total volatility is obtained from a regression of the daily ratios on a dummy 
variable for each of the eleven days centered on the rumor announcement date and an intercept representing the pre- and post-rumor period averages. The average estimation 
period is 120 days before and 20 days after the rumor announcement date.   Event day 0 is the rumor announcement date. T-values, which are shown in the parentheses, are 
computed from (HAC) standard errors. The columns labeled 5% and 95% represent the 5% and 95% percentiles of the change in the IV ratio for every event date. a, b and c 
represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
  
 
All Rumors More-credible Rumors Less-credible Rumors Differences 
 
Mean t-value 5% 95% Mean t-value 5% 95% Mean t-value 5% 95% Mean t-stat 
-5 0.18% (0.425) -0.63% 0.98% 0.52% (1.117) -0.39% 1.44% 0.28% (0.613) -0.61% 1.16% -0.24% (-3.850)a 
-4 0.22% (0.557) -0.55% 0.99% 1.43% (3.274) a 0.57% 2.28% 0.08% (0.168) -0.80% 0.95% -1.35% (-41.043) a 
-3 0.81% (1.931)c -0.01% 1.63% 0.85% (1.827)c -0.06% 1.76% 1.21% (2.633) a 0.31% 2.11% 0.36% (35.960) a 
-2 1.35% (3.331)a 0.55% 2.14% 1.17% (2.574) a 0.28% 2.07% 1.46% (3.298) a 0.59% 2.34% 0.29% (37.559 ) a 
-1 1.79% (4.391)a 0.99% 2.59% 1.93% (4.170) a 1.02% 2.85% 2.44% (5.509) a 1.57% 3.31% 0.51% (18.147) a 
0 5.28% (13.07) a 4.49% 6.07% 4.36% (9.607) a 3.47% 5.25% 6.36% (14.291) a 5.48% 7.23% 2.00% (24.973) a 
1 3.13% (7.587) a 2.32% 3.94% 2.88% (6.193) a 1.97% 3.79% 3.00% (6.622) a 2.11% 3.89% 0.12% (0.436) 
2 2.04% (4.882) a 1.22% 2.85% 1.71% (3.614) a 0.78% 2.64% 2.01% (4.43) a 1.12% 2.89% 0.30% (2.373) a 
3 1.79% (4.502) a 1.01% 2.57% 1.99% (4.343) 1.09% 2.89% 1.27% (2.876) a 0.40% 2.14% -0.72% (-12.449) a 
4 1.50% (3.765) a 0.72% 2.28% 0.80% (1.731)c  -0.11% 1.72% 1.94% (4.468) a 1.09% 2.79% 1.14% (25.505) a 
5 1.70% (4.233) a 0.91% 2.49% 1.23% (2.791) a 0.37% 2.10% 1.09% (2.392) a 0.20% 1.98% -0.14% (-4.537) a 





Table 4.5: Cross-sectional regressions of CAR on the IV ratios and control variables for more-credible 
rumored firms 
This table reports the results of regressions on the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) using the Carhart (1997) 
model and BHAR using a buy and hold strategy consisting of buying the rumored firm and selling the S&P500 
index. The dependent variables are the IV ratio, BE/ME and LOGSIZE. IV ratio is calculated as            
       
           ⁄         is the intraday beta calculated as the covariance between stock i and the market index 
using returns for 25 minutes intraday intervals.       and       are the realized daily intraday volatilities for 
stock i and the market respectively. The change in the ratio of idiosyncratic to total volatility is obtained from a 
regression of daily ratios on a dummy variable for each of the eleven days around the rumor date and an 
intercept representing the pre- and post-rumor period average. The average estimation period is 120 days before 
and 20 days after the rumor. The BE/ME ratio is calculated as the book value as of the fiscal year ending in 
calendar year t-1 divided by the market value in December t-1.  The market value is the price of the stock 
multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. LOGSIZE is the log of the market value of the firm. t -statistics, 
which are shown in the parentheses, are computed from (HAC) standard errors. a, b and c represent significance 
at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively.  
 
Windows [-1; +1] [-1; +5] [-5; +5] [1; +70] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cumulative Abnormal return (CAR) 
Intercept 
0.021 -0.007 0.023 0.009 0.021 -0.009 -0.003 0.042 
(3.314)a (-0.395) (2.544)b (0.377) (2.025)b (-0.312) (-0.146) (0.594) 
IV ratio 
0.060 0.053 0.084 0.075 0.108 0.105 0.050 0.048 



































Adj. R2 0.96% 3.38% 0.96% 1.67% 1.27% 1.98% 0.05% 0.24% 
N 1177 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Intercept 
0.024 -0.006 0.026 0.015 0.026 0.002 0.008 0.013 
(3.694)a (-0.343) (2.744)a (0.596) (2.468)b (0.049) (0.489) (0.260) 
IV ratio 
0.059 0.051 0.071 0.060 0.089 0.081 0.143 0.132 








































Table 4.6:  Cross-sectional regression of CAR on IV ratio and control variables for less-credible 
rumored firms 
This table reports the results of regressions on the cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) using Carhart (1997) 
model and the buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) on a strategy consisting of buying the rumored firm and 
selling the S&P500 index. The independent variables are the IV ratio, BE/ME and LOGSIZE. IV ratio is 
calculated as                   
           ⁄         is the intraday beta calculated as the covariance between 
stock i and market index using returns for 25 minute intraday intervals.       and       are the realized daily 
intraday volatilities for stock i and market respectively. The change in the ratio of idiosyncratic to total volatility 
is obtained from a regression of the daily ratios on dummy variables for each of the eleven days around the 
rumor date and an intercept representing the pre- and post-rumor period average. The average estimation period 
is 120 days before and 20 days after the rumor. The BE/ME ratio is calculated as the book value as of the fiscal 
year ending in calendar year t-1 divided by the market value in December t-1.  The market value is the price of 
the stock multiplied by the number of outstanding shares. Ln(size) is the log of the market value of the firm. t -
statistics, which are shown in the parentheses, are computed from (HAC) standard errors. a, b and c represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
Interval [-1; +1] [-1; +5] [-5; +5] [1; +70] 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) 
Intercept 
0.035 0.013 0.034 0.025 0.030 -0.006 -0.036 0.072 
(4.873)a (1.041) (3.685)a (1.439) (2.612)a (-0.223) (-1.066) (1.082) 
IV ratio 
-0.053 -0.055 -0.078 -0.081 -0.070 -0.068 0.178 0.154 



































Adj. R2 0.95% 3.12% 0.99% 1.43% 0.46% 1.54% 0.38% 1.28% 
N 1073 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) 
 (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) 
Intercept 
0.041 0.022 0.042 0.038 0.043 0.004 0.002 0.126 
(5.448)a (1.619) (4.614)a (2.142)b (3.605)a (0.146) (0.082) (2.249) 
IV ratio 
-0.070 -0.073 -0.099 -0.107 -0.094 -0.096 0.144 0.095 








































Table 4.7: Correlation matrix 
This table reports the correlation matrix of implied market probabilities, IV ratios and other control variables. 
Market implied probability of a M&A is calculated as            where       is the markup around the 
M&A announcement day, and   is the run-up calculated as the CAR over the period between the initial rumor 
date and the M&A announcement day. The IV ratio is calculated as                   
           ⁄         is the 
intraday beta calculated as the covariance between stock i and the market index using returns measured over 25 
minute intraday intervals.       and       are the realized daily intraday volatilities for stock i and the market 
respectively. The change in the ratio of idiosyncratic to total volatility is obtained from a regression of the daily 
ratios on a dummy variable for each of the eleven days around the rumor date and an intercept representing the 
pre- and post-rumor period average. The average estimation period is 120 days before and 20 days after the 
rumor.        is the number of days between the rumor date and the M&A announcement date,         is the 
number of  rumors appearing between the initial rumor and M&A announcement dates,     is the book to 
market ratio calculated as of the last available book value and last end of year market value,           is the 
natural logarithm of the market value of the target firm 41 days before the initial rumor date,           is the 
number of analysts following the target firm,      is the coefficient of variation of the last I/B/E/S summary  
estimates,            is the last I/B/E/S consensus estimate for long-term growth reported before the rumor is 
public. Firm-specific error (Firm Misval.) is the component of m/b ratio that capture the firm relative mispricing 
versus its industry peers calculated as       (         ), where        is the natural log of the firm value 
(market-to-book ratio or M/B) and   (         ) is the value of the firm estimated using accounting data      and 
sensitivities      estimated using industry j data in year t. Time-series industry error (Ind. Misval.) is the 
component of M/B that captures the level of mispricing of an industry versus its historical average. It is 
calculated as  (         )            , where             is the long-term value of the firm according to its sector 
average over the 10 year period preceding year t. The number reported in each parentheses is the p-value of the 




Prob.                                                   
Misval. 
Firm Ind. 
        
0.230          
(0.083)c          
         
-0.023 -0.137 
      
  
(0.861) (0.078)c 
      
  
       
-0.016 0.009 0.048 
     
  
(0.906) (0.907) (0.479) 
     
  
         
0.005 -0.029 0.251 0.067 
    
  
(0.969) (0.709) (0.000)a (0.328) 
    
  
     
-0.051 0.040 0.044 -0.018 -0.259 
   
  
(0.705) (0.724) (0.662) (0.854) (0.008)a 
   
  
           
0.117 -0.071 -0.051 0.091 -0.006 -0.074 
  
  
(0.380) (0.392) (0.479) (0.208) (0.936) (0.482) 
  
  
      
0.135 0.044 -0.087 -0.116 0.020 0.036 0.393 
 
  
(0.314) (0.594) (0.232) (0.111) (0.787) (0.738) (0.000)a 
 
  
           
-0.054 0.006 -0.092 -0.066 0.010 -0.049 0.007 0.150   
(0.687) (0.939) (0.204) (0.364) (0.893) (0.641) (0.921) (0.039)b   
Firm misval. 
0.015 0.043 0.066 0.150 -0.247 -0.005 -0.089 -0.029 -0.214  
(0.909) (0.751) (0.623) (0.260) (0.061)b (0.968) (0.508) (0.831) (0.107)  
Ind misval. 
0.018 -0.037 0.138 0.084 0.146 -0.037 -0.056 -0.013 -0.088 -0.627 
(0.895) (0.783) (0.302) (0.531) (0.274) (0.782) (0.675) (0.924) (0.513) (0.000)a 
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Table 4.8: Summary results for cross-sectional regressions of market-implied probabilities on IV ratios 
and control variables 
This table reports the summary results of cross-sectional regressions of the implied market probabilities 
calculated as            where       is the markup around the M&A announcement day, and   is the run-
up calculated as the CAR over the period between the initial rumor date and the M&A announcement day. IV 
ratio is calculated as                   
           ⁄         is the intraday beta calculated as the covariance 
between stock i and the market index based on returns for 25 minute intraday intervals.       and       are the 
realized daily intraday volatilities for stock i and the market respectively. The change in the ratio of 
idiosyncratic to total volatility is obtained from a regression of the daily ratios on a dummy variable for each of 
the eleven days around the rumor date and an intercept representing the pre- and post-rumor period average. The 
average estimation period is 120 days before and 20 days after the M&A rumor.        is the number of days 
between the M&A rumor date and the M&A announcement date,         is the number of  rumors appearing 
between the initial M&A rumor and the M&A announcement date,     is the book to market calculated as of 
the last available book value and last end of year market value,           is the natural logarithm of the market 
value of the target firm 41 days before the initial M&A rumor date,           is the number of analysts 
following the target firm,      is the coefficient of variation of the last I/B/E/S summary  estimates, and 
           is the last I/B/E/S consensus estimate for long-term growth reported before the M&A rumor is 
made public. t-values, which are reported in the parentheses, are computed from (HAC) standard errors. a, b and 
c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
C 
-0.852 0.110 -0.193 -3.059 -0.988 -0.070 -0.268 -3.141 
(-0.514) (0.046) (-0.010) (-0.143) (-0.593) (-0.029) (-0.014) (-0.145) 
        
9.738 9.791 17.429 20.730 









           
       
         
    
12.319 12.221 18.053 21.897 










       
      
          
    
7.168 7.279 16.845 19.533 
    
(1.290) (1.278) (1.521) (1.441) 
      
 
-0.006 -0.007 -0.013 
 
-0.006 -0.007 -0.013 
 
(-0.653) (-0.396) (-0.599) 
 
(-0.587) (-0.393) (-0.604) 
        
 
-0.006 0.277 0.468 
 
-0.023 0.264 0.440 
 
(-0.014) (0.334) (0.439) 
 
(-0.057) (0.314) (0.405) 

















          
   
-0.240 
   
-0.249 
   
(-0.878) 
   
(-0.891) 
     
   
5.486 
   
5.621 
   
(0.835) 
   
(0.844) 
          
   
0.431 
   
0.426 
   
(0.835) 




 (%) 2.57 2.85 4.88 9.24 3.13 3.36 4.90 9.31 
N 233 233 175 157 233 233 175 157 
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Table 4.9. Summary results for within industry cross-sectional regressions of market firm value on accounting variables for all firms in CRSP and COMPUSTAT   
This table reports summary results for cross-sectional estimations of :                                 |  |                  |  |                                for 
firm i and time t, where     is the natural log of book value,    |  |    is the natural log of the absolute value of net income,       is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 
when net income is positive and zero otherwise, and        is the leverage ratio.          are the  sensitivities of firm values to the accounting variables in industry j in year t. 
The choice of industries follows the Fama-French 12 industries as detailed on the website of Kenneth French. The reported estimated coefficients are industry specific 
averages of yearly cross-sectional estimates over the period 1990-2011. The numbers reported in the parentheses are t-statistics calculated using Fama-MacBeth (1973) 
standard errors.   ̅̅̅̅  is an average adjusted R-square for every industry,  ̅ is the average number of companies used in the cross-sectional regressions. a, b and c represent 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 Fama-French 12 Industries 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
      2.114 1.842 1.803 1.980 2.055 2.501 2.621 1.514 2.044 2.428 1.520 2.466 
(27.945)a (16.144)a (21.254)a (15.643)a (25.643)a (25.563)a (21.240)a (4.604)a (26.847)a (38.853)a (12.983)a (33.416)a 
      0.590 0.624 0.631 0.681 0.557 0.650 0.513 0.714 0.618 0.584 0.606 0.573 
(37.362)a (23.909)a (52.353)a (38.207)a (25.804)a (60.885)a (30.214)a (17.716)a (43.332)a (70.765)a (44.289)a (36.615)a 
      0.415 0.362 0.355 0.254 0.441 0.332 0.358 0.243 0.363 0.389 0.345 0.396 
(26.389)a (15.384)a (38.941)a (15.831)a (23.041)a (33.874)a (23.577)a (6.716)a (25.421)a (55.349)a (28.299)a (27.342)a 
      0.345 0.360 0.344 0.262 0.375 0.252 0.384 0.302 0.291 0.286 0.227 0.243 
(23.621)a (17.274)a (31.986)a (18.413)a (17.284)a (19.890)a (29.800)a (7.669)a (23.266)a (27.069)a (17.946)a (11.536)a 
      -0.040 0.045 0.043 0.019 0.042 -0.187 0.028 0.152 0.023 -0.062 0.347 -0.059 
(-2.477)a (2.069)b (2.821)a (1.197) (2.014)b (-7.612)a (0.734) (2.209)b (1.378) (-3.206)a (19.761)a (-3.250)a 
  ̅̅̅̅  88.26% 89.47% 87.36% 89.28% 89.43% 85.41% 83.28% 92.33% 87.54% 81.79% 82.81% 82.93% 





Table 4.10: Summary results for cross-sectional regressions of market-implied probabilities on IV ratios 
and control variables 
This table reports the summary results of cross-sectional regressions of the implied-market probabilities 
calculated as            where       is the markup around the M&A announcement day, and   is the run-
up calculated as the CAR over the period between the initial rumor date and the M&A announcement day. IV 
ratio is calculated as                   
           ⁄         is the intraday beta calculated as the covariance 
between stock i and the market index based on returns for 25 minute intraday intervals.       and       are the 
realized daily intraday volatilities for stock i and the market respectively. The change in the ratio of 
idiosyncratic to total volatility is obtained from a regression of the daily ratios on a dummy variable for each of 
the eleven days around the initial rumor date and an intercept representing the pre- and post-rumor period 
average. The average estimation period is 120 days before and 20 days after the M&A rumor. Firm-specific 
error is the component of m/b ratio that capture the firm relative mispricing versus its industry peers calculated 
as       (         ), where        is the natural log of the firm value (market-to-book ratio or MB) and  
 (         ) is the value of the firm estimated using accounting data      and sensitivities      estimated using 
industry j date in year t. Time-series industry error is the component of M/B that captures the level of mispricing 
of an industry versus its historical average. It is calculated as  (         )            , where             is the 
long-term value of the firm according to its sector average over the 10 years preceding year t.       is the 
number of days between the M&A rumor date and the M&A announcement date,         is the number of  
rumors appearing between the initial M&A rumor and the M&A announcement date,           is the natural 
logarithm of the market value of the target firm 41 days before the initial M&A rumor date,           is the 
number of analysts following the target firm for the last IBES estimate,      is the coefficient of variation of 
the last I/B/E/S summary estimates, and            is the last I/B/E/S consensus estimate for long-term 
growth reported before the initial M&A rumor announcement. t-values, which are reported in the parentheses, 
are computed from (HAC) standard errors. a, b and c represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, 
respectively 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
C 
-1.046 -1.114 0.970 -8.237 
(-0.355) (-0.375) (0.226) (-0.464) 






(1.877) c (1.929)c 
            





              







0.201 0.217 0.219 0.794 
(0.274) (0.294) (0.296) (0.703) 
Industry sector 
misvaluation 
0.194 0.240 0.264 1.042 
(0.175) (0.213) (0.234) (0.600) 










              
0.377 
   
(0.309) 
          
   
-0.026 
   
(-0.101) 
     
   
2.057 
   
(0.398) 
          




   
(0.863) 
Adj. R2 (%) 2.83% 2.93% 3.39% 6.98% 
N 233 233 157 157 
 
